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The Joint Return Rate Structure: 
Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature of 
the Tax Law 
Amy C. Christian t 
[M]ale bias has paraded as neutrality[.] (W]omen 's 
perspectives and experiences have [routinely, some would say 
systematically,] been left out of [statutory] development and [the] 
... application [of the law] .... We have a responsibility to inform 
ourselves ... about women's lives and needs, about ways in which 
women's perspectives have been ignored or marginalized in law, 
and about ways that legal doctrines and concepts need to be 
changed. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine landing on the planet Ames, discovering that human 
life inhabits it, and that, like Earth, two things are inevitable: 
death and taxes.2 Upon learning that the Amesians have an 
income tax system, your first impulse is to examine it in the hope 
of discovering how the Amesians live, how they think, and what 
they believe. 11 In doing so, you learn the following. The 
t Associate Professor, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University; B.S.B.A., 
Georgetown University, School of Business Administration, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 
1991. I am indebted to Professors Anne L. Alstott, Susan H. Bitensky, Edward J. McCaffery, 
Robert A. McCormick, and Katherine B. Silbaugh and to Angela Lykos and Mark A. Sacks 
for reviewing prior drafts of this Article. I also wish to express my thanks to Lawrence 
DeAngelo, Gary Remer, Jeffery Dworin, and Peter Carayiannis for their able research 
assistance and to R. Daniel Barahona and Dorad. Hetrick for their encouragement. 
Special gratitude is extended to the library staff of D L at MSU, especially Michele Howard 
and Charlotte Bynum, for their invaluable assistance. 
1 Leslie Bender & Perette Lawrence, Is Tart Law Male7: Foreseeability Ana9'sis and 
Property Managers' Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313, 336-37 
(1993). 
2 
"Our new Constitution is now established, and has an appearance that promises 
permanency; but in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes." 
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Leroy (Nov. 13, 1789), reprinted in JOHN 
BARTU:IT, FAMIUAil QUOTATIONS 310 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). 
!I See generally Carolyn C. Jones, split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender 
Roles in the 1940s, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 259, 296 (1988) (asserting that tax laws "are cultural 
241 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 242 1997
242 journal of Law & Politics [Vol. XIII:241 
government pays male Amesians to marry females who do not 
work. When a female Amesian who does work marries, by law her 
income is cut. In fact, the Amesian government discourages her 
from working at all after marrying. By contrast, when a male 
marries, his income is automatically increased. Perhaps most 
astonishing of all is the phenomenon in which most female 
Amesians pay their husbands every year for the privilege of being 
married to them, even when the female earns significantly less 
than her husband. Each year at tax time, there is, in effect, a 
massive transfer of wealth from the married women in the 
population to their husbands. You are shocked and dismayed 
that a government would systematically favor men over women in 
so many respects. You conclude, based on your research into the 
Amesian tax system, that life on Ames, while interesting, cannot 
be intelligent life. Accordingly, you cancel your plans for a press 
conference to announce the existence of alien intelligent life. 
You cancel the book tour you had envisioned. With great regret 
and some financial trepidation, you also decide that you will be 
unable to join the lecture circuit. 
Later, after returning to Earth, lamenting your misfortune, and 
pondering the oddities of the Amesian tax code, you still cannot 
believe that seemingly intelligent beings would devise a tax 
system with such overt bias against females,4 one that departed so 
dramatically from neutral principles. You decide to establish 
interplanetary communications and to ask the Amesians why they 
chose a tax system with such an egregious impact on females. 
You gain access to a government satellite, transmit your inquiry to 
the Amesians, and a few weeks later, their reply arrives: "We got 
our tax system from you. It is a copy of your U.S. tax code. We 
have been watching you Americans for years. As we study your 
society, we adopt some of your more salient customs." You are 
shocked. You had believed that your country was much more 
enlightened than Ames, and accordingly, you undertake an 
examination of the U.S. tax code. Much to your horror, you 
discover that the Amesians are correct: the U.S. tax system is 
artifacts-understood as a part of a larger societal structure and, simultaneously, revealing 
of that culture"). 
4 It should be noted that the Amesians do not condone gender discrimination. In fact, 
their constitution, like that of the United States, contains an equal protection clause which 
would prohibit many gender-based laws. 
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identical to that of Ames.5 How could this be? How could the 
United States have a tax system that contains such egregious 
biases against women? Energized with indignation, you begin an 
inquiry into this travesty. 
This Article exposes and explains how the income splitting 
and income aggregation elements of the joint return tax rates 
substantially harm women in a shocking variety of ways. Not only 
do those elements contribute to behavioral patterns which 
discourage wives from working, but they participate as well in an 
annual coerced transfer of wealth from women to men. 
Furthermore, the self-reinforcing incentive of the rate structure 
to induce joint, rather than separate, filing locks women into 
these highly injurious patterns. The compound effect of the 
variety of problems the joint return rates impose on women 
renders the current rate structure dramatically unjust. 
As our visitor to Ames has discovered, law is not always neutral. 
Law is powerful and authoritative, in part, because it appears to be 
objective. "[M] embers of the legal profession [have continually 
tried] to effectuate a sharp separation between law and politics, so 
that law appears as a neutral, nonpolitical, transcendent entity, 
symbolized in the phrase a government of laws rather than men. "6 Yet, 
such separation, although desired, is frequently more imagined 
than real. As one feature of an imperfect society, law not only 
reflects long-standing social inequalities but may also exacerbate 
them. Legal scholars have identified many respects in which the 
law is male. 7 That is, the hidden norm in the law is consistent 
5This fact is not surprising given that Ames is in a parallel universe and is, in fact, the 
sister planet to Earth. The country in which your space ship landed, in fact, is identical in 
all relevant respects to the United States. 
6 G. Edward White, Transfurming History in the Postmodem Era, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 
1316 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)). 
7 See, e.g., CATHARINE A MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODinED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
(1987); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 837-43 (1990) 
(describing the process of "asking the woman question" to identifY male bias in the law); 
Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature cf 
Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending 
Equality Theory: A Way out of the Maternity and the Work~ce Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 
(f986) [hereinafter Finley, Transcending Equality T ]; Martha Minow, The Supreme 
Court, 1986 Term~oreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. . REV. 10 (1987); Symposium, Is 
the Law Male7, 69CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293 (1993) (containing articles in which hidden gender 
bias is uncovered in the areas of tort law, family Jaw, rape Jaw, and the Jaw of expert 
witnesses); Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Fenunist 
Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEYWOMEN'sLJ. 64,72-77 (1985). 
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with male experiences and treats those experiences as neutral. To 
the extent women's experiences differ from those of men, those 
experiences are often not accounted for within prevailing legal 
doctrines and discourses. 
What is true for law generally is also true for tax law in 
particular. Tax law is especially prone to hidden biases because it 
has not been subjected to as much critical scrutiny as have other 
legal disciplines. 8 It has not been analyzed for gender or racial 
bias to the same extent that constitutional law, employment law, 
criminal law, and even tort law have been, for example. 9 Not until 
the 1970's did scholars begin identifying as gendered certain 
aspects of the tax code. 10 More recently, studies have emerged 
8 See Jones, supra note 3, at 26o.6I (describing and criticizing this "tendency in 
[classical] tax scholarship to view the tax system as a virtually self-contained world," 
separate from socially created roles). 
9 See, e.~., Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 4I STAN. L. REV. I (I988); Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the 
StnJggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's 
Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (I989); Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist 
Torts Scholarship, 78CoRNELL L. REV. 575 (I993); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts 
on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848; Leslie 
Bender, Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J Soc. PoL'Y & L. 115 
(1994); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Contextualizing the Debate: How Fmunist and Critical Race 
Scholm-ship Can Infom& the Teaching of Employment Discrimination Law, 44J. LEGAL Eouc. 366 
(1994); Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Permeation of Race, National Origin and Gender Issues from 
Initial Law Enforcement Contact Through Sentencing: The Need for Sensitivity, Equalitarianism 
and Vigilance in the Criminal Justice System, 31 AM. CRJM. L. REV. 1153 (1994); Martha 
Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort 
Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV. 73 (I994); Martha Chamallas & 
Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MicH. L. REV. 814 
(1990); Colloquy, "Feminist Jurisprudence"-The 1990 Myra BradweU DO"} Panel, 1 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 5 (I991); Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Crimanal Law Defenses, 85 
J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80 (1994); Lucinda M. Finley, A BTMir. in the Silence: Including 
Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989) [hereinafter Finley, A 
BTMir. in the Silence]; Lucinda M. Finley, &:.-Blind, Separate but El(ual, or Anti-Subordination1 
The Uneasy Legacy ofPlessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discnmination, 12 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. I089 (1996); Finley, Transcending Equalit'j Theory, sura note 7; Thomas Koenig & 
Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice an Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. I 
(I995 ); Jean C. Love, Discriminatory speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. f23 (1990); Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist 
Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, IO CONSf. COMMENT. 319 (I993); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 215I (1995); Malinda 
L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032 (I996); Symposium, supra note 7 (identifying gender bias in tort 
law, family law, criminal law, and the law of experts); Carl Tobias, The Case for a Feminist 
Torts Casebook, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1517 (1993); Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women: Gender 
and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870.1920, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 369 (1994). See generally 
Sylvia A Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, I31 U. PA. L. REV. 
I249 (I983); Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal Scholarship: A 
Bibliography, 77 IOWAL. REV. 8-., (1991). 
10 See Grace Blumberg, Se:cism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income TtJJ<ation rf 
Won\ing Hives and Mothers, 21 Bun. L. REV. 49 (197I); George Cooper, Working Hives and 
the TtJJC Law, 25 RtrrGERS L. REV. 67 (1970). 
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which examine the Code's impact along racial lines and upon 
same-sex couples. 11 
While neutral on their face, joint return tax rates have a 
substantially biased effect against women in their application. 
For a variety of reasons, seemingly neutral tax principles 
consistently disadvantage women more than men and, therefore, 
lack real neutrality. While the Code may not have been intended to 
discriminate against women,12 it has that effect because of its 
application to larger, preexisting social patterns. Such patterns 
include the tendency for husbands to earn more than their wives 
and result from both voluntary practices, like wives opting to work 
part-time or only at unpaid labor, and from involuntary factors, 
including wage discrimination. While the tax laws did not cause 
patterns of wage disparity, they reinforce and exacerbate those 
patterns.13 Consulting the social context in which law operates 
11 Literature discussing the impact of taxation along racial Jines is currently in its 
infancy. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Maniage Bonus/Penalty in Black and 1-Wiite, in TAXING 
AMERICA 45-57 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (discussing how the 
marriage penalty tends to harm Mrican-Americans more often than white Americans); 
Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. 
L. REV. 751; john a. powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policies Have Racially 
Segregated America, in TAXING AMERICA 80-115 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 
1996). 
This Article does not attempt to examine the impact of joint return taxation specifically 
with regard to people of color or to examine the effect of its lack of availability to same-sex 
couples. Because the earning patterns among Mrican-American men and women may 
differ from those of the population generally, the patterns of bias described in this Article 
may be different for African-Americans than for other couples. Similarly, other types of 
problems that arise for same-sex couples are not described here. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, 
Sa"tM--Se:c Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAw & SEXUALITY. REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL 
IssuES 97 (19!H); Adam Chase, Tax Planning for SaJM-Sex Couples, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 359 
(1995); Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried 
Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1240 (1980). 
12 Some evidence of intentional discrimination does exist, however. Tax policy experts 
knew that automatic income splitting would have the effect of keeping women in the home 
and out of the work force. For a more detailed explanation of this phenomenon, see infra 
notes 131-34 and accompanying text. Other evidence of intentional discrimination 
included the fact that Congress enacted automatic income splitting despite contemporary 
opposition from women's groups who argued that income should not be split for tax 
computation purposes without an actual transfer of that income to the noneammg spouse. 
See jones, supra note 3, at 295 (referring to supporters of the Gearhart proposal who 
opposed automatic income splitting). For further explanation of this problem see infra 
notes 135-60 and accompanying text. Furthermore, some scholars have speculated that 
Congress adopted automatic income splitting in 1948, in part, because of pressure from 
male constituents intent on avoiding the institution of community property regimes in their 
states and the concomitant loss of full ownership in their earnings. See m.fra note 339 and 
accompanying text. 
13 See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Slauching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, 
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE LJ. 595, 602-03 (1993) [hereinafter McCaffery, 
Slauching Towards Equality] (presenting a model illustrating how the tax system as a whole 
contributes to and compounds preexisting discrimination); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation 
and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 
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has long been an accepted method for analyzing whether the law 
is biased as applied. 14 Similarly, the social reality in which the tax 
laws function must be scrutinized to determine whether those tax 
laws operate in a biased fashion.15 
The purpose of this Article is to identify various aspects of the 
U.S. joint return rate structure that contain gender bias and to 
critique that current rate structure in the hope of inspiring 
further debate regarding the sources of bias and their possible 
solutions and in the hope that such bias will eventually be 
eliminated. Critics might argue that the tax laws should not be 
used to combat societal discrimination. 16 However, to the extent 
tax law participates in, facilitates, or reinforces the subordination 
of women, then reforming the tax laws to redress those problems 
is appropriate. Even critics of using the tax code to address social 
policy would probably agree that the tax laws should not further 
or contribute to social injustice. Moreover, society has already 
sanctioned the use of taxation to effectuate social policy in other 
areas, such as encouraging charitable contributions by making 
I035-46 (I993) [hereinafter McCaffery, Fresh Look] (arguing that structural "aspects [of the 
tax Jaws] persist to this da~, serving as an anchor against the emergence of more modern 
and flexible family models ) , id. at 988. 
14 See Bender & Lawrence, supra note I; Chamallas, supra note 9, at 79-84; Denno, 
supra note 9, at I42-5I; Koenig & Rustad, supra note 9, at 8-13; Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Foreword: The Meaning of Gender Equality in Criminal Law, 85 j. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I 
(I994); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is the Law Male1: Let Me Count the Ways, 69CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
397 (I993); Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 2I55-57; Mary Coombs, Putting Women First, 93 
MICH. L. REV. I686 (I995) (reviewing KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT 
(I994)). CJ Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 40I U.S. 424 (I971) (taking social disparities into 
account for purposes of determining the existence of employment discrimination by 
conferring acceptance on disparate impact analysis). 
15 See Brown, supra note 11, at 45, 49-54 (using sociological data regarding spouses' 
relative incomes to argue that black couples are more likely to experience marriage tax 
penalties and white couples are more likely to experience marriage tax bonuses); Jones, 
supra note 3, at 261-62 (arguing that one must understand social patterns to understand tax 
Jaws); William A. Klein, Tax Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support, 45 TAX L. REV. 259, 259 
n.4 (1990) ("while the tax rules are on their {ace gender neutral, in their practical 
application they are not"); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note I3, at 897, 993, 1009-10, 1023, 
I034, I054, I059 (noting, in various contexts, that even if tax rules are neutral on their face, 
it is appropriate to examine how they apply in the social context, and that in evaluating tax 
Jaws, considering social context is crucial); McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, supra 
note I3, at 6I7, 619, 644 (noting that tax Jaws must be considered in the context of how they 
interact with real-world wage structures to determine their real impact); powell, supra note 
II, at 80, 83-92 (discussing the impact of tax subsidies to homeowners in a country m which 
home ownership is highly correlated with race). 
16 See, e.g., James Edward Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the Horse and the 
Carriag&-'But Let There be spaces in Y01lr Togetherness,' 67 TAX NOTEs 539, 548, 550.51 (I995) 
(arguing that it is inappropnate to use the tax Jaw to regulate social relationships and that 
the sole purpose of the tax system should be to raise revenue). 
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them deductible. 17 For the tax code to promote social goals 
openly in some respects, but avoid them in areas in which bias is 
found is not only inconsistent and hypocritical but also allows 
such bias to continue unabated. Those who argue that the only 
legitimate function of the tax system is to raise revenue fail to 
recognize that no tax system is socially neutral. Even a tax system 
designed only with revenue raising in mind will tend to promote 
certain social behaviors over others. 18 Therefore, the argument 
against using tax laws to effectuate social policy ignores the fact 
that the current structure already has social consequences. 
Retaining the status quo is merely a decision to promote currently 
favored social patterns, not a decision to insulate tax from social 
policy. 
Part II of this Article undertakes a history of the two 
components that generate the joint return rate structure: 
automatic income splitting19 and income aggregation.ID 
Following an explanation of the evolution and purposes of those 
concepts and how they function, Part ill identifies their general 
distributional and behavioral effects. In particular, I analyze 
which types of couples benefit and which types are harmed from 
income splitting and aggregation.21 I will show that income 
splitting and aggregation treat couples in which the spouses' 
incomes diverge much differently from couples in which spouses 
have similar incomes. I review the impact of aggregation on the 
effective tax rate of the family's secondary earner22 and note its 
effect on that secondary earner's decision of whether or not to 
participate in the paid labor force. Furthermore, I address the 
previously unexamined distributional question of who benefits 
and who is harmed by income splitting and aggregation as 
17 I.R.C. § 170 (1996) (providing a deduction for contributions to charitable 
organizations to encourage charitable donations). 
18 See Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon Tax: The Introduction of the Carbon-Bmned 
Tax (CBT), 10 UCLAJ. ENvrL L. & PoL'Y 221, 224-25 (1992); Laura Ann Davis, Note, A 
Feminist justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197, 232 
(1988) (stating that no tax system can be value neutral). 
19 See infra notes 46-75 and accompanying text. 
2l See infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 98-125 and accompanying text. 
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between the two spouses.l5 I will argue that compared to the rates 
applicable to separately filing spouses, the joint return rates 
operate frequently to benefit one spouse over the other. 
In Part IV I illustrate how the distributional and behavioral 
effects of income splitting and aggregation that are described in 
Part III are of particular concern to women. Because income 
splitting and aggregation combine to reward couples in which 
one spouse earns significantly more than the other and to punish 
those in which spousal earnings are similar, joint returns are 
thought to reinforce traditional gender roles in which the 
husband works and the wife does not. They certainly reward 
couples who comply with conventional roles in which one 
spouse, historically the husband, works and the other serves as a 
homemaker, and they harm couples who depart from that 
traditional norm.24 This pattern, sometimes described in 
literature discussing the marriage bonus and penalty,25 is thought 
to induce a behavioral response: to discourage wives from 
entering or remaining in the paid labor force. I explain how 
income splitting has this effect,~ and I outline previous 
scholarship discussing the impact of aggregation on the 
secondary earner's marginal tax rate and the resulting behavioral 
effects. v 
Part IV also notes the incongruity of allowing income to be 
shifted to the nonearning spouse for beneficial tax computation 
purposes without requiring that it be transferred for ownership 
purposes as well. 28 This feature of joint return filing is an 
aberration because it remains unavailable to related taxpayers 
who are not spouses. Income should not be treated as shared 
unless it is actually shared, and automatic income splitting 
violates this norm. 
Tax discourse has tended to focus on the contrasting tax 
l5 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 127-M, 161-63 and accompanying text. 
25 Income splitting and aggregation combine to exacerbate the marriage penalty for 
two-earner couples while creating a marriage benefit or bonus for one-earner couples. See 
infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text. 
~See infra notes 131-M and accompanying text. 
<JJ See infra notes 164-227 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 135-60 and accompanying text. 
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liabilities of single and married taxpayers, and on the resulting 
behavioral incentives regarding the decision to marry.2l Because 
many non-tax reasons exist for marrying, most people eventually 
marry despite the marriage penalty. !!0 Furthermore, tax-motivated 
divorces are probably quite rare. si Consequently, more couples 
are likely to face the issue of whether to file jointly or separately 
than will face the issue of whether to file jointly or to divorce and 
file as single individuals. Although many commentators have 
addressed the issues of the marriage penalty and bonus by 
contrasting single and joint rates, I believe an examination of the 
separate return versus the joint return would be more relevant to 
the majority of married couples. Once married, spouses typically 
consider the question of whether to file jointly or separately, not 
whether they should divorce to lower their tax bill. Therefore, 
this Article focuses to a great extent on the choice spouses face 
between filing jointly and filing separately. Part N outlines the 
behavioral effects of the rate differences between joint and 
2l See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Inco7114 Taxation and the Fami!-J, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 
(1975); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor an Allocating Income Tax 
Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8 (1980) (arguing that total tax should not change upon 
marriage); David S. Hulse, Alternatives for Eliminating the Marriage Penalty, 66 TAX NOTEs 
251, 252 (1995); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Incom4-Sharing, 
and the joint Inco7114 Tax Return, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 6!1 (199!1); McCaffery, Fresh Loolc, supra note 
1!1; Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Inco7114 Tax, 67 S. CAL L. REV. !1!19 (1994). Set~ also 
Tax Treat7114nt of Mmried, Head of Household, and Single Taxpayers: Hearings Before the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 1 (1980); Economic Problems o{Wo7114n: Hearings Before 
the Joint Economic Comm., 9!1d Cong., 221-87, 6()4..()9 (197!1-1914) [hereinafter Economic 
Problems of Wo1Mn]; U.S. DEP'TOFTilEASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 102-07, 172-76 
(1977); Z. I. GIRALDO, TAX POLICY AND TilE DUAL-INCOME FAMILY: THE "MAiwAGE TAX" AND 
OTHER INEQUITIES (Ctr. for the Study of the Family and the State Policy Paper No. !1, 1978). 
!!0 Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2011 (1996) (discussing the difficulty of determining the impact of the 
marriage penalty on actual behavior and noting that existing empirical evidence suggests 
that the marriage penalty probably does not discourage marriage in most cases). 
!liThe effect of the marriage penalty on the marriage decision is unproven. See Toni 
Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Ti1114: Marital Status as a Tax 
Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 77!1, 787 n.59 (1989) (noting that it is unclear to what extent the 
marriage penalty influences couples either to divorce or not to marry); Zelenak, supra note 
29, at !164-65 (noting that in most cases whether the marriage ~natty has an effect is 
uncertain but acknowledging that it may indeed discourage fow-mcome taxpayers from 
marrying); Contract with Am4rica: Hearings Before the Howe Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th 
Cong. 85, 86 (1995) (statement of Anne L. Alstott, Professor of Law, Columbia University 
School of Law), reprinted in 66 TAX NoTES 1!14!1, 1!144 (1995) [hereinafter Contract with 
America Hearings]. lJut see Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1!182 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that the transaction doctrine could apply to a tax-motivated divorce and remarriage); 
McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 1!1, at 617-18 (suggestin~ that among low-
income couples, the marriage penalty may indeed discourage marr1age because the 
alternative of marrying and having one earner may be economically unfeasible); AU Things 
Considered: Nation's Wealthy Loolt for Ways to Avoid Tax Hilte (National Public Radio 
broadcast, Aug. 15, 199!1) [hereinafter AU Things Considered] (interviewing Robert Willard, 
financial planner, who described one couple considering a tax-motivated divorce). 
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separate returns: that is, it describes the incentives to file jointly 
rather than separately that are built into the rates. !12 
The literature examining joint tax rates has also tended to 
focus on their behavioral incentives: how they favor one-earner 
couples over two-earner couples, thereby discouraging women 
from working. !1!1 In addition to examining these behavioral 
incentives arising out of the joint and separate rates, M this Article 
focuses on an aspect of the joint return rates that has been 
neglected in the tax literature until now: the important 
distributional question of who within the marriage benefits 
economically from the decision to file jointly rather than 
separately. !!6 In examining this long-neglected issue, this Article 
identifies a previously unrecognized distributional inequity with 
serious gender consequences. Because of the manner in which 
joint return rates relate to separate rates and because the rates 
apply in a society in which husbands tend to earn more than their 
wives and in which real sharing of resources between spouses is 
frequently limited, filing jointly rather than separately tends to 
benefit husbands and to harm their wives. Essentially, the 
decision to file jointly rather than separately may result in a 
transfer of wealth from the lower-income wife to her higher-
income husband. Tax law is inadequate in that to avoid this 
result, it relie~ on voluntary spousal sharing of resources even 
though such sharing between spouses is often absent. 
In demonstrating the gender bias resulting from the 
application of the joint tax rates, Part IV identifies two ways in 
which the joint return rate structure operates to reinforce the 
status quo, almost guaranteeing both a perpetuation of wives' 
economic inferiority to their husbands, and the continued biased 
application of the tax code.~ While Professor McCaffery has 
described other means by which tax contributes to a self-
!12 See infra notes 228-!15 and accompanying text 
l!8 See supra note 29. 
M See infra notes 228-!15 and accompanying text 
!!6 See infra notes 2!16-!185 and accompanying text. 
~ q. supra note 1!1, infra note 219 and accompanying text (illustrating in related 
contexts how tax law perpetuates bias). 
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perpetuating pattern of gender bias,~ no literature to date has 
discussed the following examples of self-reinforcing bias. First, 
when spouses' incomes differ, a compelling financial incentive 
arises for them to file jointly rather than separately. Once they 
file jointly, aggregation reduces the incentive for the wife to 
participate in the paid labor market. This behavioral incentive 
triggers further disparity in spousal incomes, thereby inducing 
further joint filing. In this respect the joint return rate structure 
is self-reinforcing, tending to maintain the conditions which 
lead to joint returns: gainfully employed husbands and wives with 
diminished financial security. This pattern is unlikely ever to 
lead to the use of separate returns in which the wife would no 
longer be discouraged from working. !!8 
Second, the fact that divergent spousal incomes induce joint 
filing also perpetuates bias in that the disparity in spouses' 
incomes triggers the incentive to file jointly. Joint filing, in turn, 
lowers the tax of the higher-income husband and increases that 
of his lower-income wife relative to separate filing. Through the 
operation of the joint return rates as they apply in the social 
setting, the disparity in spousal incomes essentially results in a 
transfer of wealth from the poorer wife to her richer husband.~ 
Moreover, the greater the disparity in incomes, the larger the 
transfer from the wife to her husband. 40 Such systematic transfers 
operate to keep money out of women's hands and to perpetuate 
the economic superiority of men over women. Consequently, 
through the operation of the joint return rates, a disparity in 
incomes functions to perpetuate economic inequality. 
Because joint filing harms women by discouraging them from 
working and by requiring them to transfer their relatively scarce 
resources to their wealthier husbands, Part IV concludes by 
identifying and discussing a previously unexamined conflict that 
~See McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 615-24 (describing how 
women's shorter average job persistence than men's induces firms .to lower women's wages, 
rendering women secondary earners, and that income aggregation found in the tax code 
compounds this problem, giving women further reason to flee the work force, thereby 
shortening their persistence on the job); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1013 
(describing the tendency of the pension and social security systems to protect and, 
therefore, to encourage non-working wives). 
!!8 See infra Part IV. C. I. 
~See infra notes 268-77 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 274-78 and accompanying text. 
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women face: the conflict between filing separately to further 
their own best interests and filing jointly to serve the best 
interests of the marital unit. 41 This is a conflict which husbands 
largely do not face when choosing a filing status. 
Given the participation of the tax code in reinforcing and 
perpetuating gender bias, tax reform is an appropriate means for 
advancing justice. Accordingly, Part V briefly outlines various 
proposals for tax reform that have been proffered in academic 
circles as potential means of eliminating gendered effects of the 
joint return rate structure. 42 
Part VI concludes this Article by summarizing the themes that 
emerge from it and then by briefly acknowledging the more 
general issue of whether tax reforms designed to address current 
patterns of gender bias would serve women's interests. Having 
demonstrated that the joint return rate structure systematically 
harms women's economic status both distributionally, by 
requiring them effectively to transfer resources to their husbands, 
and behaviorally, by discouraging them from working, an 
appropriate remedy might be to institute tax policies which 
encourage women to enter the paid work force. In doing so, tax 
policy would put more economic resources at women's disposal. 
Before such a proposal is implemented, however, scholars should 
examine whether or not women would benefit from increased 
labor force participation. Although a thorough analysis of that 
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, Part VI briefly examines 
whether women would be served or harmed by tax incentives that 
encourage women to enter the paid labor force in greater 
numbers. It examines the question of what direction tax reform 
should take by asking what reforms would really serve women's 
best interests. Tax scholars interested in advancing women's 
interests have almost uniformly ignored this issue, assuming that 
those interests would be advanced only through policies designed 
to increase women's paid labor participation. 43 Among tax 
41 See infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 406-50 and accompanying text. 
43 Set: Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: HousetJ.JOTk and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. I, 47 (1996) (arguing that if unpaid labor were appropriately rewarded, tax scholars' 
conventional academic stance that women's interests are served only through increased 
labor force participation would be unnecessary); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 
GEO. LJ. 1571,1572 (1996). 
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scholars, only Professors Alstott and Staudt have explicitly 
questioned the assumption that increased work force 
participation is the best avenue to improved social status.44 Many 
scholars in the area of feminist jurisprudence have, by contrast, 
explicitly acknowledged this issue and have struggled with it for 
years. In Part VI, I briefly review the literature relevant to this 
issue and tentatively conclude that eradicating the disincentives 
to work that are contained in the tax code would be appropriate 
but that reforms affirmatively encouraging women's increased 
labor force participation should not be adopted without further 
research. 45 
This Article is, therefore, primarily a critique of the joint 
return rate structure. It explores the gendered impact that joint 
return rates have both with respect to different types of couples, 
one-earner versus two-earner, and with respect to different 
spouses within a couple, the higher-earning husband and the 
lower-earning wife. The issues of women's economic 
independence and access to the labor force that arise upon 
examining the gendered features of the joint return tax structure 
lead to the question of whether or not greater access to the paid 
work force would really benefit women. Accordingly, this Article 
briefly acknowledges that issue as well. 
II. n-IE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INCOME SPLITTING AND 
INCOME AGGREGATION 
An understanding of the separate elements of income splitting 
and income aggregation and their historical developments is 
necessary to grasp the structure of the joint return tax rates and to 
comprehend the biased patterns which the current rate structure 
induces. 
A Income Splitting 
Income shifting provides a potential financial benefit 
whenever different tax rates apply to different taxpayers. Under 
the progressive U.S. tax rates, such a possibility is present: the 
44 See Alstott, supra note 30 (describing conflicting feminist goals); Staudt, supra note 
43. 
45 See infra notes 451-81 and accompanying text. 
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higher a taxpayer's taxable income, the greater the marginal tax 
rate on the last dollar of income earned and the higher the 
effective tax rate on income overall. 46 Thus, a high-income 
taxpayer can obtain a tax savings by shifting income to a low-
income taxpayer, preferably one with whom the high-income 
taxpayer shares resources.47 The shifted income would, 
consequently, be subject to tax at a lower marginal rate rather 
than at that of the higher-income earner, and if the two taxpayers 
share resources, that "shifted" income would, simultaneously, 
remain available for the earner's enjoyment. 48 
The IRS, Congress, and the courts have viewed income shifting 
46 Many rationales have been advanced in defense of progressivity, each meeting varying 
degrees of acceptance. First, it is argued that progressivity results in payments 
commensurate with the benefits that the government has provided. See Walter J. Blum & 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case fur Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L REV. 417, 451-55 
(1952). It has also been defended on the grounds of equality of sacrifice, ability to pay, and 
redistribution of wealth. See id. at 455-79, 48~, 486-501. Progressivity has been defended 
on feminist grounds as well. See Maljorie E. Kornhauser, The Rheturic of the Anti-Progressive 
Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 504-23 (1987). 
However, progressivity has been attacked on the grounds that it is inequitable, that it lacks 
simplicity, that it subverts fiscal responsibility, and that it engenders uncertainty. See 2 ADAM 
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 825-28 (Roy H. 
Campbell & Andrew S. Skinner eds., The Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith, Oxford University Press 1976). Current arguments against 
progressivity focus on fiscal irresponsibility, see DAVID G. DAVIES, UNITED STATES TAXES AND 
TAXPOLICY 16-18 (1986), harm to market efficiency, see id. at 16-17, the presumption that 
income and wealth are manifestations of merit, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 21-25 (1985 ), and the preference for individual autonomy over government 
control, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169-72 (1974). A complete 
discussion of whether or not progressive tax rates are justified is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
-r1 See BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. McMAHoN, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDMDUALS 34-1 to 34-2 (2d ed. 1995);JAMES f. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 263-64 (7th ed. 1991); GRAETZ, supra note 46, at 456; 
Bittker, supra note 29, at 1394 n.6. 
48 In general, the tax savings equals the amount of income shifted multiplied by the 
difference in the marginal rates. If a significant amount of income is shifted so that the 
higher earner's top bracket is completely emptied and the income from the next highest 
bracket is also shifted, then the total tax savings equals the sum of two amounts: the 
amount of income from the highest bracket multiplied by the difference between the low 
earner's marginal rate and the high earner's top marginal rate plus the amount of income 
shifted from the earner's second-highest bracket multiplied by the difference between that 
second-highest marginal rate and the lower earner's marginal rate. Similarly, if shifting 
causes the lower earner to be pushed into a higher tax bracket, then the total tax savings is 
the sum of two or more amounts: the amount of income shifted into the lower earner's top 
bracket multiplied by the difference in the taxpayers' marginal rates plus the amount of 
income shifted into the lower earner's new top marginal bracket multiplied by the 
difference between the higher earner's marginal rate and the lower earner's new top 
marginal rate. 
Of course, the higher earner and the lower earner may both simultaneously move into 
new tax brackets. Consequently, the best way to determine the tax savings in any specific 
situation is to compute the combined liability of the two individuals first assuming that 
income is not shifted and then assuming that income is shifted. The two results should 
then be compared. 
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as a tax avoidance technique in situations in which the higher-
bracket earner retains effective control over the shifted income, 
and have generally prohibited taxpayers' attempts to shift 
earnings to another for tax computation purposes when they 
retain control or ownership of the earnings for purposes of 
enjoying them. 49 Income shifting has been permitted historically 
only in situations in which the high-income taxpayer surrendered 
ownership and control over the shifted income.!'() Despite the 
general prohibition against income shifting when the taxpayer 
retains earnings, joint filing permits income to be shifted without 
requiring a transfer in the ownership of those earnings. 51 The 
higher-earning spouse effectively shifts his income to the lower-
earning spouse for purposes of computing tax liability, even 
though the higher earner continues to own the "shifted" income 
and to have complete control over it under common law property 
49 See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill (1930) (earner was not permitted to shift income 
to his spouse because the earner controlled whether or not the income would be earned); 
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) (grantor was not permitted to avoid taxation by 
shifting income to a beneficiary through a transfer of income-producing property to a trust 
which grantor could revoke at any time); Helvering v. Qifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (grantor 
was not permitted to shift income to his spouse by transferring income-producing property 
to a trust and naming the spouse as a beneficiary because grantor retained significant 
control over the trust property); I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1994) (the grantor trust rules codifying 
Cliffurd and similar cases). See also I.R.C. § l(g) (1996) (the Kiddie Tax which taxes certain 
children's net unearned income at their parents' top marginal rate to preclude the tax 
savings parents might seek by shifting unearned income to their low-bracket children). 
!'()See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 
1277 (2d Cir. 1983); Broide v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1957); First Teachers 
Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 892 (1980). See also Frederick R. Schneider, 
Which Tax Unit fortheFederallncoJTUJ Tax,, 20DAYTONL. REV. 93, 106 (1994) (noting that it 
is out of the ordinary to tax income to a person who did not actually receive it); Zelenak, 
supra note 29, at 354 & n. 73. Surrendering ownership is not always sufficient to guarantee 
the tax savings from shifting, however. The Kiddie Tax under I.R.C. § I (g) prevents that tax 
savings even when ownership of the unearned income is shifted from parent to child. The 
assumption underlying the Kiddie Tax is that even if a parent transfers legal ownership of 
income-producing property to a child, the parent will essentially have control and use of 
that income, if for no other purpose, than to extinguish or to minimize his or her 
obligation to support the child. 
51 Upon filing a joint return, the rates that cause the income-shifting result are triggered 
automatically. Compare I.R.C. § 1 (a) (1994) with I.R.C. § 1 (d) (1994) (illustrating the 
different income brackets created for joint versus separate returns). s~ also Bittker, supra 
note 29, at 1394-95; Michael J. Mcintyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a 
Comprehensive and Simplified IncoJTUJ Tax, 90 HARv. L. REV 1573, 1583 (1977). The 
phenomenon of income shifting is built into those rates and occurs whether or not 
ownership or control of the shifted income is transferred to the nonearning spouse. Cf 
Zelenak, supra note 29, at 355; Lily Kahng, Gender Bias in the Estate and Gift Tax 15, 34 
(Aug. 14, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting in the estate tax 
context the unfairness of granting tax benefits as if property were transferred when the 
property is not, in fact, transferred). 
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principles. 52 
Income shifting is legally available to married taxpayers who 
file jointly. 53 In fact, married taxpayers who file jointly 
automatically get the greatest possible benefit from mcome 
52 Common-law states confer ownership of earnings solely on the earner. See Jones v. 
Farris, 69 P.2d 344 (Okla. 1937) (holding that a wife's heirs could not inherit a farm 
because it had been acquired with the husband's earnings, precluding her from having a 
vested or devisable interest in it); WILUAMj. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNJ'IYPROPER'JY LAW OF 
IDAHO 41-43 (1962) (in common·law states savings out of earnings belong to the earner 
spouse); Gann, supra note 29, at 27; Scott Greene, Comparison of the Prop~ Aspects o[ the 
Community Properly and Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their RelatJve Compatibility 
with the Current View of the Marriage Relationship and the IOghts of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 71, 83 (1979) ("Property acquired by the spouses [subject to the common.Jaw property 
system] during marriage is either his or hers, never theirs. . .. The common·law system 
rewards the spouse who is directly responsible for the acquisition of property and generally 
ignores the nonmonetary contributions of the other spouse toward that acquisition.") 
(footnote omitted); 0. Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband 
and "-'ife, 15 Moo. L. REV. 133, 135-36 (1952) (savings out of earnings belong to the earner 
spouse); Susan Westerberg Prager, Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law, in 
RETHINKINGTHE FAMILY. SoMEFEMINISTQUESJ'IONS 111, 116 (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn Yalom 
eds., 1982); Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 51 (noting that "nothing in family law requires 
couples to share their monetary income");Jeannette Anderson Winn & Marshall Winn, Till 
Death Do We Split: Married Cuupks and Smgle Persons Under the Individual Income Tax, 34 
S.C. L. REV. 829, 878 (1983); Efizabeth A Cheadle, Comment, The Development of Sharing 
Principks in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1269, 1276, 1308 n.208 
(comparing Texas, where only the earner controls his own earnings, with common-law 
states like Missouri and indicating that in common-law states, one spouse's earnings are 
shielded from the other spouse), 1312. See aLso NEB. REV. STAT.§ 42-203 (1995) (earnings 
of a married women belong solely to her). 
Even the Married Women's Property Acts, which were adopted in the last half of the 
nineteenth century and which gave wives in common law jurisdictions the right to own and 
manage their own property, did not give them any present property interest in their 
husband's earnings. "The act[] ... ignored the realism that it was the husband who was 
largely responsible for acquiring property during the marriage. The wife was left with 
hollow legal equality since she had little o~portunity to acquire property to which the 
Married Women's Property Acts could apply. Greene, supra, at 80 (footnote omitted). See 
also Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York: 
Partnership ofCo-EqualsP, 8FAM. L.Q.l69,173 (1974); MaryAnn Glendon, Is There a Future 
for Separate Property1, 8FAM. L.Q. 313', 316 (1974); Prager, supra, at 115-16. 
IRS Publication 555 establishes that for federal income tax purposes, only residents of 
the nine community property states are considered to have a present ownership interest in 
their spouses' earnmgs. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 
PUBUGATJON 555, FEDERAL TAX INFORMATION ON COMMUNJ'IY PROPERlY 2 (1996) [hereinafter 
PUBUGATJON 555]. See also Fred F. Murray, Problems of Taxation of the Income of Spouses in the 
Context of Divorce and Separation, COMMUNI'IYPROP. J., July 1987, at 20, 23. These states are 
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. See PUBUCATION 555, supra, at 1. From the perspective of the federal 
government, residents of other states do not have a present ownership interest in the 
earnings of their spouses. 
[I]n common law states, sharing principles are never legally applied until 
the end of the marriage. AI. long as the marriage continues, each spouse is 
the sole owner of his or her earnings .... Any rights of the other spouse to a 
portion of those earnings are inchoate and vest only at death or upon the 
filing of a divorce action. 
Cheadle, supra, at 1269 n.2. 
53 See supra note 51. 
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shifting.54 Income is shifted from one taxpayer to the other until 
the two taxpayers are treated as having earned exactly equal 
incomes. This regime of maximum shifting is known as income 
splitting. This name was originally derived from the fact that 
traditionally the husband earned all the family income, and, by 
filing jointly, he could "split" his income in half for purposes of 
tax computation. 55 The couple's tax liability would be computed 
as if the husband had earned half of his income and as if his wife 
had earned the other half. A large tax savings would typically 
result because of the progressive rate structure. 56 Lower marginal 
and effective rates would usually apply to the incomes of two 
people each reporting half of what one of them had actually 
earned. The total joint return tax would be computed by doubling 
the tax that a separate filer would pay on half of the couple's 
combined net taxable income.57 The net effect is that some of the 
income of the higher-earning spouse would be treated as if the 
other spouse had earned it and would be shifted into that other 
spouse's lower marginal bracket. 58 
Congress and the Treasury Department did not always permit 
income splitting between jointly filing spouses. 59 Prior to 1930 
54 See Gann, supra note 29, at 6; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 340. 
55 s. REP. No. 80-1013, pt. Vlll.A., at 19-20 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.AN. 1163, 
1187. 
56 See Davis, supra note 18, at 206; Lisa K. Edison-Smith, "If You Love Me, You'll Sign My 
Tax Return.· • Spousal]oint and Several Liability fur Federal Income Taxes and the "Innocent 
Spouse• Exuption, 181-iAMUNE L. REV. 102, 106 (1994). 
57 See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub L No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. (62 Stat. 110, 114) 
85, 92-93; S. REP. No. 80-1013, pt. Vlll.A., at 15-20 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1163, 1184-87; Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1982); Mapes v. United 
States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 965 
(N.D. Ind. 1976); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 19#8, 
61HAitv. L REV. 1097, 11()6..()7 (1948). See also Bittker, supra note 29, at 1412-13; McCaffery, 
FTUh Loolc, supra note 13, at 990; J. Timothy Philipps &: L. Bradford Braford, Even A Tax 
Collectur Should Have Some Hearl: Equitable Relief fur the Innocent spouse Under l.R. C. § 
6013(e), 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33, 38 (1987); Nancie Quick &Joseph N. DuCanto, Joint Tax 
Liability and the "Innocent Spouse• Doctrine in Common Law and Community Property 
Jurisdictions: A Review of Code Section 601J(e) and Its Progeny, Section 66, 17 FAM. L.Q. 65, 65 
(1983); Robinson &: Wenig, supra note 31, at 779; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 346. 
58 See Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent spouse Problem: ]oint and Several Liability fur 
Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43VAND. L REV. 317,369 (1990) (explaining that income 
splitting benefits couples by moving some of the higher earner's income into a lower 
bracket). 
59 See Gann, supra note 29, at 13-20 (discussing the Treasury Department's early 
positions on the splitting of community income); Douglas B. Maggs, Community Property and 
the Fedeml Income Tax, 14CAL. L REV. 351, 354-57 (1926) (same). 
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married couples generally could not split their incomes. 00 In 
1930, however, the Supreme Court altered this approach through 
its decision in Poe v. Seabom. 61 In Seaborn the Court held that 
couples living in certain community property states like 
Washington could split their incomes for purposes of computing 
their federal income tax liability. Eight months earlier in Lucas v. 
Earl, 62 the Court had denied income-splitting privileges to married 
couples in California.6.'1 The difference in Seaborn was that 
Washington state's community property laws were held to invest 
the nonearning wife with a present ownership interest in her 
husband's earnings while California's community property laws 
were not. Essentially, each time the husband in Seaborn rendered 
services, the marital community consisting of both the husband 
and the wife had, by operation of Washington's state law, earned 
income.64 The Seaborn Court adopted a legal ownership standard, 
00 This was true not only for couples residing in common law states but also for those 
living in community property states in which each spouse had a present ownership interest 
in the earnings of the other. See Murray, supra note 52, at 23. The Treasury initially denied 
income splitting to community property residents because state laws conferred on the 
husband the exclusive ri~ht to manage and control the community property. The 
Department reasoned that if only the husband could manage and control his earnings, he 
ought to be the only party taxed on those earnings. No part of them should be attributed 
and taxed to his wife in the absence of control or management powers for her. See Maggs, 
supra note 59, at 354. However, in 1920 and 1921 the Attorney General decided that 
residents of most community property states should be able to split their incomes because 
most community property jurisdictions gave each spouse a present, one half undivided 
property interest in those earnings. See 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 298 ( 1920); 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 435 
(1921). The Treasury Department followed the Attorney General's position and issued 
T.D. 3071, 3 C.B. 221 (1920) and T.D. 3138, 4 C.B. 238 (1921) which briefly permitted 
income splitting to residents of most community property states. Soon thereafter the 
government withdrew all administrative rulings on the topic, see 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 265 
(1927), and argued once again that income splitting should be denied to community 
property residents because management and control powers were conferred solely on the 
husband. For example, see Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (testing Washington state 
law) in which the Commissioner asserted this legal position and lost. 
61 282 U.S. at 115. 
62281 U.S. Ill, 111 (1930). 
6.'1 ld. at 114-15. Earl was a case involving California taxpayers. California was a 
community property state, but under the state law in effect during the tax years in question, 
the wife's interest in her husband's earnings was held not to rise to the level of a present 
ownership right. It was not until 1927 that California changed its state law sufficiently to be 
considered a community property state for federal income tax purposes. See United States 
v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931) (holding that the change in California law was effective to 
make that state a community property state for federal income tax purposes, thereby 
conferring the income-splitting benefit of Seaborn. on Californians). The 1927 changes 
provided that each spouse had "present, existing and equal interests [in the community 
property] under the management and control of the husband." 1927 Cal. Stats. 484, ch. 
265, § 16la. This provision is now codified in CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West 1996) but no 
longer limits management powers to the husband. For more in-depth analyses of Seaborn. 
and Ear~ see Bittker, supra note 29, and Gann, supra note 29. 
64 282 U.S. at 116-18. 
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whereby income would be taxed to the spouse who owned it under 
state law, and rejected the government's argument that because 
community property law conferred management and control 
powers solely on the husband, he should be the proper taxpayer 
for all of his earnings. ffi Because state property law determined 
the income owner, it also determined the proper earner for 
federal income tax purposes. 66 Ali a result, the Supreme Court 
held that the wife in Seaborn must be taxed on half of her 
husband's earnings. 67 Couples in community property 
jurisdictions began enjoying the benefit of income splitting 
under the authority of Seaborn. By contrast, residents of other 
jurisdictions could not split their incomes for tax computation 
purposes because state law did not provide the nonearning spouse 
with a present ownership interest in the other's earnings. m 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Earl and Seaborn provided 
more favorable tax computation rules for taxpayers living in 
community property states than for residents of common law 
jurisdictions where wives did not enjoy a present, vested interest 
in their husbands' earnings. m Married taxpayers living in 
community property states could generally enjoy the financial 
f6 ld. at 110-13. MaJjorie Kornhauser has suggested that the Seaborn Court should have 
adopted a management and control standard which would have precluded income splitting 
in community property states at the time. See Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 75. 
ffi See Seabum, 282 U.S. at 110 ("[t]he Commissioner concedes that the answer to the 
question [of who should be taxed on the husband's earnings] ... must be found in the 
provisions of the law of the State, as to a wife's ownership of or interest in community 
property"). See also United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 205 (1971) (state law determines 
the amount of income that is owned by the wife as community property and, therefore, the 
amount that is taxed to her); Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457 (1967) 
(acknowledging that federal estate tax liability often turns upon the character of a property 
interest under state law). 
67 282 U.S. at 118. 
ffi See Earl, 281 U.S. at 11415. 
m See Gann, supra note 29, at 1415, 16 n.56; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 
989-90; Staudt, supra note 43, at 1606-07; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 345; Davis, supra note 
18, at 201. See a&o Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1982); Mapes v. 
United States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 
965 (N.D. Ind. 1976). In common law states, as well as in certain community property 
states like California, the wife did not have a present, vested, and undivided one half interest 
in her husband's earnings. Rather, under common law, a wife's only legal interest in her 
husband's earnings was an inchoate dower or expectancy interest. The dower right was a 
life estate in some portion of the husband's pror.,erty, usually his realty, which would 
commence only upon his death provided the Wife was still living at that time. In 
community property states like Washington, by contrast, the wife had an immediate, vested, 
undivided one balf interest in her husband's earnings. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., 
THE LAworPROPEJITY69-72 (2d ed. 1993). See also Murray, supra note 52, at 23; Robinson & 
Wenig, supra note 31, at 774 n.4. 
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benefit of income splitting while residents of common law states 
could not. By 1948, Congress responded to this geographic 
disparity, partly to achieve equal tax treatment between the 
citizens of community property and common law states,70 but also 
to avert the growing movement among states to shift to 
community property regimes. 71 Congress resolved the disparity by 
enacting income splitting for all married couples who filed 
jointly regardless of their domiciliary, building the tax benefits 
into the joint return tax rates. 72 
Congress did not make this income splitting benefit available 
to couples who chose to file separately.~ Income splitting is 
available to couples residing in common law states only if they 
elect to file a joint return. However, because of the Seaborn 
decision, couples in community property states who file separately 
~See, 11.g., S. REP. No. 80-1013, pt. VIII.A, at 19 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1163, 1187 (uAdoption of these income-splitting provisions will produce substantial 
geographical equalization in the impact of the tax on individual incomes."); H. REP. No. 
80-1274, at 24 (1948). &e al.w Mapes, 576 F.2d at 899 (noting the Revenue Act of 1948 was 
originated to neutralize the effect of the ditrerent property regimes); Staudt, supra note 43, 
at 1607. 
7l SeeS. REP. No. 80-1013, pt. Vlli.A., at 18-19 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1163, 1186: 
[T]he fact which makes action at the present session imperative is the 
potential rapid extension of community property to a large number of other 
common-law States .... If the necessary action is not taken, there will be a 
flood of State legislation intended to produce the same results [as the 
income splitting allowed in community property jurisdictions pursuant to 
PO# v. Smhorn], but doing so in a manner which has most unfortunate 
consequences, not only for the taxpayers involved, but also for all the 
persons who must use or administer the property laws of the States which 
rush into the community-property system. 
Set~ also Drulcer, 697 F.2d at 48 (describing common-law states' conversions to community-
property regimes as usomething of a stampede"); Bittker, supra note 29, at 1411-12; Gann, 
supra note 29, at 24; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 65; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 
774, 777-78. 
Of course, had Congress not acted in 1948, the community property regime probably 
would have been adopte<l universally, see, e.g., Bittker, supra note 29, at 1412, and women 
might have obtained greater rroperty rights as a result, whether during marriage, upon 
divorce, or upon the husband s death. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 18, at 215. Essentially the 
incorporation of automatic income splitting into the joint return rates stemmed the earlier 
incentive states had to adopt community property laws, laws which at the time were widely 
viewed as benefiting women. Set~, 11.g., Kahng, supra note 51, at 27. See also Gann, supra 
note 29, at 16, 18 & nn.67~8 (discussing state law shifts to community property systems 
prior to 1948). 
72 SuRevenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. (62 Stat. llO, 114) 
85, 92-93; Drulcer, 697 F.2d at 48. 
~Married spouses who filed separately from 1948 through 1969 used tax rates identical 
to the rates applying to unmarried individuals. 
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enjoy the benefit of income splitting. 74 Thus, for separate filers, 
disparate treatment between community property and common-
law residents continued even after 1948. Congress eliminated 
geographic disparity for joint filers by enacting automatic income 
splitting in 1948, but in doing so, it created a new disparity, as 
demonstrated below, which adversely impacted wives. It 
sanctioned, for the first time, the shifting of income for tax 
computation purposes without requiring its transfer for 
ownership purposes. '15 
B Income Aggregation 
The burdens of income aggregation~ and of joint and several 
liability77 accompany the advantages of income splitting when a 
couple files jointly. In addition to income splitting, income 
aggregation is the other feature of the joint return rate structure 
that determines how joint return rates relate to those of separate 
returns. As I will demonstrate later in this Article, the combined 
impact of income splitting and aggregation gives rise to patterns 
in the rate structure that adversely impact ~omen. While income 
aggregation seems to reverse the impact of income splitting, it 
usually does not have that effect. This fact gives rise to the 
patterns of gender bias that are the primary focus of this Article. 
74 In Poe v. Seaborn the Supreme Court permitted income splitting to a couple that had 
filed separate, individual tax returns. The effects of state law vesting the earnings of one 
spouse m the marital community were not dependent on the filing status chosen for federal 
income tax purposes. Consequently, income splitting is mandatory in community property 
states for spouses regardless of filing status. See Beck, supra note 58, at 324 & n.19; Murray, 
supra note 52, at 21, 53, 57, 61. See alsoP UBLICATION 555, supra note 52, at 3-4 (stating that if 
spouses in community property states file separate federal returns, then each spouse must 
report half of the other spouse's earnings). In Harrold v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 625, 627 
(1954), rt:rJ'd on other grounds, 232 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1956), the Tax Court held that when 
spouses come under the jurisdiction of a community property state, that community 
property system is "not a means of splitting income which may be voluntarily chosen or 
elected to minimize taxes." Rather, each separately filing spouse is required to report half 
of the community earnings as income. ld. at 627·28. See also United States v. Mitchell, 403 
U.S. 190 (1971) (involving a taxpayer who was a resident of a community property state and 
who owed tax on half of the earnings of her spouse for tax years in which the spouses had 
filed separately); Galliher v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 760 (1974), a.ff'd, 512 F.2d 1404 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (same); Quick & DuCanto, supra note 57, at 78. Cf. Murray, supra note 52, at 53 
(stating that income splitting was not optional, but required, in commumty property states 
as a result of Seaborn). Income splitting was, therefore, required in community property 
states even if couples filed separately. 
75 See infra notes 135-60 and accompanying text. 
~ See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
77 Joint and several liability as well as the innocent spouse exception is the subject of 
another article that is currently in progress. For more detailed discussions of these topics, 
see generally Beck, supra note 58. 
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Income aggregation requires spouses' mcomes to be 
combined before tax liability is computed.78 The effect of 
aggregation in a progressive tax system is to push some of the 
combined income into a tax bracket that is higher than those 
that would have applied to the incomes separately.'l9 Total tax 
liability, therefore, increases as a result of aggregation. 
Aggregation is required only if spouses file jointly. IJl 
Although they exist simultaneously in the U.S. tax system, 
income splitting and income aggregation are, conceptually, two 
different phenomena. While Congress incorporated income 
splitting into the Internal Revenue Code in 1948,81 income 
aggregation has been a feature of joint filing ever since 1921.82 
The following examples illustrate the separate features of 
income splitting and aggregation. Prior to the adoption of 
income splitting, only the aggregation rule applied to joint filers. 
In such a regime, a couple filing jointly in which the husband 
earned $100,000 and the wife earned $40,000 would have computed 
its tax liability as if one individual had earned the aggregate, or 
$140,000.~ Because of the progressive rate structure, the 
aggregation effect associated with joint filing would have pushed 
this married couple into a much higher tax bracket than would 
78 I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994) ("if a joint rerum is made, the tax shall be computed on 
the aggregate income1. 
19 See Beck, supra note 58, at 335. See also sources cited infra note 99. 
IJl No Code provision analogous to I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) exists requmng income 
aggregation for separate filers. See Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 968 (N.D. 
Ind. 1976). 
81 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.AN. (62 Stat. llO, ll4) 85, 
92-93. 
82 Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, § 223(b) (2), 42 Stat. 227, 250 (a husband and 
wife may either file returns individually, or include "[t]he income of each ... in a single 
joint return, in which case the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income"). 
8!\Before 1948, only one rate schedule existed, one for individuals. A married couple 
was treated as one individual if it elected to use a joint return. If the spouses filed 
separately, each spouse was treated as an individual. See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1400 
("'be right of married couples to file a joint return (first recognized by statute in 1918) was 
not an exception to this individualistic bias, since the same rate schedule applied to both 
separate and joint returns, with the result that joint filings were disadvantageous except in 
unusual circumstances") (footnote omitted). See also Davis, supra note 18, at 200. 
Currently, the Internal Revenue Code contains five rate schedules: § I(a) for Married 
Individuals Filing Joint Returns and Surviving Spouses; § I(b) for Heads of Households; 
§ 1 (c) for Unmarried Individuals (Other than Surviving Spouses and Heads of 
Households); § 1 (d) for Married Individuals Filing Separate Returns; and§ I (e) for Estates 
and Trusts. I.R.C. § l(a)-(e) (1994). 
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have applied to either spouse filing individually. 84 
Had income splitting existed in the U.S. tax system in the 
absence of aggregation, the couple in the above example would 
have computed its tax liability as follows: the husband would 
compute his share of the couple's tax liability by doubling the tax 
that would result from $50,000, or half of his income. The wife 
would compute her share of the couple's tax liability by doubling 
the tax that would result from $20,000, or half of her income. The 
spouses would each enjoy the benefits of income splitting with 
regard to their individual incomes without suffering the burden 
of higher rates due to aggregation. The only aggregation would 
be that of the two spouses' individual tax liabilities to arrive at the 
couple's total liability. 
When adopting income splitting m 1948, Congress 
superimposed it on the already ex1sung requirement of income 
aggregation.16 Applying mcome splitting and mcome 
aggregation simultaneously, tax liability is computed by doubling 
the tax that is determined on one half of the couple's combined 
taxable income.86 For couples in which both spouses have 
earnings, the incomes of each are "split." Then each half is 
aggregated with half of the other spouse's income. For a couple 
in which the husband earns $100,000 and the wife earns $40,000, 
half of the husband's income, or $50,000, would be attributed to 
the wife, and half of the wife's income, or $20,000 would be 
attributed to the husband. The couple would then be taxed under 
the individual, or married filing separately, rates as if the husband 
and wife had each earned $70,000. The net effect would be that 
$30,000 of the high-bracket husband's income would be treated as 
if his wife had earned it and would be shifted into her lower 
marginal bracket. Under the current system of joint return tax 
computation, the separate phenomena of income splitting and 
income aggregation are both present87 and are built into the joint 
84 See sources cited infra note 99. 
16 See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.AN. (62 Stat. 110, 114) 
85, 92-93 (originally codified at I.R.C. § 12(d) (1948)) (incorporating income splitting 
between spouses); Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 1, § 51(b), 53 Stat. 27 (1939) 
(originally codified at l.R.C. § 51(b) (1939)) (already containing the aggregation 
requirement). 
86 See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.AN. (62 Stat. 110, 114) 
85, 92-93; see sources cited supra note 57. 
87 See Blumberg, supra note 10, at 52. 
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return rate structure. 
It would be inequitable, in the present system, to permit the 
benefits of income splitting without exacting the burden of 
aggregation. For computation purposes, the current tax system 
treats married couples who file jointly as one economic unit, as 
one taxpayer. Through income aggregation, that one taxpayer 
reports both sources of income and moves into a higher tax 
bracket. However, the tax brackets rise half as quickly relative to 
the rate schedule for married couples who file separately to allow 
for what is, in effect, income splitting. 88 If Congress were to 
repeal aggregation but leave income splitting in place, the 
brackets would rise slowly, benefiting joint filers, but in the 
absence of aggregation, the lower tax rates would apply to smaller 
levels of income. Congress would have essentially flattened the 
progressive rate structure for couples filing jointly while leaving 
rates relatively steep for all other taxpayers. A less progressive rate 
schedule for only one filing status, Married Filing Jointly, would 
further encourage married couples to file jointly rather than 
separately, and would subject even more couples to the regime of 
joint and several liability. 
It is tempting to regard income splitting as simply reversing 
the harm that aggregation causes in requiring higher rates to 
apply to the couple's combined income. This view is generally 
true for couples in which spouses have similar incomes. For 
couples in which spouses have equal incomes the income-
splitting benefit exactly offsets the harm from aggregation and 
makes them generally indifferent between filing jointly and filing 
separately.ffi However, for couples in which spouses have disparate 
incomes, that is, for couples in which one spouse earns more 
than the other, the joint return benefit of income splitting always 
outweighs the concomitant harm from aggregation.00 
88 Compare the brackets contained in § 1 (a) for married taxpayers filing jointly with 
those of§ l(d) for married taxpayers filing separately. See also Kornhauser, supra note 29, 
at 94n.97. 
ffi See Beck, supra note 58, at 374 n.267. 
00 See infra Table 2 and accompanying text. 
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ffi. DISTRIBUTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF jOINT FlUNG: 
PATTERNS THAT EMERGE FROM INCOME SPLIITING AND 
AGGREGATION 
A Distributi(JTUll Effects Relo.ting to the Distribution of Earnings Between 
spouses and Concomitant Behavioral Responses 
1. Distributional and Behavioral Effects of Income Splitting 
Income splitting is most beneficial to couples in which one 
spouse earns significantly more than the other.91 Where the 
incomes of a husband and a wife are similar, little benefit results 
from shifting one's earnings to the other because both spouses 
are already in the same or a similar tax bracket. !fl Income 
splitting could not effectively shift income of either spouse into a 
much lower tax bracket. On the other hand, spouses with 
substantially different income levels enjoy a significant economic 
benefit from income splitting because they are likely to fall in 
different tax brackets. 9S In such circumstances, the different 
marginal rates allow the higher-earning spouse to shift income 
from a high marginal rate to the lower rate of the other spouse. 
The greater the disparity in incomes, the greater the financial 
benefit from income splitting and the greater the incentive to file 
jointly. 94 Income splitting, therefore, encourages highly disparate 
incomes, that is, patterns in which one spouse works and the 
other does not.!li 
91 See johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 965 (N.D. Ind 1976). See also Beck, 
supra note 58, at ~74; Blumberg, supra note 10, at 55-56 (noting that income splitting is a 
benefit to couples with only one wage earner); Cooper, supra note 10, at 68-69; Gann, supra 
note 29, at ~5 n.122; Zelenak, supra note 29, at ~()..41 (noting that the one-earner couple 
experiences a marriage bonus because of the benefit of income splitting). 
!fl See Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898 (Ct a. 1978). See also Beck, supra note 
58, at ~69. ~74 n.267 (implying that similar-income couples do not experience savings from 
income splitting by stating that spouses with substantially disproportionate incomes benefit 
from it). Cf. Zelenak, supra note 29, at ~0 (noting that equal-income couples experience a 
marriage penalty because of the fact that income splitting confers no value on them). 
9S See johnson, 422 F. Supp. at 965; Beck, supra note 58, at ~69. 
94 See infra Table 2 and accompanying text. 
!li See infra notes 127-~ and accompanying text 
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2. Distributional and Behavioral Effects of Income 
Aggregation 
Because aggregation requires income from both spouses to be 
combined before the progressive rate schedule applies, 
aggregation pushes some of the combined income into a higher 
tax bracket than would apply otherwise.96 Consequently, 
aggregation disadvantages all couples who file jointly. At the 
same time, however, the harm from aggregation is the least severe 
for couples in which the spouses' income levels differ 
substantially. A couple in which the husband earns $100,000 and 
the wife earns $5,000 would experience limited harm from 
aggregation because the wife's $5,000 of income may not push the 
couple into a higher bracket than would apply to the husband's 
last dollar of earnings. Even if the couple moves into a higher 
bracket as a result of the additional $5,000, the extra marginal rate 
will be minimal. By contrast, if the husband and wife each earn 
$100,000, then aggregation would push a relatively large amount 
of income into a much higher tax bracket than would have 
applied in the absence of aggregation. The top marginal rate for 
$200,000 of net income would apply rather than that for $100,000, 
and the resulting total tax liability would be significantly higher. 
Income aggregation, therefore, tends to harm disparate-income 
couples only slightly and equal-income couples much more 
significantly.97 
Many tax scholars have noted that one of the most troubling 
aspects of joint filing is that aggregation causes the perceived 
secondary earner's98 first dollar of income to be taxed at the 
highest marginal rate of the primary earner rather than at the 
lower marginal rate that would have applied had the secondary 
96 See sources cited infra note 99. 
97 q. sources cited supra note 91 (discussing a similar pattern with regard to income 
splitting). 
98 The term "secondary earner" refers to the spouse whose earnings are discretionary. 
Generally, the secondary earner is the spouse who earns less. See, e.g., McCaffery, Fresh 
Loo1c, ruf!Ta note 13, at 992-94 (defining the marginal worker as "that worker whose labor 
market hours are most discretionary, or 'at the margin' to the family"); Blumberg, supra 
note 10, at 49. 
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earner filed separately.00 The following table demonstrates this 
phenomenon. 100 
TABLE 1 
Impact of the Secondary Earner's Decision to Enter or Remain in 
the Paid Labor Force 
Taxable MFJ MFSlOI Single Income(s) 
PE's 11 = $60,000 Total tax= PE's tax = $14,864 PE's tax = $14,122 
SE's 11 = $0 $12,003 SE's tax= $0 SE's tax= $0 
Total tax= $14,864 Total tax= $14,122 
PE's 11 = $60,000 Total tax= PE's tax = $14,864 PE's tax = $14,122 
SE 's TI = $30,000 $20,429 SE 's tax = $6,002 SE 's tax = $5,527 
Total tax= $20,866 Total tax= $19,649 
00 See Contract with America Hearings, supra note 31, at 85, reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES at 
1344 (statement of Professor Alstott); Bittker, supra note 29, at 1431; Blumberg, supra note 
10, at 52-53; Davis, supra note 18, at 201, 210-14; Gann, supra note 29, at 41; McCaffery, 
Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 617; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 849 
n.328 (quoting DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., GENDER jUSTICE 188-89 (1986)); Zelenak, supra note 29, 
at 365. 
100 This table is derived from the rate schedules in I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (c), and (d), 
unadjusted for inflation, for married individuals filin~ joint returns, for unmarried 
indiVIduals (single individuals), and for married individuals filing separate returns, 
respectively. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 416, 458. Taxable incomes, rather than gross incomes, are used in 
the table to avoid the complication of deduction allocation between the two spouses. 
Therefore, this table illustrates the relationships between taxable income levels and pre-
credit tax liability for joint, separate, and single filing statuses. "MFJ," "MFS," and "Single" 
refer to the filing statuses of Married Filing Jointly, Married Filing Separately, and 
Unmarried Individuals, respectively. "PE" signifies primary earner, and "SE" signifies 
secondary earner. "T1" refers to taxable income. To facilitate readability, all figures in this 
table, and in subsequent tables and examples, are rounded to the nearest dollar. Any 
computations using these figures were performed using non-rounded numbers, and the 
results were then rounded to the nearest dollar or percentage point. 
101 The tax liabilities computed for couples filing separately assume that the spouses 
reside in a common law state. If the spouses lived in a community property state, the1r total 
tax upon filing separately would equal the tax they would incur had they filed jointly 
because of the income splitting required for such separate filers under Poe v. Seaborn. See 
PUBUCATION 555, supra note 52, at ~- Furthermore, each spouse's separate return liability 
would amount to half the total separate return liability. 
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The table demonstrates the impact on tax liability of the 
secondary earner's decision to enter the work force. In both 
situations the primary earner makes a constant amount, $60,000. 
The effect of the secondary earner's decision to take a job 
paying $30,000 is to increase the couple's tax liability to $20,429. 
Had that spouse not worked outside of the home, he or she would 
have generated no taxable income, and the family's tax liability 
would have been $12,003, assuming joint filing. Therefore the 
couple owes additional tax of $8,426 as a result of the secondary 
earner taking a job paying $30,000. 102 The tax on his or her 
income would have amounted to only $6,002 had he or she filed 
separately or $5,527 had the secondary earner made $30,000 as a 
single person. The higher tax under the joint filing status results 
from the aggregation effect: the secondary earner's first dollar of 
earnings is essentially taxed in his or her spouse's highest 
bracket once that spouse's income has been split, the 28% 
bracket. Some of the low earnings of the secondary earner, which 
otherwise would have been taxed primarily at 15% but to some 
extent at 28% as well, would reach the 31% tax bracket. None of 
his or her income would be taxed in the lowest 15% bracket. The 
additional $8,426 of tax incurred as a result of the secondary 
earner's decision to work translates to an effective tax rate of 28% 
on his or her first o$30,000 of taxable income, rather than the 
effective tax rate of 20% that would have applied had he or she 
filed separately. This distributional pattern induces the 
behavioral response in some secondary earners of discouraging 
them from participating in the paid labor force.Hll 
3. Distributional and Behavioral Effects Resulting from the 
Combined Impact of Income Splitting and Aggregation 
Because income splitting alone is most beneficial to disparate-
income couples and because aggregation alone is least harmful 
to those same couples, both phenomena converge in the joint 
return to favor disparate-income couples dramatically over those 
in which the two spouses have similar earnings. The following 
table demonstrates these distributional effects. 104 It shows the tax 
102$20,429- $12,003 = $8,426. 
103 See infra notes 228-35 and accompanying text. 
104 This table is derived from the tax rate tables in I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (c), and (d). 
unadjusted for inflation. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 10~6. § 13201, 
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liabilities for various filing statuses and for various combinations 
of income between husband and wife. In each of the three 
situations the total taxable income of the couple is $120,000.Im 
TABLE2 
Tax Liabilities for Varying Combinations of Income Between 
Spouses for Couples with Identical Total Incomes 
Taxable MI'J MFS Single 
lncome(s) 
H=$60,000 Total tax= H's tax= $14,864 H's tax= $14,122 
W= $60,000 $29,729 W's tax= $14,864 W's tax= $14,122 
Same Total tax= $29,729 Total tax = $28,244 
incomes. 
H=$80,000 Total tax= H's tax= $21,564 H's tax= $20,322 
W= $40,000 $29,729 W's tax= $8,802 W's tax= $8,327 
Disparate Total tax = $30,366 Total tax = $28,649 
incomes. 
H=$120,000 Total tax= H's tax= $35,964 H's tax= $32,972 
W=O $29,729 W's tax= $0 W's tax= $0 
Very disparate Total tax = $35,964 Total tax = $32,972 
incomes. 
This table reveals a number of patterns resulting from the rate 
structure, including the behavioral incentive for most couples to 
file jointly rather than separately. The greater the income 
differences between husband and wife, the greater their financial 
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 416, 458. This table also uses taxable income as in the 
previous table. "MFJ," "MFS," and "Single" stand for the respective filing statuses of Married 
Filing jointly, Married Filing Separately, and Unmarried Individuals. 
105 The figures supplied for separate return liabilities assume each couple resides in 
one of the forty-two common-law jurisdictions. The forty-two common-law jurisdictions 
consist of the forty-<~ne states that do not employ community property regimes and the 
District of Columbia. Because Seaborn requires income splitting for separate filers living in 
community r.roperty states, separate returns for residents of those states would generate 
total tax liabilities equivalent to the tax liability under joint returns, and each spouse would 
be liable for half of the total separate return liability. See supra note I 01. 
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benefit from filing jointly rather than separately. For the couple 
in which each spouse earns $60,000, total tax liability would be 
$29,729 whether the couple files jointly or separately. This couple 
experiences no financial incentive to file jointly rather than 
separately because the spouses are in the same tax bracket and, 
consequently, derive no net benefit from income splitting. 100 
Shifting the income of one spouse into the marginal tax bracket 
of the other would generate no tax savings. Alternatively, any 
benefit resulting from income splitting has been exactly offset by 
the cost from aggregation. 
By contrast, the couple in which the husband earns $120,000 
and the wife earns nothing would have a total tax liability of 
$35,964 by filing separately versus $29,729 by filing jointly, a 
difference of over $6,200. As this example demonstrates, the 
benefit from income splitting provides a compelling financial 
incentive for this couple to elect joint filing status over separate 
returns,107 and outweighs the smaller or, in this example, the 
nonexistent harm arising from income aggregation. 
The greater the difference between the spouses' incomes, the 
more valuable is the benefit from income splitting and the 
smaller is the harm from income aggregation.11l! Thus, a large 
income disparity between husband and wife triggers a strong 
financial inducement to file jointly. 109 Professor Boris Bittker, 
writing in a world in which disparate incomes prevailed, 
acknowledged that the income-splitting benefits of joint returns 
make an offer "that [cannot] ... be refused" and that joint returns, 
while elective as a technical matter, are "mandatory in fact. "110 As 
the disparity in incomes decreases, that is, as the incomes of 
husbands and wives approach each other, the benefit from 
income splitting decreases and the harm from aggregation 
increases, and consequently, the advantage from filing jointly 
diminishes. At somewhat disparate incomes, the income 
splitting benefit exceeds the harm from aggregation only 
106 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
10'7 Su Gann, supra note 29, at 35 n.122. 
111! Su supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
109 Su Gann, supra note 29, at 35 n.122. 
110 Bittker, supra note 29, at 1409 n.55. See also Beck, supra note 58, at 372 ('The tax 
system is designed almost to force married persons to file jointly rather than separately."). 
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moderately, and the married couple is slightly better off by filing 
jointly than separately. For example, the couple in which the 
husband earns $80,000 while the wife earns $40,000 faces a tax 
liability of $30,366 filing separately versus a liability of $29,729 
filing jointly. When the husband and wife have equal incomes, 
the spouses no longer have any economic incentive to file jointly. 
As described above, they may file separately without financial 
penalty. However, as long as incomes are disparate, a financial 
incentive will induce spouses to elect joint return status. 111 It will 
later be shown that this behavioral incentive for couples to file 
jointly rather than separately essentially locks women into the 
patterns that exist in the joint rate structure even though those 
patterns significantly disadvantage women. 
Although the vast majority of couples file jointly, some do file 
separately.n2 Based on the above analysis, it is difficult to 
understand why any married couple would ever elect the separate 
filing status. Separate returns have, at times, been advantageous 
"with respect to such matters as the limit on the capital loss 
deduction, medical expenses, charitable contributions, and the 
matching of long-term and short-term capital gains and losses. "m 
111 &e Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898 (Ct. Cl. 1978). See also McCaffery, Fresh 
Look, supra note 13, at 989 n.I7 (noting that the rate schedules make filing separately 
disadvantageous). But see infra notes 112·16 and accompanying text (explaining the rare 
circumstances in which spouses may prefer to file separately). 
l12 In 1993 an estimated 95.2% of all returns filed by married taxpayers were joint 
returns and an estimated 97.5% of all married couples filed jointly. These figures were 
estimated from IRS statistics on the number of joint returns filed and the number of 
separate returns filed. In 1993, 48,298,687 returns in which spouses filed jointly were 
submitted to the IRS. Only 2,437,311 separate returns were filed by married taxpayers. See 
INTERNAL REVENUE SEilVICE, U.S. DEP'ToFTilEASUilY, PUBUCATION 1304, STAnsncs OF INCOME, 
INDMDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 1993 (revised 1996). Consequently, the total number of 
returns filed by married taxpayers can be estimated to be 50,735,998. Of these, 48,298,687 
or 95.2% were joint returns. 
When one spouse files separately, the other may also file separately or not at all. 
depending on whether that other spouse has sufficient income to trigger the filing 
requirement. An estimate of the number of such couples would be half of the number of 
separate returns filed in 1993 or half of 2,437,311. This is not a precise estimate, however, 
because undoubtedly some spouses of separate filers did not file separately or at all on their 
own behalf. Nevertheless, assuming 1,218,656 couples filed separately, the total number of 
married couples who filed returns would amount to 49,517,343 and the percentage of 
couples who chose to file jointly could be estimated as 48,298,687 divided by the total 
number of couples who filed, or 49,517,343. In this manner the percentage of couples who 
filed jointly could be estimated at 97.5%. 
W1Murray, supra note 52, at 57. See also Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 49 n.l 
(2d Cir. 1982); Bittker, supra note 29, at 1414 n.73; Mdntyre & Oldman, supra note 51, at 
1585 n.46; Davis, supra note 18, at 20S-09. Separate filing of federal returns may also be 
advantageous in case of a state tax benefit from filing separately where states require 
couples to use the same filing status as that used for federal purposes. See Beck, supra note 
58, at 374 n.265. 
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Filing separately may also be preferable when the couple has 
generated significant allocable deductions. In such a case, 
separate filing often allows them to allocate each deduction to 
the spouse who can most readily derive a tax benefit from the 
item. 114 The spouses cannot make such allocations if they elect to 
file jointly. In these relatively rare instances, the benefit from 
allocating deductions in a certain manner exceeds the normal 
advantages of joint filing, and these married couples benefit from 
filing separately. 115 These cases are rare, however, as evidenced by 
IRS data indicating that the vast majority of married taxpayers, 
close to 100%, choose to file jointly. 116 
Table 2, above, also demonstrates another pattern from joint 
return rates that income splitting and aggregation induce: the 
marriage penalty and bonus. The marriage penalty is the 
phenomenon by which a married couple's tax liability is greater 
than the combined tax liabilities of two single people each 
earning the same incomes. The couple is essentially penalized 
for marrying. 117 By marrying, the taxpayers forgo two separate 
starts up the progressive rate schedule for unmarried individuals 
114 For example, if a deduction is allocable to either spouse and the deduction may be 
used to the extent it exceeds a floor, a percentage of adjusted gross income, the deduction 
is more valuable if allocated to the lower-income spouse. It may have no value at all if the 
couple files jointly and generates a large combined adjusted gross income. See, e.g., Beck, 
supra note 58, at 373 n.265; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 839 n.289, 846; Zelenak, 
supra note 29, at 339 n.l. Among deductions subject to such floors are deductions for 
medical expenses under I.R.C. § 213 (1994) and miscellaneous itemized deductions under 
I.R.C. § 67 (1994). Deductions not subject to a floor are /enerally more valuable if 
allocated to the higher-income taxpayer because they are use to reduce income that is 
subject to a higher marginal tax rate. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURilEY, PATHWA'\'S TO TAX REFORM: 
THE CONCEI'TOFTAXEXPENDITURES 22 (1973) (referring to this pattern as the "upside-down 
deduction" because of its regressive efiect);jOSEPH A PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POUCY 97 (5th 
ed. 1987) (the tax benefit associated with a deduction depends on the tax rate). But see 
Thomas D. Griffith, Thwries of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HAsTiNGS LJ. 343, 
352-60 (1989) (criticizing the widespread belief that deductions are more valuable to high-
bracket taxpayers than to low-bracket taxpayers). The spouse for whom a given deduction 
is most valuable generally may arrange to entitle him or herself to it by incurring and paying 
the expense. See STAFF or joiNT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., THE INCOME TAX 
TREATMENT or MAiuuED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 3-7 (Comm. Print 1980); Zelenak, supra 
note 29, at 391 n.245. 
115 Another reason some spouses file separately is to avoid tl1e regime of joint and 
several liability. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994). 
116 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
117 For excellent explanations and descriptions of the marriage penalty, see Bittker, 
supra note 29; Kornhauser, supra note 29; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13; Zelenak, 
supra note 29. See also Tax Treatment of Married, Head of Household, and Single Taxpayers: 
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 1 (1980); Economic Problems 
of Women, supra note 29, at 221-87, 604-09; STAFF or jOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 
'fHE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MAiuuED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 3-7 (Comm. Print 
1980); U.S. DEP 'Tor TREASURY, supra note 29, at 102-07, 172-76; GIRALDO, supra note 29. 
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and instead subject their combined incomes to the progressive 
rates for married couples. 118 More importantly, as Table 2 
118 Some commentators have defended the marriage penalty while others have decried 
it. To understand the debate surrounding whether or not the marriage penalty is justified, 
an understanding of some basic concepts is required. Under classical tax theory, an ideal 
tax system would meet the norms of both "couples neutrality" and "marriage neutrality." 
"Couples neutrality" requires couples with the same total incomes to pay the same amount 
of tax regardless of the distribution of earnings between the two spouses. This goal is based 
on the assumption that all married couples share resources and, therefore, that two couples 
with the same total incomes have equal ability to pay taxes and should in fact pay the same 
amounts in taxes. But see Zelenak, supra note 29, at 343-44, 34748 (noting that the pooling 
justification for "couples neutrality" was developed after income splitting was incorporated 
into the Joint return rate structure simply to rationalize it after the fact). "Marriage 
neutrality' requires a couple's total tax to remain the same upon manying or divorcing. In 
his seminal article on family taxation, Professor Bittker demonstrated that these two goals 
are incompatible in a progressive tax system. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1395-96, 1429-31. See 
also Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses are Working: 
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 78-79 (1972) [hereinafter 
Tax Treatment Hearings] (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Asst. Secretary for Tax Policy) ("No 
algebraic equation, no matter how so(?histicated, can solve this dilemma. Both ends of a 
seesaw cannot be up at the same time. ); U.S. DEP 'T OF TREASURY, supra note 29, at 102-03; 
Note, The Case for Mandatory Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91 YALE LJ. 363, 365 n.6 
(1981) (proving mathematically that progressivity, marriage neutrality, and couples 
neutrality cannot all be achieved simultaneously). Consequently, a progressive tax system 
cannot simultaneously achieve both couples and marriage neutrality. In a progressive tax 
system, policy makers must choose between those two mutually exclusive goals. 
Traditionally, tax theorists have elevated couples neutrality over marriage neutrality. 
Commentators valuing couples neutrality and progressivity over marriage neutrality have 
defended the marriage penalty, arguing not only that couples with the same total incomes 
have equal ability to pay tax, but also that married couples enjoy economies of scale, where 
single people do not, and, therefore, that married couples can afford to pay more in tax 
than their single counterparts. See STAFF OF jOINI' COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., THE 
INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MAilRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 24 (Comm. Print 1980). See 
also PECHMAN, supra note 114, at 103-07; Bittker, supra note 29, at 1422-25 (discussing 
economies of scale); Klein, supra note 15, at 370; Michael J. Mcintyre, Individual Filing in 
the Personal Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L. REV. 469 (1980); Oliver 
Oldman & Ralph Temple, Comparative Ana~sis of Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. 
REV. 585, 603-04 (1960). However, Professor Oldman has since rejected his earlier views on 
the usefulness of generalities concerning economies of scale. Mcintyre & Oldman, supra 
note 51, at 1595 n.80. 
Among those who value "couples neutrality" over "marriage neutrality" are Michael J. 
Mcintyre, Oliver Oldman, Boris Bittker, and Anne Alston. See Mcintyre & Oldman, supra 
note 51, at 1590; Bittker, supra note 29, at 1392; Alston, supra note 30, at 2015, 2026-29, 2032 
(defending "couples neutrality" by arguing that potential sharing of income between 
spouses undermmes the argument that each spouse's individual ability to pay tax is 
determined solely by his or her own income). 
More recently, a growing number of commentators have questioned the primacy of 
"couples neutrality" over "marriage neutrality." Those valuing "marriage neutrality" and 
progressivity have begun to argue that "couples neutrality" is not an important goal, or at 
least that it is insignificant in comparison to the costs of the current system and its shocking 
adverse effects on married women. They argue that not all couples pool their incomes and 
accordingly, that couples with equal incomes but different income distributions-between 
the spouses do not have equal abilities to pay tax. They have also argued that income 
pooling, taken into account for married couples, can also exist among nonmarried 
partners, but is not taken into account for them. Nonmarried individuals who pool 
resources are precluded from filing jointly. Furthermore, if pooling resources justifies the 
splitting of incomes between the poolers, then the current system should allow income 
splitting not only between some spouses but also among their children and among others 
who cohabit. See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1422 (proposing such a system); Mcintyre & 
Oldman, supra note 51, at 1573 (same as Bittker);Zelenak, supranote29,at 355. CJ Martin 
J. McMahon, Jr., Expanding the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the Income of Children and 
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demonstrates, the marriage penalty is worse for couples in which 
the husband and wife have similar incomes than for those in 
Parents, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 61 (1981) (examining the idea of aggregating all family 
members' incomes). See also Bittker, supra note 29, at 1423; Gann, supra note 29, at 29; 
Kahng, supra note 51, at 37 n.99. Cf Schneider, supra note 50, at 12().21 (arguing that 
because sharing occurs among people other than spouses, sharing between spouses does 
not sufficiently justify joint returns). All the income of the children, not only their net 
unearned income, see I.R.C. § l(g) (1996), should be aggregated with that of the parents if 
resource sharing justifies inclusion in the taxable unit. Nevertheless, the current system 
does not fully place children in their parents' tax unit despite obvious sharing. See 
Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 808 n.l45. Joint returns assume that married couples 
who pool income are economic units and ought to be taxed the same as other units with 
the same income. If some couples really do constitute economic units, however, then it is 
not at all obvious why the option of filing separately should ever be allowed. See Schneider, 
supra note 50, at 118. Cf Beck, supra note 58, at 377 (arguing that purported sharing of 
resources by spouses is not a justification for the joint and several liability that accompanies 
joint filing because those same spouses have the option of filing separately). 
Proponents of "marriage neutrality" also argue that couples with equal total incomes 
but different income distributions between the spouses are not similarly Situated even if they 
do pool resources. A couple in which the husband earns $100,000 and the wife earns 
nothing, they assert, is better off than another couple in which each spouse earns $50,000 
because the first couple enjoys the untaxed benefits of self-performed services and 
significant leisure time while these benefits are much scarcer for the second couple. Critics 
of the marriage penalty often argue that "couples neutrality" treats these two couples alike, 
couples who are not really similarly situated. The first couple, they argue, ought to be 
taxed more than the second. If "marriage neutrality" were privileged over "couples 
neutrality," the first couple would be taxed more than the second. 
Among those who criticize the marriage penalty, asserting that marital status ought not 
impact federal tax liability, are: Harvey E. Brazer, Income Tax Treatment of the Family, in THE 
EcoNOMICS OFT AXATION 223 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980); Brown, supra 
note 11; Douglas K. Chapman, Marriage Neutrality: An Old Idea Comes of Age, 87 W. VA. L. 
REV. 335 (1985); Gann, supra note 29, at 6-7, 25; Philip J. Harmelink, Marital Status Tax 
Discrimination After Tax &form: Proposals to Resolve the Penalty/Bonus Issues, 26 WIUAMETIE 
L. REV. 593,594 (1990); Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 65; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 
13, at 985; Alicia H. Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual Under the Federal Personal 
Income Tax, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 247-78 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin 
eds., 1980); Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 776 n.lO, 787, 852-53; Zelenak, supra note 
29, at 342, 359-61 (noting that the public has expressed more outrage over the marriage 
penalty than it did with respect to the pre-1948 lack of couples neutrality), 363; Davis, supra 
note 18, at 363; Note, supra, at 363; Patricia Cain, Sexual Identity in Tax & Theory, Critical 
Tax Theory: A Workshop (Sep. 8, 1995) (questioning whether "marriage" should be 
treated as a tax-relevant event). 
The current rate structure, through automatic income splitting, permits equal-income 
couples to pay equal taxes and, therefore, chooses the goal of "couples neutrality" at the 
expense of "marriage neutrality." See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1392-95. Cf Mcintyre & 
Oldman, supra note 51, at 1575-77 (proposing income splitting among all members of the 
family who enjoy the earner's income and, thus, treating equal-income families alike); 
Gann, supra note 29, at 25; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 992. Accordingly, the 
act of marrying affects a couple's combined tax. 
It should be noted that other features in the tax system apart from the joint return rate 
structure also contribute to marriage penalties. See gmeraUy Hulse, supra note 29, at 252 
(describing how the standard deduction causes an additional marriage penalty); Maule, 
supra note 16 (discussing numerous tax provisions that contribute to marriage penalties); 
Harmelink, supra. For example, one cause of a severe marriage penalty among low-income 
taxpayers is the earned-income tax credit of I.R.C. § 32 (1994 &: Supp. 1995). See Anne L. 
Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare &form, 108 
HARv. L. REV. 533 (1995). See also Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for Low-Income 
Taxpayers: Some Options, 57 OHIO Sr.l.J. 145, 184 (1996); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 
13, at 995-96; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 398. 
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which the spouses' incomes differ. 119 For example, the couple in 
which both spouses earn $60,000 experiences a marriage penalty 
of $1,485. The couple in which the husband earns $80,000 while 
the wife earns only $40,000 experiences a much smaller marriage 
penalty. That couple will file jointly to minimize its tax liability 
and will incur a marriage penalty of only $1,080. A marriage 
"benefit" often arises for couples with highly disparate incomes. 12> 
That is, combined tax liability declines upon marriage. That is 
the case for the couple in Table 2 in which the husband earns 
$120,000 while the wife earns nothing. Because the spouses file 
jointly to minimize tax liability, the size of the marriage benefit is 
$3,244. The result is that the benefits from income splitting 
exceed the harm from aggregation so much for that married 
couple that the couple pays less tax upon marrying and filing 
jointly than it would if the spouses had remained single. As 
described in the Amesian hypothetical given in this Article's 
introduction, the government, through the operation of the 
marriage bonus, essentially pays a man to marry if he marries a 
woman who does not work. He obtains a marriage bonus, rather 
than penalty, by finding a traditional wife who does not 
participate in the paid labor force. Table 3, below, summarizes 
these results. 
119 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 58, at 371; Bittker, supra note 29, at 1430; Cooper, supra 
note 10, at 68-69; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 991; Harvey S. Rosen, The Marnage 
Ta:x: is Doum but Not Out, 40 NAT'L TAXJ. 567, 570 (1987); Zelenak, supra note 29, at 340; 
Davis, supra note 18, at 207; Tom Herman, Ta:x: Report: The Marriage Penalty Arouses 
Renewed Criticism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1996, at Al. See also Brown, supra note 11, at 49-52; 
John Brozovsky & AJ. Cacildo, II, A Historical Analysis of the "Marnage Ta:x: Penalty, • 21 
Accr. HISTORIANS J. 163, 166 (1994); Gann, supra note 29, at 22. 
12> See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 49-52; Brozovsky & Cataldo, supra note 119, at 166; 
Cooper, supra note 10, at 68-69; Gann, supra note 29, at 22; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra 
note 13, at 991; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 783 n.35; Rosen, supra note 119, at 
570; Zelenak, rupra note 29, at 340-41; Herman, supra note 119, at AI. Cf. Davis, supra note 
18, at 205 (describing that at the adoption of income splitting for joint returns in 1948, 80 to 
85% of married couples had only one wage earner. Consequently, at that time the marriage 
bonus arose more frequently than the marriage penalty) . 
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Marriage Penalizes Similar-Income Couples and Rewards Couples 
with Highly Disparate Incomes 
Di&parity in Incomes Spouses' Incomes Marriage Penalty (Bonus) 
Equal Incomes H = $60,000 $1,485 
w = $60,000 
Somewhat Di&parate H = $80,000 $1,080 
Incomes w = $40,000 
Highly Disparate Incomes H = $120,000 ($3,244) 
W=$0 
The marriage penalty as it currently exists arose in 1969. In 
that year, Congress lowered the tax rates applicable to unmarried 
individuals in response to single taxpayers' complaints that the 
1948 adoption of income splitting only for married taxpayers had 
shifted the income tax burden disproportionately to unmarried 
individuals. 121 Previously, individual and joint return rates had 
been related in that the joint return rates yielded a tax for couples 
that was twice the individual tax on half of the couple's combined 
l2l &e McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 990-91; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 
31, at 782. Under 1969 rates a single taXpayer could pay as much as 42.1% more in tax than 
a couple with equivalent income. See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 48, 50 (2d Cir. 
1982); Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. a. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 
422 F. Supp. 958, 966 (N.D. Ind. 1976); STAFF or joiNT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96rn GONG., 
THE INCOME TAX TllEATMENT or MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 23 ( Comm. Print 1980); 
S. REP. No. 91-552, at 261 tbl.21 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2298; Bittker, 
supra note 29, at 1418-28; Gann, supra note 29, at 18-20, 28, 31. In 1969 Congress 
responded by creating a new filing status for "Unmarried Individuals" or singles and by 
lowering the rates applicable to those single taXpayers. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 
No. 91-172, §§ 801-805, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. (83 Stat. 487) 509, 740-81; S. REP. No. 91-552, at 
262 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2298-99; Mapes, 576 F.2d at 899. See Gann, 
supra note 29, at 19, 27; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 991; Robinson & Wenig, 
supra note 31, at 782. Rather than simultaneously lowering the rates applicable to married 
individuals who did not want to file jointly, Congress made the new, lower rates apply only 
to unmarried individuals and retained the old, higher individual" rates for married 
couples who chose to file separately. Congress renamed those higher individual" rates the 
"Married Filing Separately" filing status. SeeS. REP. No. 91-552, at 261, reprinted in 1969 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 229'1-98; Beck, supra note 58, at 371 & n.261; Bittker, supra note 29, at 1429; 
Gann, supra note 29, at 21 n. 79; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 782-83 & n.33. 
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taxable income.122 Consequently, prior to 1969, a couple in which 
a man and woman earned equal incomes would generate the 
same total tax liability, whether the taxpayers were single or 
whether they filed jointly as a married couple. The 1969 reduction 
in individual rates for single taxpayers without a concomitant 
reduction in joint tax rates thereby gave rise to the possibility of a 
marriage penalty.13 Two single taxpayers with equal incomes 
would each enjoy the newly lowered single rates. Upon marrying, 
however, the old higher rates would apply. For spouses who 
earned equivalent incomes, the benefits of income splitting 
would be offset entirely by the burden of aggregation, leading to 
the highest possible joint return tax liability, one that would 
exceed the tax imposed on two single taxpayers earning 
equivalent incomes. Whether filing jointly or under the new 
married-filing-separately regime, 124 the married couple would be 
taxed under the old higher rates. Congress' reduction in rates 
applicable to single taxpayers, therefore, resulted in some cases in 
an increase in combined tax upon marriage, even when the 
spouses chose to file jointly. 125 
The 1969 reduction in rates for single taxpayers was not so 
large, however, that it made taxpayers better off single than 
married in all cases. For married couples with disparate incomes, 
who could benefit from income splitting and who could avoid the 
worst harm from aggregation, the reduction in taxes from filing 
jointly rather than separately could still exceed the reduction 
Congress had conferred on single taxpayers in 1969. 
Consequently, some couples could obtain a larger tax reduction 
by marrying and by filing jointly than they could under the rate 
reduction for singles in 1969. Those couples experience a 
marriage benefit rather than a marriage penalty. 
122 See supra notes 57, 86 and accompanying text. 
13 See Mapes, 576 F.2d at 900; Gann, supra note 29, at 21-22; McCaffery, Fresh Look, 
supra note 1 ~. at 991. 
124 See supra note 122. 
125 SeeBittker, supra note 29, at 14~0-31; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 991. 
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B Distributional Effects m Between the Higher-Earning and Lower-Earning 
Spouses: Income SpliUing and Aggregation Combine in Joint Filing to 
Benefit the Higher-Earner but to Harm the Lower-Earning Spouse 
One aspect of joint filing that has not been explored in the tax 
literature until this Article is that the benefit of income splitting 
and the burden of aggregation are not allocated equitably 
between spouses when one earns more than the other .1a> Income 
splitting and aggregation combine to give the higher-earning 
spouse an income-splitting benefit which is only partially offset 
by the harm from aggregation. The higher-earning spouse adds 
half the income of the other spouse to half of his or her own 
income, and thereby moves into a tax bracket that is lower than 
the one that would have applied had his or her own income been 
taxed separately. In this manner the combination of income 
splitting and aggregation benefits the higher-earning spouse. 
That higher-earning spouse would pay less tax by filing jointly 
than he or she would by filing separately. 
By contrast, income splitting and aggregation combine to give 
the lower-earning spouse an aggregation harm that exceeds any 
income-splitting benefit. Income splitting alone could place the 
lower-earning spouse in a lower tax bracket, but when applied in 
combination with aggregation, half of that spouse's lower 
income would be increased by half of the other's higher income. 
The combination of income splitting and aggregation acts to 
push the lower-earning spouse into a higher bracket than would 
have applied had his or her own income been taxed separately. 
For the lower-earning spouse, the harm from income aggregation 
exceeds the benefit that income splitting confers. Consequently, 
the lower-earning spouse pays more tax by filing jointly than he 
or she would by filing separately. 
As noted above, the greater the disparity in spousal incomes, 
the greater the incentive to file jointly. Furthermore, the greater 
the disparity in spousal incomes, the more benefit flows from the 
lower-earning spouse to the higher-earning spouse upon filing 
jointly rather than separately. Ironically, a disparity in spousal 
incomes is almost inevitably followed by a transfer of wealth from 
the lower-earning to the higher-earning spouse because of the 
Ia> For a more complete discussion of this pattern, see infra notes 236-385 and 
accompanying text. 
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incentive to file jointly. These patterns will be illustrated further 
in Part N.C.2, below. 
The various patterns emerging from income splitting and 
aggregation that have been identified and explained in Part Ill 
will now be examined in Part N with respect to their implications 
for women. 
N. PATTERNS EMERGING FROM THEjOINT RETURN RATE 
STRUCTURE HAVE SIGNIF1CANT IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN 
A Income Splitting 
!.Automatic Income Splitting Rewards Conventional Marital 
Roles, Removing any Tax Incentives Wives May Have to 
Work 
As illustrated above, income splitting is most beneficial to 
couples in which one spouse earns significantly more than the 
other. The closer the incomes of the two spouses, the less benefit 
income splitting confers.l27 Therefore, income splitting provides 
a tax benefit primarily to couples who fit traditional roles in 
which the husband earns most or all of the income and in which 
the wife does not work. Even if the wife does work, the income 
splitting benefit is more significant the lower her earnings are 
relative to those of her husband. Although the benefit of income 
splitting is available to couples in which the wife earns 
significantly more than her husband as well, that pattern is 
extremely unusual.l28 The benefit of income splitting is minimal 
for couples in which the spouses earn similar amounts, that is, for 
couples whose working patterns defy traditional, stereotypical 
roles in which the husband is gainfully employed and the wife is 
not. In fact, the benefit is nonexistent if the spouses earn equal 
incomes. By benefiting disparate-income couples, the income-
splitting feature of the joint return rewards working patterns that 
127 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. 
128 In 1994, only 18.9% of wives earned more than their husbands. See infra note 164 
for a discussion of how this figure was computed. BUREAU or THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP 'Tor 
COMMERCE, CUR.R.ENT POPUlATION REPORTS, Tables F-11 and F-15 (1996). In 1989 wives 
earned more than their husbands in only 18% of married couples. See Diane Crispell, Mure 
Bacon, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec. 1989, at 9 (citing BUREAU or THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T or 
COMMERCE, CUR.R.ENT POPUlATION REPOitTS P60.165, EARNINGS or MAiuuED-CoUPLE FAMIUES: 
1987 (1989) (hereinafter EARNINGSorMARRIED-CoUPLE FAMIUES)). 
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conform to sexist stereotypes while failing to reward taxpayers 
who challenge the stereotype.l29 One may question the propriety 
of a tax system contammg a benefit whose availability and 
amount is tied to how closely the couple fits a sexist stereotype.00 
129 See Gann, supra note 29, at 35 (statinl!" that the split-income structure is designed to 
benefit the group of taxpaying couples in wh1ch only one spouse works); )ones, supra note 
3, at 261 (discussing impact of automatic income splitting on spouses roles); "Zelenak, 
supra note 29, at 34041 (noting that the one-earner couple benefits from income splitting). 
See also McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 987, 992 & n.29 (noting that the tax laws 
encourage one-earner families); Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 793 n.92 (noting that 
the tax laws, as reflections of social judgments about life-styles, reward conformity to 
traditional roles and penalize departures from them); Contract with America Hearings, supra 
note 31, at 85, reprinted in66 TAX NOTES at 1344 (statement of Professor Alstott). CJ Mapes 
v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898 (Ct. a. 1978) ("the Code adds to the attractiveness of a 
prospective spouse without taxable income, and detracts from one with it"). 
The sexist stereotype is one in which the husband is the primary breadwinner and in 
which the wife is viewed as a discretionary earner. In traditional family working patterns, 
the husband worked full-time and the wife stayed at home, raising children, doing 
housework and rarely workin!!" outside of the home for economic benefit. The sexist 
stereotype refers to these tradiuonal gender roles. See Greene, supra note 52, at 85. 
130 CJ Kahng, supra note 51, at 2 (making the same point with regard to the estate tax). 
Some might argue to the contrary: that taxing a one-earner couple less than a two-
earner couple by benefiting the one-earner couple more is appropriate on the theory that 
the one-earner couple has fewer resources than a two-earner couple and, therefore, has less 
ability to pay the tax. This argument overlooks the fact that income splitting benefits the 
one-earner couple more than the dual-earner couple even when both couples have the 
same total incomes, and thus, even when the two couples have equivalent resources and 
presumably equal abilities to pay tax. 
Assuming a couple shares, or "pools," its resources, a fair tax system would satisfY three 
criteria: (1) a single person should pay a greater tax than a one-earner married couple with 
equal income; (2) a one-earner married couple should pay a greater tax than a two-earner 
married couple with equal income; and (3) a two-earner couple should pay a greater 
combined tax than two single persons with the same combined income. See Oldman & 
Temple, supra note 118, at 603-04. 
Professor Oldman later acknowledged that these criteria are of limited value because 
they are based on notions of economies of scale in living patterns that are no longer 
accepted: "The great variety of living arrangements which now characterize our society 
undermines the economies of scale argument for persons above the subsistence level. 
Generalities about economies of scale are no longer useful." Mcintyre & Oldman, supra 
note 51, at 1595 n.80. See also Bittker, supra note 29, at 1424-25. 
Note that if a couple derives economies of scale through division of labor, that is, by 
having one spouse take responsibility for the home and children while the other spouse 
generates financial resources, then under criterion number two, above, that couple should 
be taxed more than another married couple earning the same total income in which both 
spouses work. Such a couple can live more cheaply than a two-earner couple by avoiding 
certain expenses of having both spouses work, such as child care. Furthermore, the one-
earner couple is undertaxed because imputed income, the value of self-performed services 
like housework, is excluded under current law from the income tax base. See McCaffery, 
Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1001.{)5; Staudt, supra note 43, at 1576-77; Zelenak, supra note 
29, at 372-73. But-see Bittker, supra note 29, at 1392-96 (acknowledging this problem but 
arguing that the two-earner and one-earner couple should pay equivalent tax, presumably 
because both couples will share resources completely, thereby having equal ability to pay 
tax). The benefit of income splitting has just the opposite impact, failing to tax the one-
earner couple more than the two-earner couple. It lowers the tax to a great degree on joint 
filers for couples in which only one spouse works while providing a more minimal benefit 
for couples in which both spouses work. As a consequence, income splitting violates 
criterion number two because the one-earner couple will not pay more in tax than the two-
earner cou pie. See supra note 118. 
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At the time income splitting was adopted, one of its 
acknowledged goals was to promote the stereotypical, traditional 
gender roles in which husbands were gainfully employed and 
wives stayed at home, economically dependent on their 
husbands.m In praise of the 1948 income-splitting approach, 
Stanley Surrey wrote in that year that "[w]ives need not continue 
to master the details of the retail drug business, electrical 
equipment business, or construction business, but may turn from 
their partnership 'duties' to the pursuit of homemaking. "1!12 
Clearly, commentators knew in 1948 that income splitting would 
function to keep women in the home and, therefore, to keep 
them economically dependent on their husbands. Relegation of 
women to "homemaking" pursuits was clearly viewed as a more 
appropriate role for women in post-war society than staying in the 
work force, and income-splitting was probably an intentional 
effort to promote conventional, stereotypical gender roles. 138 
Economists have asserted that income-splitting does, in fact, 
promote one-earner couples and that its repeal would probably 
increase married women's labor force partiCipation rates 
significantly.134 By discouraging women from working, income 
splitting is a feature of the tax code and of U.S. government policy 
131 See Jones, supra note 3, at 296. 
132 Surrey, supra note 57, at 1111. Prior to 1948, couples in common law states 
attempted to obtain the benefits of income splitting availal>le to married residents of 
community property states by establishing husband and wife partnerships. See Jones, supra 
note 3, at 26:i, 2"74-75. Such partnerships, if bona fide for tax purposes, allowed couples to 
shift income from the husband's business, normally taxed to him under Lucas v. Earl, to 
the spouses equally as partners. See Jones, supra note 3, at 259-60, 274-93; Staudt, supra 
note 43, at 1607 n.152; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 345-46. One requirement for such a plan 
to succeed was that the; wife had to be a bona fide partner. That is, she had to be either a 
bona fide participant or a bona fide investor in the partnership. Consequently, taxpayers 
often had to show that wives really participated in the business venture more than 
nominally. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 737-38 (1949); Lusthaus v. 
Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293, 297 (1946); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 290 (1946); 
l.T. 3845, 1947-1 C.B. 66, 67 (1947). These activities by wives demonstrated that the 
unavailability of automatic income splitting encouraged couples to move towards the 
income-splitting result by arran~ng for both spouses to work, to earn income. The 
absence of automatic income sphtting did indeed encourage women to work in an effort to 
reduce the family's tax liability. CJ. S. REP. No. 8(}.1 013, at 17, reprinted in 1948 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1184. 
1.!1.'1 Much has been written of employer and governmental non-tax policies designed to 
exclude women from the work force in the aftermath of World War II when employment 
opportunities were needed for returning GI 's. See generalfy SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE HOME 
FRONT AND BEIDND: AMER.ICAN WOMEN IN TilE 1940s, at I!i-29, 44-51, 12341 (1982); Jones, 
supra note 3, at 263-65. 
134 See, e.g., Jane H. Leuthold, Income splitting and Women's Labor-Force Participation, 38 
INDUS. &: LABoR REL. REV. 98 (1984). 
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that has the same effect as the hypothetical Amesian tax laws 
described at the beginning of this Article. The government 
encourages married women not to engage in paid labor. 
2.Automatic Income Splitting Removes any Tax Incentive to 
Transfer Ownership of Assets or Earnings to Wives 
Another concern for women involves the fact that income 
splitting is available for tax computation purposes even though 
control or ownership of the "shifted" earnings remains with the 
earner. 1!!6 Traditionally, tax rules have required that income be 
taxed to the party who owns it or who controls the earning of that 
income. 1~ The theory underlying this principle is that the owner 
of earnings is the party most financially able to pay tax on them.137 
Taxing someone on earnings he or she does not own or control 
would be unfair because it is contrary to notions of fairness 
regarding ability to pay. For example, if a high-bracket taxpayer 
anticipatorily assigns earned income to his low-bracket child, 
then under the authority of Lucas v. Ear~ l'!il the income will be 
taxed to the high-bracket earner, not to the child. 
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who 
eamed them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by 
anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised 
to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in 
the man who eamed i t. 139 
The person who controls whether income will be earned, the 
earner, is the party who is properly taxed on that income. 140 
This principle has also been adopted with respect to income 
generated from property. Whoever owns income-producing 
1!!6 See McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 990 n.21; Robinson &: Wenig, supra note 
31, at 775 n.4; Bea Ann Smith, The Parlnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 
68TEX. L. REV. 689 (1990); Zelenak, supra note 29,at 380&: n.I99 ("the tax Jaws should not 
reward spouses for sharing that does not exist"). 
136 See Schneider, supra note 50, at I 06 (noting that it is unusual for income to be taxed 
to someone other than the person who received it). See also Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 
74; Staudt, supra note 43, at 1641-42. 
137 Cf. Robinson &: Wenig, supra note 31, at 777 (noting that the income tax was 
designed to take ability to pay into account); Zelenak, supra note 29, at 385 (noting that 
wives should not be taxed on half their husband's earnings despite equitable distribution 
Jaws because the husband is the party with control over the earnings during the marriage). 
138281 u.s. Ill (1930). 
139 ld. at 114-15. 
140 SeeHelvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940) (discussing Earl, 281 U.S. at 111-15). 
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property is the proper party to be taxed on the income, even if the 
income interest is severed prior to the generation of that 
income.141 Furthermore, a retention of control over income-
generating property constitutes ownership for these purposes. 
Thus, under Helvering v. Clifford, 142 the settlor of a trust attempted 
to shift income from his own high bracket to his wife's low 
bracket by creating a trust to hold his income-producing property 
and by naming his wife as the beneficiary while he retained 
control of the corpus. 14!1 The Supreme Court would not allow the 
grantor to shift income arising from the trust assets because the 
"short duration of the trust, the fact that . . . [his] wife was the 
beneficiary, and the retention of control over the corpus by ... 
[him] all ... [led] irresistibly to the conclusion that .. . [the 
grantor] continued to be the owner."144 Retention of control over 
the assets constituted ownership of them for tax purposes, and as 
owner, the grantor was the proper party to be taxed on the 
unearned income.145 
In 1954 Congress enacted the grantor trust rules contained in 
sections 671 - 678 of the Internal Revenue Code.146 & amended in 
1986, those provisions clarify and continue the doctrine 
enunciated in Clifford. If the grantor retains specified 
reversionary interests in trust property or certain rights or powers 
with respect to the trust, including the power to revoke the trust 
or the power to distribute the income to the grantor or to his or 
her spouse, then the trust income is taxed to the grantor, even 
though the income may actually be distributed to a third party or 
held in trust. 147 The grantor's retention of control over the 
income-generating property is considered sufficient to render 
him the owner of the property and, therefore, to subject him to 
141 See id. 
142 309 u.s. 331 (1940). 
14!1 The attempted transaction took place long before Congress compressed the low 
bracket for trusts and estates in I.R.C. §I (e) (1994). 
144 Clif!urd, 309 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added). 
145 See also Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) (holding that a transfer of income-
producing property to a revocable trust did not constitute a transfer for income taX 
purposes and requiring, therefore, that the income be taxed to the settlor, not to the trust). 
146 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 671-678, 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(68AStat. 226), 262-69 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1994)). 
147 I.R.C. §§ 671, 673-677. 
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tax on any earnings. 148 
A5 of 1948, when Congress adopted income splitting for all 
joint filers, the principle that the earner or the income owner is, 
for tax computation purposes, the proper person to be taxed was 
abandoned solely for married couples who filed jointly. 149 The 
adoption of income splitting caused income to be assigned 
automatically to the lowest available tax bracket between the 
spouses regardless of which spouse earned the income or had an 
ownership interest in it.100 Once income splitting was adopted, 
half of one spouse's earnings was attributed to the other spouse 
for purposes of computing federal tax liability.151 Such attribution 
occurred even if the nonearning spouse had no present 
ownership interest in those earnings under state law, 152 which is 
the usual case under common law property principles.153 Courts 
have consistently ruled that state law determines which spouse 
owns the earnings 154 and, furthermore, that the filing of a joint 
return does not change that ownership.155 Shifting income from 
148 See I.R.C. § 671. 
149 See Zelenak, supra note 29, at 355. Since 1948, occasional proviSions have been 
enacted which impose tax on the income owner at the rate applicable to another taXpayer. 
For example, the Kiddie Tax, I.R.C. § 1(g) (1996), imposes tax on children for certain 
unearned income at the parent's top applicable rate. However, the purpose of the Kiddie 
Tax was to prevent income from being shifted into a lower bracket. The joint return 
provisions, by contrast, der.art from the general rule of taXing the income owner precisely 
to permit income to be shifted into a lower taX bracket. 
100 See Jones, supra note 3, at 273. Ironically in Seaborn, which created geographic 
disparity and which induced Congress' eventual move to automatic income splitting, the 
Court allocated income between the spouses for tax computation purposes precisely 
because state law gave them both present ownership interests in half the earnings of the 
other spouse. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110-11, 113 (1930). 
151 s. REP. No. 80-1013, pt.VIII.A, at 19-20 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 
1187. 
152 See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1395. 
153 See, e.g., PUBUCATION 555, supra note 52, at 1-2 (implicitly acknowledging that 
common law states do not give the non~amer an ownenhip interest in the earnings of his 
or her spouse by limiting income splitting for separate filers to residents of the nine 
commumty property jurisdictions). See also supra note 52. 
154 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 205 (1971). 
155 See In re Illingworth, 51 AF.T.R. 1215 (P-H) (D. Ore. 1956). Although jointly filing 
spouses would have been jointly and severally liable for any deficiency, the wife was entitled 
only to that portion of a refund attributable to her own net income. Because no income or 
taXes were atuibutable to the wife, the court ordered her to endorse the refund check to her 
husband's bankruptcy trustee. The filing of a joint return does not change ownership 
interests between those filing the joint return. See also In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544, 547 
(8th Cir. 1972); Glaubke v. United States, 41 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 759 (E.D. Va. 1978); 
Pettengill v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Dunn v. Commissioner, 22 
T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (1963); In re Estate of Carson, 199 A.2d 407, 409 (NJ. Camden County 
Ct. 1964); In re Estate of Trecker, 215 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Wis. 1974). 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 285 1997
1997] Joint Return Rate Structure 285 
one spouse to another for purposes of minimizing tax liability 
ought to be inappropriate unless ownership m the "shifted" 
income is transferred simultaneously. 156 Ownership and/ or 
control remains the test for determining the proper taxpayer 
among other related taxpayers who pool resources. 157 It should 
remain the test for determining the proper taxpayer as between 
spouses. Apart from eliminating the geographic disparity of 
treatment occasioned by Seaborn, any theoretical justification for 
separating ownership of earnings from identification of the 
proper taxpayer in the sole context of spouses remains elusive. 158 
A few lower court Pennsylvania decisions allowing the nonearning wives rather than the 
husbands' estates to keep the joint return refund reflected the views of those courts that 
under Pennsylvania property [aw, the filing of a joint federal taX return evidenced the 
spouses' intention to hold the refund as tenants by the entireties during their lives. Upon 
the death of either spouse, the right of survivorship operated to vest total ownershif in the 
surviving spouse rather than in the decedent's estate. See In re Estate of MacNeill, 2 Pa. D. 
& C.2d 480 (1959); In re Estate of Green, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 595 (1958). But see In re Estate 
of Jackson, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 402 (1964) (holding that, by filing jointly, parties did not 
intend to hold a taX refund as tenants by the entireties). Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts 
take a minority view. All other reported cases dealing with this issue hold that the refund 
belongs to the S{>C'Use whose income and tax payments generated it. In the vast majority of 
jurisdictions, fihng a joint return does not effect a conveyance of any kind between the 
spouses. 
156 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 29, at 380 & n.I99 ("the taX laws should not reward 
spouses for sharing that does not exist"); Gann, supra note 29, at 27; Winn & Winn, supra 
note 52, at 878. Cf Bittker, supra note 29, at 1402 ("[T]he income-splitting joint return 
authorized by Congress in 1948, which with only minor changes is still in effect, achieves the 
taX result that Mr. and Mrs. Earl were seeking [in Lucas v. Earl]. It does so, however, 
without requiring husband and wife to equalize their ownership inter st; in this respect, the 
Earl agreement might be regarded as an improvement over the 1948 statutory reform 
[because it shifted actual ownership of income rather than attempting to shift income for 
tax-computation purposes only].") (footnote omitted); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 
13, at 990 n.21 (noting the incongruity of shifting income for taX purposes when it is not 
shifted for ownership purposes); Zelenak, supra note 29, at 378-79, 386 (noting that by 
abolishing joint returns and by overruling Lucas v. Earl, that is, by permitting income to be 
split only if property is actually transferred to the nonearning spouse, an incentive would 
arise for husbands to share legal ownership of earnings with their wives). 
!57 Control determines which taxpayer's marginal taX rate applies even with regard to 
the Kiddie Tax, I.R.C. § l(g) (1996). Under the Kiddie Tax, net unearned income of 
children under age fourteen is taxed to the children at the parent's top marginal rate. 
I.R.C. § 1(g)(l). Ownership of the assets generating the unearned income causes the child 
to be the taXpayer but the applicable taX rate is that which would apply to the parent, 
reflecting the parent's likely control over the child's unearned income. Under certain 
conditions I.R.C. § I (g)(7) permits the parent to elect to include the child's unearned 
income on the parent's return as if the parent were the taxpayer. 
158 Several taX theorists have argued that the current regime of income splitting has 
permitted husbands to retain legal title in all their property, while transferring half their 
property to their wives for beneficial taX computation purposes. Providing the benefit of 
income splitting to married couples regardless of which spouse has legal ownership of the 
property eliminates any incentive for actual sharing of the property between spouses. See 
Gann, supra note 29, at 47 ("[b]y solidifying separate ownership ... the irrelevancy of source 
of income [as between the spouses for taX purposes] may also have contributed to the 
economic dependence of women"); Winn & Winn, supra note 52, at 878; Zelenak, supra 
note 29, at 378. q: Kahng, supra note 51, at 3, 34, 50 (arguing that a similar feature within 
the estate tax removes the incentive for property to be transferred outright to wives). 
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Furthermore, Congress could have pursued other approaches to 
alleviate the geographic disparity. 159 
Income splitting allows a husband to shift his income to his 
If Congress were to abandon the income tax and to adopt a consumption tax in its 
place, then taxing the consumer, the nonearning spouse, rather than the income owner, the 
earner, could be justified. See Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 97; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 
354, 357-58; Bittker, supra note 29, at 1394 (proposing a set of family attribution rules that 
would have this effect); Oldman, & Temple, supra note 118, at 593 (describing French 
income tax system which has same effect). While conceding that ownership rights are 
important, Bittker argues that "legal ownership of property and income within the family 
should be disregarded in judging Ithe family's] taxpaying capacity." Bittker, supra note 29, 
at 1394. Bittker, Mcintyre and Oldman argue, therefore, that for purposes of computing a 
couple's tax, income should be attributed to both spouses regardless of who owns the 
earnings. In both Bittker's article and that of Mcintyre & Oldman, this argument seems to 
be based on the premise that individuals share resources within family units and that access 
to and use of resources is a better measure of ability to pay as a practical matter than are 
arbitrary rules regarding legal ownership. While it may make sense in a consumption-based 
system to compute tax as if the non-earner, consuming spouse generated income, a 
presumptiun of sharing within the family ignores the reality that sharing often does not occur 
and that trends show a movement away from sharing between spouses. See generally 
Kornhauser, supra note 29. In the absence of a guarantee that spouses will share their 
resources, tax should be computed as if only the income owner will use the earnings. 
Thus, in common law jurisdictions, the earner, the only individual with a property interest 
in the earnings, should be the only taxpayer. Income should not be split and taxed as if a 
non-owner had earned it. Income-sr.litting in effect computes tax as if both spouses each 
earned half the total income even if both spouses do not own it. Income splitting also 
assumes both spouses will have equal access to the earnings despite property laws to the 
contrary. See supra notes 60.74 and accompanying text 
159 Instead of enacting automatic income splitting, Congress could, presumably, have 
resolved the problem of geographic disparity by overriding Seaborn and by providing that 
income must be taxed to the party who earned it without regard to community property 
laws. Geographic disparity would have been eliminated because income splitting would no 
longer have been available to anyone, regardless of domiciliary. Congress has made 
community property laws inapplicable in other contexts. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 879(a) (1994) 
(regarding married couples when one is a non-resident alien); I.R.C. § 1402(a)(5) (1994) 
(regarding certain self-employment income which one spouse does not help generate); 
l.R.C. § 66 (I 994) (regarding spouses living apart and filing separately)-all taxing 
community income to the individual who earned it rather than half to each spouse. 
Congress has also enacted legislation disregarding community property laws in other 
contexts. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 32(c)(2)(B) (1994), 219(f)(2) (1994), 402(d)(4)(E) (1994), 
403(b)(2)(D)(ii) (1994), 408(g) (1994), 448(d)(4) (1994), 457(e)(7) (1994). 
9ll(b)(2)(C) (1994), 932(d) (1994), 2032A(e)(10) (1994). For discussions regarding the 
constitutionality of overriding Seaborn, see Gann, supra note 29, at 55-58; Gale Ann Norton, 
The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 HAR.v. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 591 (1985); Zelenak, supra 
note 29, at 388-91. 
Alternatively, Congress could have eliminated geographic disparity by allowing couples 
in common law states to enter into contracts like the one in Lucas v. Earl, specifically 
providing that such agreements would be valid for federal income tax purposes. Under this 
approach, geographic disparity would be eliminated because couples in common law 
jurisdictions could enter into income-sharing arrangements that would make the non-
earner the owner of half the income. Through such agreements, the income-splitting result 
would become available to residents of common law states, but only when actual ownership 
of the "shifted" income is transferred. Even if Congress had not acted to eliminate 
geographic disparity, that disparity would have probably disappeared on its own as each 
common law state adopted a community property system to confer the tax benefits of 
income splitting on its own residents. See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1412 (speculating that 
community property laws would have become universal had Congress failed to address the 
geographic disparity problem); Jones, supra note 3, at 295 (noting that by adopting 
community-property laws, the common-law states could have eliminated the extra tax their 
citizens faced). 
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wife to lower the total tax attributable to his income even though 
she receives absolutely no ownership in or control over those 
earnings. Women's interests suggest that if the benefits of 
income splitting are to be conferred for tax computation 
purposes, then the nonearning spouse should also receive a 
present property interest in the "shifted" earnings. It was just 
such a property interest that justified income splitting in the 
Supreme Court's view. 100 Conversely, if the wife gets no immediate 
property interest in her husband's earnings, as is generally the 
case in common law jurisdictions, then income splitting should 
not be permitted. 
B Aggregation 
!.Aggregation Encourages Conventional Marital Roles, 
Discouraging Many Wives from Working and Making Work 
Less Profitable for Those Who Do Persist in the Labor 
Market 
Just as income splitting provides the greatest benefits to 
couples with disparate incomes, couples that fit conventional 
patterns in which the husband works and the wife does not, 
income aggregation also rewards the same groups. As discussed 
earlier, income aggregation harms all couples who file jointly but 
it harms disparate-income couples the least and equal-income 
couples the most. 161 Consequently, the phenomenon of 
aggregation places the heaviest tax burdens on the couples that 
defy traditional stereotypes-those in which the spouses earn 
similar incomes. Aggregation imposes a much lighter burden on 
and, thereby, rewards couples in which one spouse earns 
significantly more income than the other. Once again the tax 
system contains a feature that imposes more harm on two-earner 
couples, those that challenge stereotypical working patterns, and 
less harm on one-earner couples, those that comply with the 
traditional roles in which the husband works and the wife does 
not.162 The tax system arguably should not contain a feature that 
burdens couples to the extent they depart from sexist 
100 See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
161 See supra notes 104-25 and accompanying text. 
162 See Edward J. McCaffery, Equality of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN's LJ. 289, 308-09 
(1996). See also supra note 129. 
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stereotypes. 1ss 
have acknowledged that 
the spouse who is a 
that, on the margin, it 
working altogether.HiD 
Tax theorists as well as economists 
aggregation has a harmful impact on 
"secondary earner," usually the wife, 164 in 
discourages secondary earners from 
16.!1 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
164 Women are considered to be "secondary" wage earners much more frequently than 
men. S«jESSIE BERNARD, WOMEN AND THE PUBUC INTEREST: AN EssAY ON POUCY AND PROTEST 
191 (1971) ("ln one study of 53 such two-career families, the wife's career was viewed as 
merely a kind of hobby, an avocation rather than a vocation, in a substantial proportion 
with a traditional orientation."); Carole Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in 
DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFAilE STATE 231, 244 (Am:r Gutmann ed., 1988) ("Women in the 
workplace are still perceived primarily as wives an mothers, not workers. The view is also 
widespread that women's wages are a 'supplement' to those of the breadwinner. Women, it 
is held, do not need wages in the same way that men do-so they may legitimately be paid 
less than men."). See also jANE C. HOOD, BECOMING A Two:JOB FAMILY 188 (1983) (wives in 
middle- and upper-income families often perceive their work as unnecessary to the family's 
survival, thus treating themselves as "junior partner[s] "); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 
13, at 994 (describing married women as historically having been the marginal or secondary 
earners in the family). 
Furthermore, wives are secondary earners because they usually earn less than their 
husbands. See Edison-Smith, supra note 56, at 120. Although the wage gap between men 
and women has been diminishing over the last 30 years in the United States, women on 
average still earn significantly less than men do. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
show that for the fourth quarter of 1995 "[w]omen who usually worked full time had 
median earnings of $407 per week, 74.3 percent of the $548 median for men." B UllEAU OF 
LABoR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP 'T OF LABOR, UsUAL WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALAilY WoRKEilS: 
FOURTH QUAilTI!Il1995 (1996). Data from 1994 indicate that the median annual earnings of 
all full-time workers were $30,854 for men and $22,205 for women. See BUilEAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, HOUSEHOW ECONOMIC STuDIES, INCOME AND POVERTY: 1994 
INCOMESUMMAilY, tbi.A (1996). 
The above data compare earnings of full-time working men and women without regard 
to their marital status. Data comparing earnings of husbands and wives show an even 
greater disr.arity because of the many wives who work in paying positions only part time or 
not at al . Professor McCaffery reports that, on average, married women earn 
approximately 46% of what their husbands earn. See McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 
994 (citing Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 
431, 445 n.86 (1990)). In 1994, the percentage of wives who earned more than their 
husbands was only 18.9%. This figure was arrived at by adding together the number of 
couples in which wives with earnings earned more than their husbands who had earnings 
(7,218,000) and the number of couples in which the wife worked while the husband did not 
(2,958,000) and dividing that sum ~ the total number of married couples (53,865,000). 
See B UllEAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP T OF COMMERCE, CUilllENT POPULATION REPOilTS, Table F-
15 (1996) (providing 7,218,000 and 53,865,000 figures); BUilEAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, CUilllENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P60, Table F-11 (1996) (providing the 
2,958,000 and 53,865,000 figures). In 1989, wives earned more than their husbands in only 
18% of marriages. See Crispell, supra note 128, at 9 (citing EARNINGS OF MAllluED-COUPLE 
F AMIUES, supra note 128). 
Because wives tend to earn less than their husbands, if one spouse were to leave the 
labor force voluntarily or to care for a child or elder relative, it would most likely be the 
wife rather than the husband. Wives are, therefore, properly viewed as secondary earners. 
This characterization is not intended to express a goaf or a desired norm, but rather simply 
describes the current social reality. 
165 See McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 989-96, 1018; McCaffery, Slouching 
Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 61'7-18 (arguing that the combined impact on wives of 
the aggregation effect, social security taxes, and other costs of working is so great that it 
must affect behavior and discourage paid work); Harvey S. Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint 
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Because families usually view the wife rather than the husband as 
a secondary earner, the wife's first dollar of earnings is generally 
subject to tax at her husband's highest marginal rate. The term 
"secondary earner" is adopted from Grace Blumberg's ground-
breaking work from 1971:166 
[T]he observation that American working wives are 
predominantly secondary family earners is not intended to express a 
social ideal. It merely reflects a contemporary social reality. 
Women workers generally earn substantially less than their male 
counterparts. Working wives earn less than their employed 
husbands. The American wife's working career is likely to be 
broken by child-bearing and rearing. Unless prompted by economic 
necessity, her return to work is generally considered discretionary. 
Even when she is earning a substantial salary, her husband is 
unlikely to view his employment as discretionary. Thus, the 
American working wife should properly be understood as a 
secondary family earner for the purpose of determining the work 
disincentive effect of various Code provisions. 167 
Although the term "secondary earner" was adopted over twenty-
five years ago, many of the social factors combining to make the 
wife a secondary, or discretionary, worker still prevail.l68 In 
discouraging secondary earners, or wives, from working, not only 
does aggregation tend to preclude economic independence for 
women, but it also promotes traditional gender roles in which 
wives do unpaid labor and husbands are viewed as productive and 
powerful, roles which have limited wives' autonomy and which 
Filing1, 30NAT'L TAXJ. 423, 426 (1977); Zelenak, supra note 29, at 343, 365-66, 371; Davis, 
supra note 18, at 21a.14; Note, supra note 118, at 368-70. See also Contract with America 
Hearings, supra note 31, at 85, nprinted in 66 TAX NOTES at 1344 (statement of Professor 
Alstott); H.Il REP. No. 104-84, at 13 (1995); Gann, supra note 29, at 41; Kornhauser, supra 
note 29, at 64; Munnell, supra note 118, at 263-64. Tax scholars have also identified other 
aspects of taxation in addition to the joint return rate structure that discourage women 
from working: the social security system, see, e.g., McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 
996-1001; Jonathan Barry Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement 
Program: Partial Inkg;ration and a Credit for Dual-Emner Cou('_les, 45 TAX LAW. 915, 933, 94447 
(1992); the non-taxation of services performed by one fam1ly member for another, that is, 
the non-taxation of imputed income, see, e.g., McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1001-
05; the non-deductibility of expenses related to having both spouses work, see, e.g., id. at 
1005-10; and the tax treatment of fringe benefits, see, e.g., id. at lOJa-14. 
166 Blumberg, supra note 10. 
167 ld. at 49 (footnotes omitted). 
168 See sources cited supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text; sources cited infra notes 
238-54 and accompanying text. 
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have been used to devalue women generally. 100 Table 1, above, 
illustrates the impact of aggregation on the secondary earner. 
Statistical evidence demonstrates that husbands, on average, earn 
significantly more than their wives and, therefore, supports the 
assumption that the husband is the primary earner and that the 
wife is the secondary earner. 170 Income aggregation, even when 
combined with income splitting, pushes the "secondary" earner 
into a higher tax bracket than would apply in the absence of 
income aggregation.171 The wife in the example from Table 1, 
above, would generate a tax of $8,426 on her first $30,000 of 
income for an effective tax rate of 28%. This compares extremely 
unfavorably with the taxes that would have been imposed had she 
been single or filed separately, $5,527 or $6,002, respectively. 172 
The higher tax costs associated with the secondary earner's 
income make her less profitable and, furthermore, discourage 
many married women from working altogether.l'13 The claim is 
not that aggregation prevents working from being worthwhile for 
all women. Rather, some women, without regard to tax 
considerations, do not earn enough to justify working outside the 
home. The costs of working, such as child care, professional 
attire, etcetera, exceed the incomes of some married women, 
rendering employment economically unwise. Aggregation 
increases the costs of employment further for "secondary 
earners." 174 Consequently, on the margin, even more women 
169 See McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 987, 994. 
170 See infra notes 164, 23S.54 and accompanying text. 
171 See Gann, supra note 29, at 41; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 993, 1041 
n.219; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 365-66; Davis, supra note 18, at 21 ~11. 
172Her effective tax rate would be only 18% if she had been single or 20% if she had 
filed separately. Se~ Gann, supra note 29, at 42 n.l37 (noting that the wife would be more 
likely to work outside of the home if she could file separately to avoid the aggregation 
effect). 
1'13 
The higher the tax rate on the first dollar the woman earns, the lower 
her disposable wage and the lower the probability of her participating in the 
labor market. Furthermore, the greater the tax on her husband's earnings 
and nonwork income, the lower other after-tax income and the greater d1e 
probability of [his] labor-force participation. 
Leuthold, supra note 134, at 103 (using data from the 1979 MICHIGAN SURVEY or INCOME 
DYNAMICS). See also Davis, supra note 18, at 212; sources cited supra note 165. 
174 See Davis, supra note 18, at 210. Se~ also Dat~lin~ NBC: Two for th~ Money (NBC 
television broadcast, May 1, 1996) (interviewing Linda Kelly, home economist: "Most 
second incomes do clear a profit but usually it's not nearly as much as expected. And there 
are some people who even go in me hole because of a second income. They lose money. 
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discover that the expenses associated with working outside the 
home, including the tax cost, exceed actual earnings. In contrast, 
the primary earner is able to use the lowest tax brackets for his 
earnings simply by virtue of being the primary earner. 
Essentially, women who are the "secondary earners" in the family 
have to earn more than their husbands would have to earn to 
break-even, to make working financially feasible. 175 
The following example illustrates how the aggregation effect 
prevents women on the margin from working. 1;,; Assume that a 
husband has taxable income of $60,000. His wife earns nothing 
for her work at home, generating no taxable income. The wife 
considers taking a job that would result in $30,000 of taxable 
income. The additional tax the couple pays as a result of the 
wife's $30,000 of taxable income is $8,426, as shown above in Table 
1. Assuming that the wife incurs the following costs in 
connection with working, her income will fall short by $1,353 of 
covering just the listed expenses: 
- additional income tax attributable to the wife's $30,000 
income of $8,426; 
-social security taxes of $2,678;177 
- additional state income tax attributable to the wife's 
$30,000 income of $1,500;178 
It's when both partners work full time that the costs just explode .... Uncle Sam ... is very 
fond of second in comers because his take on their paychecks is so large.") . 
175 See Davis, supra note 18, at 210. 
176 This example is similar to an illustration provided in Bittker, supra note 29, at 1432 
& n.l23. See also Gann, supra note 29, at 41 n.l36; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 
I 021-22, 1026-27; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 37~74. 
177 The social security tax is currentJr 6.2% of gross wages. l.R.C. § 3IOI(a) (1994). In 
1996, this tax applied only to the earners first$62,'700 of wages. I.R.C. § 312l(a)(l) (1996); 
Social Security Act§ 230, 42 U.S.C. § 430 (1994). The medicare tax is currently 1.45% of 
gross taxable wages. I.R.C. § 3101 (b) (1994). Since the beginning of 1994, no wage ceiling 
has existed for the medicare tax. I.R.C. § 312l(a) (1994). Accordingly, for taxpayers 
earning less than $62,700, the combined social security and medicare tax is 7.65% of gross 
wages. Assuming her gross income from wages amounts to $35,000, this wife's social 
security and medicare taxes would amount to $2,678. Professor McCaffery has argued 
compellingly that the social security tax system, itself, also tends to discourage secondary 
earners from working. See generally McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 996-1001. 
178 This assumes the state of residence imposes a flat 5% income tax. Michigan, for 
example, imposes a flat 4.4% income tax. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, STATE OF MICHIGAN, 1996 
MICHIGAN INCOME TAX RETURNS AND HOME.Sn:AD PROPEIOY TAX CREDIT CLAIM. 
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-commuting expense (at 31¢ per mile 179 for an additional 
10,000 miles 110 of driving per year) of $3,100; 
- child care (2 children at $200 per week 181 for 50 weeks 
per year) of $10,000; 1.82 
179 The 3I t per mile standard business mileage rate that was deductible in I996 for 
work-related, noncommuting use of one's personal vehicle covers operating and fixed costs 
including depreciation, maintenance and repairs, tires, gasoline (including all taxes 
thereon), oil, insurance and registration fees. Rev. Proc. 95-54, I99!>2 C.B. 450, 45I-52 
(1995). Neither the depreciation nor gasoline expenditure would be tax deductible for the 
woman in the example because such commuting expenses are not tax deductible. 
INTERNAL REVENUE SEIMCI!, U.S. DEP'TorTHE TREASURY, PUBUCATION No. 9I7, BUSINESS UsE 
orA CAil3 (I995). Nevertheless, these figures provide a rough approximation of the cost of 
operating one's personal vehicle. 
180 Additional mileage results from the wife's decision to enter the work force as a 
result of drivin~ she does to· and from work, as a result of trips to and from the day-care 
center or babysitter's house, and from driving to and from restaurants. 
181 This example assumes the cost of child care for each child is $I 00 per week. Tamar 
Lewin estimates that $300 per week is a typical cost for a full-time, in-house babysitter. See 
Tamar Lewin, Fur Some Two-Paycheck Fatiu'lies, the Economics Don't Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
2I, I99I, at EI8. Child-care costs are difficult to estimate because of low-cost options 
provided by relatives that are available to some working women but not to others. See 
McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note I3, at I02I n.I49. In I993 families in the Northeast paid, 
on average, $85 per week for child care. See LYNNE M. CASPER, BUREAU or THE CENSUS, U.S. 
DllP 'Tor COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P70.52, WHAT DollS IT COST TO MIND OUR 
PRilSCHOOLilRS?. It has been estimated, however, that child care costs can substantially 
exceed those levels. Writing in I99I, Zigler and Lang reported that "parents of preschoolers 
in Washington, D.C. must pay $IOO a week or more." EDWARD F. ZIGLER & MAllY E. LANG, 
CHilD CARll CHOICES: BALANCING THE NllllDSOrCHIIDRilN, FAMIUES, AND SOCIETY 9-IO (199I). 
Similarly, the "U.S. House of Representatives determined the cost of infant care to be up to 
$I30 per week." ld. at IO. And "infant care [can] cost[] up to $200 weekly in New York 
City." Jd. 
1.82 A credit for child and dependent care expenses is available to some taxpayers under 
I.R.C. § 2I (I994). This credit is available to married couples who live together only if the 
couple files jointly. I.R.C. § 2I (e)(2) ("If the taxpayer is married at the close of the taxable 
year, the credit shall be allowed under subsection (a) only if the taxpayer and his spouse 
file a joint return for the taxable year."). See aLso I.R.C. § 2I (e)(3) (treating legally 
separated spouses as not married for these purposes) and § 2I (e)( 4) (treating spouses who 
live apart for the last six months of the year as unmarried for these purposes). 
Furthermore, for this couple, assuming two children under age I3, the credit would be 
limited to $960 because of dollar limitations incorporated in§ 2I(c) and because the credit 
is limited to a percentage of those expenses under § 2I(a)(I) and (2). The $8,426 tax 
attributable to the wife would be reduced to $7,466. By factoring in the effect of the credit 
for child and dependent care expenses, this wife's income will fall short by $393 of covering 
the expenses listed in the example, and she will still be discouraged from working. The 
§ 2I credit grants only partial relief for child-care costs, and is, therefore, inadequate in 
alleviating the economic pressure facing wives who work outside the home. See Jonathan 
Barry Forman, Beyond President Bush's Child Tax Credit ProposaL· Towards a Comprehensive 
System of Tax Cndits to Help Low-Income Families with Children, 38 EMORY LJ. 66I, 677-84 
(I989); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at I007, I009; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 372-73; 
Ellen R. Zieve, To Won\ ur Not to Work, and What About the Kids1, 3 S. CAL RllV. L. & 
WOMEN'SS"ruD.I63, I74-76 (I993). In addition to the §21 credit for child-care costs, 
Congress has also f>rovided a limited exclusion for cenain employer-provided child care 
under I.R.C. § 129 (I994). Section I29 excludes the value of a child-care plan from income 
only if an employer established the plan. Consequently, very few employed women obtain 
the benefits of§ I29. See McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note I3, at 1008. It is assumed in this 
example that the wife's potential employer does not provide a qualifYing dependent care 
assistance program, so that exclusion provides her with no tax benefit. 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 293 1997
1997] Joint Return Rate Structure 
- additional lunch expense ($5 per day or $25 per week 
for 50 weeks per year) of $1,250; 
-housecleaning expense of $1,200;18.'1 
- professional attire at $2,500; 
- additional dry-cleaning expenses of $700. 184 
Total= $31,353 
293 
This list does not include other costs of working, such as 
higher car insurance premiums for regular commuting, more 
frequent restaurant patronage due to decreased time available for 
meal preparation, job training costs, etcetera, all of which 
contribute to making employment even less viable. A wife 
earning $30,000 annually using the above assumptions would 
generate negative annual disposable income. Clearly, her 
employment in this situation is not financially worthwhile, and 
she will choose not to take the job. This example illustrates the 
problem of aggregation. Had the wife paid only $6,002 in federal 
income tax by filing separately, 111i her earnings would have 
exceeded her total costs by $1,071, and her decision to work would 
have brought in more money than it cost. Of course, given such 
small post-expense wages, the wife may still opt not to work 
outside the home. Nevertheless, this example serves to illustrate 
how the additional tax due to aggregation would, on the margin, 
18.'1 Of course, some women who take paying jobs forgo hiring a housekeeper and do 
most of the housework themselves. See LouiS HAiuus, INSIDE AMElliCA 98-99 (1987); ARUE 
HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MAcHUNG, THE SECOND SHIIT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT 
HOME 3, 276 (1989); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 985. Those women can be 
viewed as bearing the additional housecleaning expense in the form of the drain on their 
life energy and their time. 
184 Apart from the § 21 credit for child and dependent care expenses and the § 129 
exclusion for dependent care assistance programs, none of these listed items may be used 
to reduce tax liability. Such items are considered to be nondeductible personal expenses. 
Grace Blumberg argues compellingly that such items should not be viewed as personal 
expenses, but rather as expenses incurred in the production of income and accordin~ly 
should be deductible. Blumberg, supra note 10, at 63-80. See also Daniel I. Halpenn, 
Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 
122 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1974); William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: 
Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 871 
(1969); Staudt, supra note 43, at 160~5. Even though these items are not deductible for 
purposes of computing tax liability, they should be deducted from the wife's gross income 
m determining whether it is financially worthwhile for her to work. CJ. Mapes v. United 
States, 576 F.2d 896, 903 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (acknowledging that the family incurs "significant" 
additional expenses when the second earner takes a job, including "transportation, lunches, 
and clothing, which are not tax deductible"). 
185 Her tax of $6,002 is not reduced by the § 21 credit for child and dependent cire 
expenses because that credit is unavailable to married spouses who file separately. I.R.C. 
§ 21(e)(2). See a/.soPUBUCATION 555, supmnote 52, at 4. 
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discourage some women from working, women who do not earn 
enough to afford the additional tax. 1a; Even women who earn just 
enough to pay the additional joint tax attributable to their 
incomes would tend to be discouraged from working because 
their post-expense wages are low.187 Aggregation serves to hinder 
women's access to employment. Not only does aggregation 
discourage some women from working altogether but it tends to 
make working less profitable for wives than for husbands. The 
problem results because aggregation imposes a higher effective 
tax rate on the secondary earner than on the primary earner. 188 
Statistical studies amply support the phenomenon that higher 
taxes on women discourage them from participating in the paid 
labor force by demonstrating that a married woman's earnings 
are more tax sensitive than are those of a married man .1ffi "[T] he 
}a; Anecdotal stories have surfaced describing instances in which women actually 
decided to leave the work force because the costs of working exceeded their incomes. See 
Elizabeth Ritchie Johnson, "I Couldn't Afford My foh, • REDBOOK, Apr. 1991, at 89-90. See aLso 
Stephen E. Frank, Higher Taxes on Wealthy May Reduce Number of Two-Income Households, 
WALL Sr. J., Aug. 13, 1993, at B5a (citing economists who predict that higher tax rates 
would force some women to leave the work force); Lewin, supra note 181, at El8 
(discussing the case of a woman who left work after realizing that her salary was not netting 
the family much money once taxes and work-related expenses were taken into account); All 
Things Considered, supra note 31 (interviewing Robert Willard, certified financial planner, 
who described a couple in which the wife was considering leaving the labor force because 
of her low profitability due to taxes); Dateline NBC: Two for the Money, supra note 174 
(interviewing a ~amer family in which the wife's cost of working exceeded her income, 
yet she decided to continue working to retain the health care benefits available through her 
job). 
187 This pattern suggests the propriety of a deduction or credit for ~arner couples, 
or a deduction for "personal" expenses that are incurred to enable the second earner to 
work. See Contract with America Hearings, supra note 31, at 88-89, reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES 
at 1346 (statement of Professor Alstott); Blumberg, supra note 10, at 59-62; Gann, supra 
note 29, at 36. For a discussion of some pros and cons of such an approach, see Bittker, 
supra note 29, at 1433-37. 
188 See McCaffery, Fresh Loolc, supra note 13, at 1041 n.219; Davis, supra note 18, at 211. 
lffi SeeSrAFF or JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96nf CONG., THE INCOME TAX TllEATMENT or 
MAiuuED COUPLES AND SJNGU! PERSONS 5 (Comm. Print 1980) ("Virtually all statistical studies 
of the issue conclude that a wife's work effon is more responsive to reduced taxes than her 
husband's.");Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A 
New Loolc at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L REV. 1905, 1925-27 (1987); Jerry A Hausman, 
Labor Suppl-y, in How TAXES AFFECT EcoNOMIC BEHAVIOR 27, 28, 55-58 (HenryJ.. Aaron & 
Joseph A.- Pechman eds., 1981); Leuthold, supra note 134, at 103-04; Jane . Leuthold, 
Home Production and the Tax System, 3 J. EcoN. PS\CHOL. 145 (1983); Thomas MaCurdy, Worlc 
Disincentive Effects of Taxes: A Reexamination of Some Evidence, PAPERS & PROC. 104TH ANNUAL 
MEEriNGAM.-EcoN. Ass'N in82AM. EcoN. REV. 243, 243 (1992); McCaffery, Fresh Loolc, supra 
note 13, at 1003 & n.73, 1038-39; Harvey S. Rosen, Tax IUusion and the Labor Supply rf 
Married Women, 58 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 167 (1976); Robert K. Triest, The Effect of Income 
Taxation onLahorSupply in the United States, 25j. HUM. RESOURCES 491, 501-13 (1990). See 
generall, Jerry A Hausman, Taxes and Labor Supply, in 1 HANDBOOK or PUBUC ECONOMICS 
213, 23849 (Alan]. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985). But see Mcintyre, supra note 
118, at 485-86 (stating that studies indicate that the reduction in wives' work hours due to an 
increase in the applicable tax rate may be canceled out by cross-effects). 
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net effect of the higher marginal rate faced by married women is 
to induce a substitution of either home production or leisure for 
market production. "100 The media has also acknowledged the 
greater tax sensitivity of wives' earnings compared to those of 
husbands.191 Furthermore, even the government has 
acknowledged in legislative history to the Contract with America 
Tax Relief Act of 1995192 that the aggregation effect found in the 
current joint return system, which also contributes to the 
marriage penalty, causes concern because of "the potential work 
disincentive it causes. "1!8 
Some commentators would argue that the tax attributable to 
the wife's $30,000 of earnings is not $8,426, but rather is only 
$6,810, or a third of the joint return tax liability of $20,429 because 
her $30,000 of income is one third of the couple's combined 
income.194 Of course, even if that allocation were appropriate, the 
wife would still be better off by filing separately rather than 
jointly, in which case her tax liability would be only $6,002. In 
addition to the wife being worse off by filing jointly due to lack of 
access to her husband's large tax savings,195 it is improper in 
analyzing the aggregation effect to divide the $20,429 joint tax 
liability between the spouses in proportion to their relative net 
incomes. In this context the issue is the effect of the current tax 
structure on the wife's decision of whether or not to engage at all 
in paid labor. Therefore, the proper comparison is to determine 
whether the couple will have additional disposable income as a 
result of the wife's decision to enter the work force. 100 Stated 
alternatively, the proper comparison is to determine how much 
100Janet C. Hunt et al., Taxation and the Wife's Use of Time, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
426,427 (1981). See id. at 431-32. Accord Zelenak, supra note 29, at 366. 
191 See Martin Feldstein, Tax Rntes and Human &haviur, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1993, at Al4; 
Frank, supra note 186, at B5A. 
192H.R. 1215, 104th Cong. (1995). 
193 H.R. REP. No. 104-84, at 13 (1995). 
194 See Mcintyre, supra note 118, at 484. Professor Mcintyre does not eXJ>lain how to 
compute the tax attributable to the wife's income. He merely states that "Lflor married 
couples who are not pooling, the burden of the tax on the community will be a matter of 
negotiation." /d. Nevertheless, because he implies that income is fungible, that income 
from each spouse finds its way into part of the lowest tax bracket, I conclude that he would 
apportion tax liability between the spouses in proportion to their relative incomes. 
195 See infra notes 255-370 and accompanying text. 
1!16 See Davis, supra note 18, at 210. 
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additional tax the couple must pay as a result of the wife's $30,000 
of earnings. If only the husband works, the joint return tax 
liability would have been $12,003. The impact of the wife's job is 
to increase the family's total tax by $8,426 to $20,429. In deciding 
whether or not the wife should work, it is this additional $8,426 
that must be considered, not $6,810. The $8,426 is her true tax 
cost for purposes of determining whether or not she will enter 
the work force. 
Professor Michael Mcintyre argues compellingly that 
attributing the wife's, rather than the husband's, income to the 
highest marginal tax rates is a reflection of flawed human 
perceptions, and that the tax code does not differentiate between 
sources of income when assigning the income to various 
brackets: "[t]he tax system ... treats all marital income alike. "100 
He argues that the view of the wife as a secondary earner who 
must be taxed in the highest applicable brackets is due to human 
bias, not to bias intrinsic to the tax code. 1~ Income from both 
spouses could be said to be taxed in the lowest bracket because 
income is fungible. If the husband were the spouse deciding 
whether or not to work, it would be his $60,000 of income that 
could be viewed as being taxed in the upper brackets and the 
wife's income that would be viewed as being taxed in the lowest 
brackets. 199 
Although insightful, this criticism of the aggregation effect 
ignores the reality that most wives are, in fact, secondary earners 
precisely because most wives tend to earn less than their 
husbands.2l0 In many families neither spouse is considered a 
1!17 Mcintyre, supra note 118, at 484. 
1~See id. 
199 SeeMapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 901~2 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (taxpayer's argument 
in a constitutional challenge to the aggregation effect); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. 
Supp. 958, 968-69 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (taxpayer's argument in a constitutional challenge to 
the aggregation effect). 
2lO Census data from 1994 indicate that median income for married men whose wives 
were present substantially exceeded the median income for married women whose 
husbands were present. The median income for married men was $28,377, while the 
median income for married women was only $11,859. BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'TOF 
COMMERCE, CUilllENT PoPUlATION REPOIITS, Series P60, Table P-6 (1996). These median 
incomes include incomes not only from full-time workers but also the incomes of spouses 
who work pan-time and the incomes from those who do not participate at all in the labor 
force. See infra notes 238-54 and accompanying text. See also Bankman & Griffith, supra 
note 189, at 1926-27 (stating that wives have been the marginal workers historically); Gann, 
supra note 29, at 42 n.l37 (asserting that wives stay out of the labor force becoming, in 
effect, secondary earners in pan because husbands are paid more); McCaffery, Fresh Look, 
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discretionary worker because income is needed from both 
spouses.2>1 However, in most families, if one spouse must leave 
the work force to assume, for example, child-care responsibilities, 
it is the lower-earning spouse who will usually do so. IDZ 
Traditional societal values and the failure to tax home 
production ID!1 further encourage women to stay at home and out 
of the work force, reinforcing the notion that wives are, in fact, 
secondary earners.2>4 Even in some of the few cases in which a 
wife earns more than her husband, the wife might still be viewed 
as the secondary earner because of social or biological 
constraints.:m Consequently, in assessing whether or not a wife 
will work, it is appropriate to assume that the highest tax brackets 
apply to her income. While "[t]he tax law's basic rate structure is 
nominally indifferent to who earns any given amount of income, 
. . . the interface with . . . real-world conditions pushes towards a 
traditional, gendered division of labor, "2Xl with wives at home 
doing unpaid labor and husbands gainfully employed. Even wives 
supra note 13, at 99~94, 10()4..()5 (describing societal tendency to marginalize the lesser-
earning spouse, usually the wife, and describing wives as being viewed historically as the 
marginal earners); Kahng, supra note 51, at 22. But see Staudt, supra note 43, at 161~12 
(contesting that all women are secondary earners, and arguing that many women, especially 
women in low-income families and women of color, have historically had high attachment 
to the labor force). Wives also tend to be secondary earners because the realities of 
childbirth require them to leave their jobs at least temporarily, see McCaffery, Fresh Look, 
supra note 13, at 994, and because of pervasive gender bias in society, see id. at 1057-58. 
2ll S«Staudt, supra note 43, at 1611-13 (arguing that many women, especially women in 
poor families and women of color, are not marginal workers because their financial 
contributions to the family are significant, expected, or needed). 
:min 1994,39.4% of married women were not in the paid labor force. See BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP 'T OF COMMERCE, STATirnCAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1995) 406 
tbl.638 [hereinafter STAnrnCAL ABSTRACT]. By contrast, only 22.6% of married men were 
out of the labor force in 1994. S« id. at 405 tbl.636. This fact suggests that of the two 
spouses, wives are the most likely to be viewed as secondary or discretionllr)' workers. As 
Professor Bittker noted in predicting the argument Mcintyre articulates, "[i]n a society that 
takes the husband's job for granted and views the wife as the secondary wage earner, ... it is 
reasonable to describe the existing state of affairs as biased against women. " Bittker, supra 
note 29, at 1433. 
3!!1 See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 43 (providing an analysis of the non-taxation of imputed 
income and for a feminist defense of taxing housework); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 
13, at 1001.{)5 (discussing how the failure to tax imputed income discourages women from 
working); Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 44-47 (same). 
2>4 See Gann, supra note 29, at 42-43 & n.139. 
lm Among my own acquaintances, a wife who earned more than her husband was the 
spouse to leave the work force upon having a child. Clearly, cultural influences about the 
proper roles of men and women influenced that couple to treat the wife as the secondary 
earner despite the fact that she had earned more than her husband. 
2l6McCaffery, Fresh Lool, supra note 13, at 1059. See also Zelenak, supra note 29, at 366-
67 (characterizing Mcintyre's approach as formalistic and criticizing it as failing to take 
social reality into account). 
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who work despite the aggregation effect are harmed by it because 
the higher rates that apply to women render their work effort less 
profitable than that of their husbands. To the extent the 
aggregation effect discourages women from working, they are 
harmed economically both in the short-run because they 
generate no income of their own and in the long-run because 
they forgo developing the valuable human capital of work 
experience. 
Despite aggregation and its tendency to discourage women 
from working, wives' labor force participation rates have been 
increasing over the past six decades.lm In 1940, 14.7% of married 
women participated in the labor force. By 1950 that rate had 
increased to 23.8%. As recently as 1994, 60.6% of married women 
participated in the labor force.l!ll Consequently, 39.4% of married 
women, a significant portion of them, still did not participate in 
the work force by 1994 despite trends to the contrary. 
Accordingly, many of those women must lack economic 
independence during their marriages. Undoubtedly many factors 
contribute to wives' reluctance to enter or remain in the labor 
force,:oo but the aggregation effect, disproportionately high 
taxation of married women's earnings, is probably one of them. 
Although women have been entering the work force in larger and 
larger numbers, it appears that for married women, various 
factors, including the aggregation effect, currently prevent 
significant additional work force participation. 
Some commentators point to women's increased participation 
in the work force as evidence that the aggregation effect does not 
exist or is unimportant.210 Analysis of a family's additional tax 
burden when a second spouse enters the work force, as provided 
317 See, e.g., PECHMAN, supra nore 114, at 77 (noting these historical trends); RU'JH SIDEL, 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAsT: THE PUGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA at xv, 60 
(1986); WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'Tor LABoR, PUB. No. 92-1, WoMEN WORKERS: OUTLOOK 
TO 2005, 2 tbl.1, (1992) (providing and projecting labor force participation rates of men 
and women over a 30-year time period from 1975 to 2005); Gann, supra note 29, at 33 & 
nn.114 & 116, 34 & n.ll9, 35 (providing charts of married women's labor participation 
rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics through 1979). 
all See SrATirnCAL ABSJ'RAcr, supra note 202, at 406 tbl.638. 
:00 See T. Aldrich Finegan, Parlicipatian of Mmried Women in the I...alxTr Force, in SEX, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND THE 0MSJON OF LABOR 27-29 (Cynthia B. Uoyd ed., 1975) (listing factors 
that encourage and others that discourage married women from working in the paid work 
force). 
210 See, e.g., Mcintyre, supra nore 118, at 486-87. 
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in Table 1 above, definitively demonstrates the existence of the 
aggregation effect. One can speculate that without such a pattern 
in the joint return taxation of married couples, even more 
married women would enter the work force. Professor Pamela 
Gann has suggested that the effect of aggregation is properly 
determined by comparing the percentage of women who 
participate in the labor force under aggregation with the 
percentage who would participate if aggregation were repealed, 
rather than by examining historical trends in married women's 
labor force participation rates. 211 The fact that many women 
already work despite current tax law's aggregation of spousal 
incomes merely demonstrates first, that many women are now 
earning enough to afford the additional tax, second, that many 
couples experience economic need severe enough to encourage 
work even when posHax earnings are minimal,212 and third, that 
other factors such as evolving social attitudes21~ have ameliorated 
the pressure discouraging women from working. Perhaps, many 
women enter or remain in the labor force because they need 
"economic security in the case of divorce. "214 Others probably 
work despite aggregation because of the psychic benefits a 
productive professional life can provide. In describing reasons 
for increased labor force participation rates among affluent wives, 
Professor McCaffery has stated, "these tendencies are 
independent of tax considerations, and do not serve to diminish 
the particular incentives generated by tax laws. "215 Even though 
many married women are in the paid work force, significant 
numbers of others are not, in part perhaps, because of 
aggregation.216 Under aggregation, those women who do work in 
the paid labor force are rendered less profitable than are primary 
earners. "Thus, despite the increase in labor force participation, 
women continue to suffer economic disadvantages at the hands 
211 Gann, supra nore 29, at 43. Accord Rosen, supra note 165, at 426. 
212 See McCafiel}', Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1017 n.133. 
213 See Gann, supra nore 29, at 43; Winn & Winn, supra note 52, at 860. 
214 Zelenak, supra note 29, at 376. 
215McCaffel)', Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1028. 
216 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 29, at 369-70 (noting that many married womeq work 
either part-time or not at all). 
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of the tax system. "217 Aggregation operates to discourage women 
on the margin from working once they marry, and in that respect 
it is another example of the pattern described in the Ames 
hypothetical above in which government policy discourages wives 
from paid work. 
In the current tax rate system, spouses are financially 
encouraged to file jointly whenever their incomes differ, that is, 
whenever one earner is primary and the other is secondary.218 
Nevertheless, through the aggregation effect, the very act of filing 
jointly further discourages the secondary earner from working, 
thereby resulting in continued income disparity. As long as 
incomes are disparate, couples will have an incentive to file 
jointly. As long as couples file jointly, the aggregation effect will 
continue to discourage women from working and will perpetuate 
the disparity in spousal incomes, resulting again in an incentive 
to file jointly. The current system of joint filing operates against 
women because they earn less than men and maintains that status 
quo by discouraging many women from working altogether.219 In 
this manner the current rate structure contributes to the 
perpetuation of inequality between men and women by 
reinforcing the inequality of spousal incomes. This vicious circle 
reveals the gendered nature of the tax code and shows how the 
2l7 Davis, supra note 18, at 213 (discussing the aggregation effect). 
218 See supra Pan III.A 3. 
219 q. McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 988 (arguing that aspects of the rate 
structure serve to perpetuate traditional family patterns); id. at 1029-30 (arguing that tax 
laws contribute to the self-perpetuation of certain gender biases); id. at 1030..32 (illustrating 
how employer expectations of women employees can become self-fulfilling prophesies due 
to the lower remuneration the expectations prompted); NANCY CHODOR.OW, THE 
REPRODUCTION OF MOTHEIUNC: P ~OANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER. (1978) (making 
the point that in non-tax, psychoanalytic, sociological, and philosophical contexts, such as 
family dynamics, gender mequalities tend to be perpetuated automatically and are self-
reinforcing); ClAUDIA GoLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER. GAp: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
AMEIUCAN WOMEN 214 (1990); HOCHSCHILD &: MACHUNC, supra note 183, at 254 (same as 
Chodorow); Mary E. Becker, Bmriers Facing Women in the Wag~Labor Market and the Need for 
Additional Remedies: A &ph to Fischel and Laz.ear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1986); Stephen 
Coate &: Glenn C. Loury, f.wU Affirmativ~Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes'!, 83 
AM. EcoN. REV. 1220, 1221 (1993) (modeling self-fulfilling prophesies); Mayer G. Freed &: 
Daniel D. Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equaliry of Men and Women: A Revisionist View 
?!_Sex Discrimination in Employment, 1981 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 585, 634-35 (discussing 
national" statistical discrimination that leads to self-fulfilling prophesies, using female job 
persistence as an example); Reuben Gronau, Sex-related Wage Differentials and Women's 
Interrupted Labor Careers-The Chicken or the Egg, 6J. LAB. EcoN. 277, 294 (1988); McCaffery, 
Slouchang Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 61!)..16, 624 (describing tendency of wage 
discrimination to be self-perpetuating along gender lines in pan because of income 
aggregation); Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. 
REv. 421, 443-54 (1992) (asserting that gender discrimination is perpetuated through self-
fulfilling prophesies). 
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rate structure contributes to denying economic independence to 
women.Z!O Eliminating gender-based wage discrimination alone 
Z!O q. McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note I3, at 1000 (demonstrating how taxes 
contribute to the self-perpetuation of single-earner families in the context of the social 
security system); Davis, supra note IS, at 233 (arguing generally that the tax system helps 
perpetuate women's inferiority in society by "subsidiz[ingJ patriarchy") (citation omitted). 
Critics might argue that the high U.S. divorce rate is evidence that wives are not 
economically dependent on their husbands. True economic dependence, they would 
assert, would tend to preclude or discourage women from divorcing their husbands. 
Many responses to this argument demonstrate its weaknesses. First of all, the 
aggregation effect harms women economically during marriage, not upon divorce. Once 
spouses divorce they can no longer file jointly, and the wife's first dollar of earnings are no 
longer taxed at her husband's top margmal tax rate. Indeed, commentators have suggested 
that the divorce rate may be high, in part, because of the marriage penalty. Sa, e.g., Alan L. 
Feld, Divorce, Tax-Style, 54 TAXES 608, 609 (I976). But see George E. Ray, Prr>!Josed Changes 
in Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income Tax, 30 CAL. L. REV. 397, 413 (I942) 
(arguing that tax consequences are unlikely to impact a couple's marital status); Robinson 
& Weni~, supra note 3I, at 787 n.59 (noting that it is unclear to what extent the marriage 
penalty mfluences couples either to divorce or not to marry) ; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 364-
65 (noting that in most cases whether the marriage penalty has an effect is uncertain). The 
true impact of the marriage penalty on divorce rates, if any, is the subject of debate and is 
difficult to determine. 
Furthermore, while the aggregation effect economically harms all wives who earn less 
than their husbands, only those wives who are discouraged from working altogether will be 
extremely dependent on their husbands. Those wives would be the ones most likely to be 
precluded from divorcing because of their nonparticipation in the work force. Other wives, 
those who work because they earn enough to afford the additional tax the aggregation effect 
imposes, would still likely be able to divorce because they do participate in the labor force. 
For these women, aggregation operates to tax them at a high effective tax rate. The 
aggregation effect would not prevent them from divorcing, but it would leave them with 
fewer assets after taxes so that they would be poorer upon divorce than would be the case in 
the absence of aggregation. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 58, at 384 (noting the insecure 
economic position of divorced women in the Untted States). 
Factors unrelated to a woman 's_ economic status often contribute to the high divorce 
rate. For example, social factors such as physical and emotional abuse contribute to the 
high U.S. divorce rate. Women often divorce for these reasons even when they are 
economically dependent. Therefore, the premise that a high divorce rate signifies that 
women have economic independence is flawed. Many women divorce despite their lack of 
financial resources and despite the consequent poverty they tend to experience. See, e.g., 
LENORE j. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SoCIAL AND EcoNOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 32>56 (1985) (hereinafter WEITZMAN, 
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION] (asserting that in I985 women on average experienced a 73% 
decline in their standards of living in the year after divorce, while men enjoyed a 42% 
improvement in their standards of living); Beck, supra note 58, at 384; McCaffery, Fresh 
Loolc, supra note I3, at I05I-52 (referring to economic disaster upon divorce); Robert E. 
McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20 J. FAM. L 443 (I98I-
82); James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women 
and Childrm, 2I FAM. L.Q 35I, 404 (I987); Karen Seal, A Decade of NoFauU Divorce: What It 
Has Meant Financially for Women in California, FAM. ADVOC., Spring I979, at IO; Cynthia 
Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemalur: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership 
Buyouts and Dissociation Under NoFauU, 60 U. CHI. L REV. 67, 7~73, 78-85 (I993); Lenore J. 
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and &onomic Cons~uences of Property, Alimony, 
and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. llBI (I98I) [hereinafter Weitzman, The 
Economics of Divorce]; joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, I VA.J. Soc. PoL'Y& L. 
383 (1994) (discussing how family law contributes to women's poverty upon divorce); 
Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Expkn-atory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986). In 
addition, divorces sought by men contribute to the high divorce rate. Those divorces 
suggest nothing about whether or not wives are economically 'dependent. Thus, the high 
divorce rate may coexist with large numbers of wives being economically dependent on 
their husbands. 
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will not solve the problem of women's economic inferiority 
because the current tax system operates on income patterns that 
exist, in part, for nondiscriminatory reasons. These income 
patterns induce joint filing which, in turn, continues to 
discourage many women from working and thereby perpetuates 
disparity in spouses' incomes. 221 
By discouraging married women from working, not only does 
the aggregation effect "deter[] [married women] from entering 
the labor force and the mainstream of social and political life,"222 
but it also harms unmarried women. "To the extent that this 
incentive to remain at home reinforces traditional, patriarchal 
stereotypes about the female role in family and society, the tax 
filing system has a negative impact on single and divorced 
women [as well]. "2'..5 In this manner the tax filing system "reflects 
a societal policy of keeping married women in the home, and 
thus constitutes a significant barrier to the full recognition of 
women as equal members of society. "224 By discouraging the paid 
labor of married women, the aggregation effect sends the 
message to society that women should not work. 225 This pattern 
not only harms women, but also creates inefficiencies for society 
at large by discouraging married women from taking jobs for 
Another response to the argument that the high divorce rate demonstrates women's 
economic independence is that certain states' divorce laws enable women without assets of 
their own dunng marriage to divorce by giving them some rights to the assets their 
husbands have accumulated These property division and alimony rules come into play 
only upon divorce and do not give the wife access to her husband's assets during marriage. 
See Murray, supra note 52, at 25. Thus, the high divorce rate does not prove that wives are 
economically independent during marriage. While a couple remains married, the tax 
system, through the aggregation effect, contributes to keeping wives financially dependent 
on their husbands. In this manner, the tax system can be said to be contributing in intact 
marriages to the concentration of power in men's hands. 
Through the aggr~ation effect joint filing harms wives financially. That the aggregation 
effect can harm wives economic well-being does not mean that it is so severe that it 
completely prevents women from divorcing. Even if the financial harm to wives from 
income aggregation does not reach the level of total economic devastation, and even if 
divorce remains available to her, the tax system should not favor one spouse over the other 
on a systematic basis. 
221 See Zelenak, supra note 29, at 363. 
222 Davis, supra note 18, at 210. 
2'..5 ld. at 198. 
224 ld. at 213 (footnotes omitted). See also Bittker, supra note 29, at 1433; Wendy C. 
Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FoRDHAM L. REV. 27, 36-37 
(1978). This point, with regard to the effect of aggregation, may also be made with respect 
to the impact of income splitting. See supra note 132. 
225 See Davis, supra note 18, at 214 (arguing that aggregation tacitly teaches messages 
that reinforce job discrimination and sexual stereotypes). 
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which they may be well qualified, perhaps more so than those 
currently undertaking those jobs. 2'4i By creating an artificial 
barrier to employment, the aggregation effect contributes to the 
costly misallocation of labor force resources, misallocations that 
have been estimated to be in the billions of dollars. 'Zl1 
C Income Splitting and Aggregation Combined 
!.Joint Return Rates Penalize Marriage When Spouses Defy 
Conventional Marital Roles and Benefit Marriage When 
Spouses Conform to Traditional Roles 
Because income splitting and aggregation each independently 
reward families in which earnings are concentrated in one 
spouse rather than distributed between them evenly, their 
combined effect, not surprisingly, is to reward disparate-income 
couples greatly and to penalize similar-income couples 
significantly.228 Consistent with this intuition, a number of tax 
scholars have noted that the marriage penalty diminishes as the 
spouses' incomes diverge.229 A couple fitting the stereotypical 
pattern in which the husband works and the wife does not will 
have a minimal marriage penalty, or even a marriage benefit, if 
the spouses file jointly. However, the more the couple strays from 
this traditional living pattern, that is, the more equivalent the 
spouses' incomes, the more severe their marriage penalty.230 In 
this manner the operation of the marriage penalty and bonus 
2'4i See McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1042, 1051; Davis, supra note 18, at 212. 
For analyses of the efficiency consequences of the aggregation effect, see Gann, supra note 
29, and McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13. 
'Zl1 See BERNAilD, supra note 164, at 160-62; Winn & Winn, supra note 52, at 859. The 
failure to tax household capital and labor results in excessive allocation of those resources 
to the home. According to economist, Professor Boskin, this misallocation cost society 
between $24 billion and $45 billion in 1972. Michael J. Boskin, Efficimcy Aspects of the 
Di{fermtial Tax Treatment of Market and Household Economic Activity, 4 J. PUB. EcoN. 1, 11-12 
(1975). 
ZIB See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. See also supra Table 3. Other 
features of the tax system, such as the earned income tax credit and certain passive activity 
loss limitations, function to exacerbate the marriage penalty that is already present because 
of the rate structure. See generally Alstott, supra note 118 (describing how the earned 
income tax credit contributes to a marriage penalty for low-income taxpayers); Harmelink, 
supra note 118, at 593-94 passirrr, Hulse, supra note 29, at 252 (describing how the standard 
deduction causes a marnage penalty). This Article will focus only on the contribution of 
the joint return rate structure to the marriage penalty and bonus. 
230 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text 
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seem to "reinforce traditional gender roles within the family. "211 
Arguably, the tax system should not penalize taxpayers in 
proportion to how much they depart from a sexist stereotype or 
benefit them because they fit the stereotype.2'12 Because of income 
splitting and aggregation, disparate income couples have the 
most to gain by filing jointly, often obtaining a marriage bonus. 
For the same reasons, equal income couples have the most to 
lose, suffering significant marriage penalties as a result of the 
great economic harm conferred on them by aggregation and the 
nonexistent benefit from income splitting. 
The pattern in which the marriage penalty becomes more 
severe as the spouses' incomes converge applies only if the couple 
files jointly, which the spouses will do until incomes are exactly 
equal. Notice that if the couple had not been induced to file 
jointly, and instead had been able to file separately, a different 
pattern would emerge, one which might encourage both spouses 
to work.~ The couple in which both spouses earned $60,000 
would have experienced a marriage penalty of $1,485 had they 
filed separately. The couple in which the husband earned $80,000 
and the wife earned $40,000 would have had a larger marriage 
penalty of $1,717. And the couple in which only the husband 
worked, earning $120,000, would have had an even greater 
marriage penalty of $2,992.2'14 Under separate filing, the more 
divergent the spouses' incomes, that is, the more they fit sexist 
stereotypes, the greater the marriage penalty.236 By contrast, 
couples with equivalent incomes, those who challenge 
211 Contract with America Hearings, supra note 31, at 85, reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES at 1344 
(statement of Professor Alstott). See also supra note 129. 
2'12 See supra notes 222-25. However, even if the marriage penalty encourages traditional 
gender roles, this may not necessarily be harmful. Rather, the marriage benefit obtained by 
the family in which the wife raises children and cleans the house, forgoing paid labor, may 
be viewed as financial compensation for her efforts in the home. It has been 
acknowledged, however, that this tax benefit accorded to the family may not benefit the wife 
individually. SeeAlstott, supra note 30, at 2029-30,2050-51. 
~ Cf. Gann, supra note 29, at 42 n.l37 (describing the aggregation effect and noting 
that if the wife could tile separately, she would be more likely to work outside of the home). 
2.'14 See supra Table 3. q. Hulse, supra note 29, at 253 (proposing a system where 
married couples could opt either to file jointly or as if they were single and noting that 
combined tax liability increases under the single rates the more divergent the spouses' 
incomes). 
236 q. Donald V. Stuchell, The Married Filing Separate Anomaly-Is This What Congress 
lntended7, 42 TAX NoTES 241, 241 (1989) (noting m another context that the marriage 
penalty varies depending on relative spousal incomes even if couples file separately). 
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conventional roles, would experience the smallest marriage 
penalty. If the benefits of income splitting were not embedded in 
the rate structure for couples who file jointly, then separate filing 
would emerge and would provide an incentive for couples to avoid 
traditional roles. By avoiding the stereotypical working patterns 
and by accepting similar financial responsibilities for the family, 
the spouses could minimize their marriage penalty. Vis-a-vis 
current patterns, women would be encouraged to promote their 
own economic independence by working and would have first-
hand access to greater resources, larger post-tax earnings. 
Furthermore, the tax system would provide a benefit whose 
availability and amount would be tied to how closely the couple 
promotes economic independence for both spouses. The fact 
that the marriage penalty worsens when both spouses work is 
another feature of the U.S. tax system that the Ames example 
illustrates. Through the tax system, the government rewards 
divergent spousal incomes, consequently discouraging the 
secondary earner from working. 
2.Filing Jointly Benefits Husbands and Harms Wives 
Economically 
Another joint return pattern with severe implications for 
women results from the combined impact of income splitting 
and income aggregation. This pattern has not been described or 
addressed in the tax literature until now. When a couple living in 
one of the forty-two common-law jurisdictions files jointly rather 
than separately, income splitting and aggregation together act to 
reduce the tax attributable to the higher earner and to increase 
the tax attributable to the lower earner.~ Thus, the benefits and 
burdens of joint filing are not distributed evenly between the 
spouses when one earns more than the other, as is the usual 
case. 237 
~This pattern is not present for couples living in community property states because 
of the different manner in which their separate return liabilities are computed. Community 
property spouses are subject to income splitting under Poe v. SeaboTn even if they file 
separately. See supra note 74. 
237 Note that if the spouses earned the same amount of taxable income, then the 
benefits and burdens of jomt filing would be distributed between them evenly. However, if 
they earned the same amounts, there would be no economic benefit to filing jointly. They 
would be no worse off by filing separatelr. Whenever spouses should be filing jointly to 
save in taxes, the benefits of joint fihng wil inure to the higher-earning spouse, usually the 
husband, and the burdens will inure to the lower-earning spouse, usually the wife. The tax 
attributable to the husband would be less than the amount he would have owed had he 
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One economic reality in society is that men tend to earn more 
than women. Although the wage gap between men and women 
has been diminishing over the last thirty years in the United 
States, women on average still earn significantly less than men 
do. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that for the 
fourth quarter of 1995 "[w]omen who usually worked full time had 
median earnings of $407 per week, 74.3 percent of the $548 
median for men. "2!!8 Even for men and women in managerial and 
professional specialty occupations and for college graduates with 
advanced degrees, men who usually worked full time earned 
significantly more than women who usually worked full time. 
Men in those occupations earned $825 per week while such 
women earned $604 per week. "Among college graduates with 
advanced degrees . . . the highest 10 percent of male workers 
earned $1,916 or more [per week], while the highest 10 percent of 
their female counter-parts made [only] $1,403 or more. "2'19 
Data from the Bureau of the Census also demonstrate that men 
entering the full-time work force earned significantly more than 
full-time female entrants. From 1991 through 1993 those men 
earned an average of $459 per week, while their female 
counterparts earned only $306 per week. 240 Assuming fifty weeks 
of work per year, the difference of $153 per week amounted to 
$7,650 less income for women than for otherwise similarly 
situated men. This disparity constituted half of the women's 
annual income. Women entering the full-time work force were 
earning only two-thirds of what full-time male entrants to the 
work force were making. Data from 1994 indicate that the median 
annual earnings of all full-time workers were $30,854 for men and 
$22,205 for women. 241 
All of the above-referenced data compare earnings of full-
filed separately, see Edison-Smith, supra note 56, at 120, and the tax attributable to the wife 
would be more than her tax liability had she filed separately. 
2.'18 BUREAU or LABoR STATISTICS, supra note 164. These data exclude self-employment 
income. 
219 ld. These data also exclude self-employment income. 
240 PAUL RWCAVAGE, BUREAU OF TilE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T or COMMERCE, CURRENT 
POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STuDIES, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC WELL·BEING: 
LABoR FORCE, 1991 ro 1993, P7048, 2 tbi.B (1995). 
241 BUREAU OF TilE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HoUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES, 
INCOME AND POVER1Y: 1994 INCOME SUMMARY SERIES P70.47, tbi.A (1996). 
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time242 working men and women without regard to their marital 
status. Because men tend to earn more than women, it should 
surprise no one that husbands also tend to earn more than their 
wives. In fact, data comparing earnings of husbands and wives 
show an even greater disparity than that present between men 
and women generally24.'1 because of the many wives who work part-
time244 or not at all.~ Census data from 1994 indicate that 
median income for married men whose wives were present 
substantially exceeded the median income for married women 
whose husbands were present. The median income for married 
men was $28,377, while the median income for married women 
was only $11,859.246 These figures include incomes not only from 
full-time workers but also the incomes of spouses who work part 
242 Su!Ve)' participants were classified as full-time workers if they reponed that they 
usually worked thirty..f1ve or more hours per week. See B UllEAU OF LABoR STATISI1CS, supra 
note 164. 
24S See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Earnings Gap: Learning from 
International Comparisons, PAPERS & PROC. 104nt ANNUAL MEETING AM. EcoN. Ass'N in 82 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 533, 534 (1992) (among married workers, the ratio of female to male earnings 
in the United States is under 0.60); Dowd, supra note 164, at 453 & n.137. 
244 See HoCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 183, at 2 (noting that one-third of mothers 
who work have part-time jobs). Pan-time jobs pay considerably less than full-time jobs 
both in terms of benefit efigibility and wages. See CHRIS TILLY, SHORT HouRS, SHORT SHRIFT: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PART-TIME WORK 3-12 (1990); Martha Chamallas, Women and 
Part-Time Worlc: The Case for Pay Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. REV. 709, 711, 715-16 
(1986) (noting that pan-ume work is underpaid); McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 
985. 
~In 1992, only 59.2% of all married women were in the waged labor force. See 
STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr, supra note 202, at 405 tbl.636. In that same year married women, on 
average, contributed approximately 32% of their household's income. See LAWRENCE MISHEL 
& jARED BERNSTEIN, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1994-95 at 61 (1994). In 1980 wives' 
median contribution to total family earnings was only 26.7%. See WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. 
DEP'T OF LABoR, BULLETIN 298, TIME OF CHANGE: 1983 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WoRKERS, 18 
tbl.l-12, 19 tbl.l-13 (1983). Husbands tend to earn significandy more than their wives. 
Professor McCaffery reports that "married working women eam[ed]. on average, [only] 
fo!1r-six percent of what their husbands d[id]." McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 994 
(ciung Dowd, supra note 164, at 445 n.86). If only the spouses contributed to household 
income, this 46% corresponded with wives earning 31.5% of the household income. This 
information is derived by solving the two equations below: Total income = Ws income + 
H's income. Wife's income = 0.46 x H's income. Total income = 0.46 x H's income + H's 
income. Total income = 1.46 x H's income. Total income = (1.46) x (W's income/0.46). 
(0.46/1.46) x Total income • Ws income. 0.315 xTotal income = Ws income. The wife's 
income is 31.5% of the couple's total income. 
Census data from 1994 indicate that many more women than men work part-time or not 
at all. Full-time male workers numbered 51,580,000 while full-time female workers 
numbered only 34,155,000. Assuming a population with at least as many women as men, at 
least 17,000,000 more women than men worked either pan-time or not at all. See BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, HOUSEHOU>ECONOMIC STUDIES, INCOME AND PoVERTY: 
1994 INCOME SUMMARY, tbi.A ( 1996). 
246 B UllEAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP 'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPOIITS, 
Series P60, Table P-6 (1996). 
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time and the incomes from those who do not participate at all in 
the labor force.247 Spouses whose earnings are represented by 
these median figures would have a compelling financial incentive 
to file jointly rather than separately because of the great income 
disparity. Furthermore, of the two spouses, the wife is much more 
likely than the husband to be the lower-earning spouse. 
Despite thirty years of narrowing, the gender wage gap for full-
time workers continues today.248 A variety of factors contributes to 
this phenomenon: jobs traditionally performed by women 
typically pay less than those traditionally performed by men;249 
247 ld. 
248 See, e.g., BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE EcoNOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 11945 (1986); 
FllANCINE D. BLAu & MAiliANNE A FEilBEil, THE EcoNOMics or WoMEN, MEN, AND WoRK 132-38 
(2d ed 1992); SAilA M. EVANS & BARBARA J. NELSON, WAGEjUmCE: COMPAilABLE WollTH AND 
THE PAilADOX or TECHNOCilATIC REFORM S.10 (1989) (reviewing data on wage differentials); 
SUSAN FALUDI, BACKlASH: THE UNDECLAilED WAll AGAINsr AMEIUCAN WOMEN 36~99 (1991); 
GoLDIN, supra note 219, at 211-13; Becker, supra note 219; Blau & Kahn, supra note 243; 
Rosemary Hunter, Afterword: A Feminist Nesponse to the Gender Gap in Compensation 
Symposium, 82 GEO. LJ. 147 (1993); Pamela J. Loprest, Gender Differences in Wage Growth 
and job Mobility, PAPEilS & PllOC. 1041H ANNUAL MEETING AM. EcoN. Ass'N, in 82 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 526 (1992); McCaffery, supra note 162, at 294; Betty Friedan, How to Get the Women's 
Movement Moving Again, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1985, (Magazine) at 26, 9B;Judith L. Lichtman, 
Equal Pay: Women StiU Don 't Get It, USA TODAY, June 7, 1993, at 13A 
249 BUilEAU OF 1HE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CUilllENT POPULATION REPORTS, 
HOUSEHOLD EcONOMIC STUDIES, SEJUES P70-1 0, MALE-FEMALE DlrrEilENCES IN WORK EXPEIUENCE, 
OCCUPATION, AND EARNINGS: 1984, at 9-10 (1987); BERGMANN, supra note 248, at 70 (charting 
occupational segregation by gender); TEilllY A jACOBS, REVOLVING DoollS: SEX SEGilEGATION 
AND WoMEN's CAllEEilS (1989); RrrA MAE KELLY, THE GENDEilED EcoNoMY (1991); SEX 
SEGilEGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TllENDS, ExPLANATIONS, REMEDIES (Barbara F. Reskin ed., 
1984); GoLDIN, supra note 219, at 71-73 (noting that occupational segregation causes a large 
part of the wage gap); CwrHIA B. LLoYD & BETH T. NIEMI, THE ECONOMICS OF SEX 
DIFFEilENTIAI..S 13947 (1979) (reviewing studies of occupational distribution by sex); 
CATHAJUNE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HAilAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CAsE or SEX 
DISCIUMINATION 10..12 (1979) (describing how most women are employed in jobs that mostly 
women do); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, jUSfiCE, GENDER, AND 1HE FAMILY 144 (1989) (providing 
comparative data concerning earnings and education, and noting that "[o]ccupational sex 
segregation cancels out women's educational advances"); SJDEL, supra note 207, at 60-62, 67-
68; WOMEN AND 1HE WORKPLACE: THE IMPUCATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEGilEGATION (Martha 
Blaxall & Barbara Reagan eds., 1976); WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOil jOBS or 
EQUAL VALUE 3~38 (Donald J. Treiman & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1981); WOMEN's WoRK, 
MEN's WollK: SEX SEGilEGATION ON THE jOB (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 
1986);Jane Bayes, Occupational Sex Segregation and Comparable Worth, in COMPAilABLE WORTH, 
PAY EQUITY, AND PUBLIC l>oucv 15, 1547 (Rita Mae Ke0y & Jane Bayes eds., 1988) (finding 
that industrial segregation is increasing even though occupational segregation is 
decreasing); Andrea H. Beller, Occupational Segregation and the Earnings Gap, in 
COMPAilABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOil THE 80's at 2~33 ( 1984); Mary Joe Frug, Securing job Equality 
for Women: Labor Marltet Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. [. REv. 55, 55-tH (1979); Law, 
su;ra note 9, at 1294-31 0; George Rutherglen, The Theory of Comparable Worth as a Remedy for 
Discrimination, 82 GEO. LJ. 135, 142 (1993) (discussing sex segregation in employment and 
noting its high frequency and severity); Elaine Sorensen, The Wage Effects of Occupational Sex 
Composition: A Review and New Findings, in COMPAilABLE WORTH: ANALYSES AND EVIDENCE 57, 
57 (M. Anne Hill & Mark R. Killingsworth eds., 1989) (reviewing occupational and wage 
data); Sarah E. Burns, Apowgia for the Status Quo, 74 GEO. LJ. 1791, 1798 (1986) (reviewing 
DAVID L. KIIlP ET AL., GENDEiljUmCE); Tim Bovee, Equal Pay Remains Elusive for Women, 
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women tend to be concentrated in low-paying, non-unionized 
positions in the service industry;2i0 jobs in which women are 
concentrated typically offer little opportunity for advancement;251 
women are more likely than men to take time out of career 
development to raise children;252 if financial constraints limit 
higher education to only one of the children in the family, that 
opportunity is typically given to the son, not the daughter, and 
the daughter's earning potential consequently remains more 
limited;l5S and, of course, gender discrimination continues to 
some extent with respect to wages for men and women 
performing the same job.254 
TIMES UNION (Albany), Nov. 14, 1991, at AI; Kahng, supra note 51, at 12 (noting that men 
tend to dominate the ranks of the highest-paying jobs). 
2iO See Hunter, supra note 248, at 155 (gender segregation reconstitutes itself after 
women enter the labor force, resulting in women continuing to be clustered in relatively 
low-paying positions); GoLDIN, supra note 219, at 75; [ACOBS, supra note 249; Blau & Kahn, 
supra note 243, at 537-38; Rose, supra note 219, at 436. See generally sources cited supra 
note 249. 
251 See generally sources cited supra note 249. 
252SeePHIUPBLUMSTEIN & PEPPER ScHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 118-
25 (1983); KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT WoRK, CAREER, 
AND MOTHERHOOD 92-122 (1985); SUVIAANN HEWLETT, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S 
LIBERATION IN AMERICA 18-47 (1986); LWID & NIEMI, supra note 249, at 80; FEUCE N. 
SCHWAIITZ, 8REAKINGWITHTRADmON: WOMEN AND WORK, THE NEW FACTS OF LIFE 66-70 (1992); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the 
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2159-79 (1994); Joyce P. Jacobsen & 
Lawrence M. Levin, Effects of lntermiUent Labor Force Attachment on Women's Earnings, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 199!>, at 14; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1023 n.I56; 
Staudt, supra note 43, at 1582 n.47 (noting that "[a]uthors in many disciplines have noted 
that women's biological roles create a foreseeable period of disability for working women at 
relatively early stages in their careers causing a lasting effect throughout their time in the 
labor force1; Victor R. Fuchs, Sex Differences in Economic Well-Being, SCIENCE, Apr. 25, 1986, 
at459, 462-63; Susan Vogel, The Perils of Part Time: For Many Women Lawyers, the Panacea of 
the '80s has Become the Albatross of the '90s, CAL LAw., Apr. 1996, at 37 (noting the harmful 
effects of part-time work on the professional development and paychecks of female 
attorneys). 
Even if the wife continues to work once she has children, she may be relegated to a low-
paying job because her "childcare res~nsibilities [may preclude higher-paying jobs that 
require] unpredictable hours or travel. Alstott, supra note 30, at 2025. See also Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Households at Wom: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. 
L.J. 89, 89 (1993) (noting that "a major, if not the major, determinant of the gender gap in 
compensation" is the fact that women remain primarily responsible for the care of children 
and of the home). 
l5S See JANET SALTZMAN CHAFETZ, MAscULINE FEMININE OR HUMAN? 148 (1978) (suggesting 
that "females are denied truly equal access to educational opportunities and discouraged 
systematically from using those that are available"); Elizabeth A. Fay & Michelle M. 
Tokarczyk, Introduction to WoRKING-ClAss WOMEN IN THE ACADEMY: LABORERS IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE FACTORY 12 (Michelle M. Tokarczyk & Elizabeth A. Fay eds., 1993). See generally 
SHIR.LEYS. ANGiliST & EuZABETH M. ALMQUIST, CAREERS AND CONTINGENCIES: How COLLEGE 
WOMEN JUGGLE WITH GENDER (1975). 
254 See SIDEL, su_pra note 207, at 66; Law, supra note 9, at 1249, 1294-310; McCaffery, 
Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 600. See generally GoLDIN, supra note 219, at 83-
118. See also supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text. 
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When one spouse earns more than the other, as is usually the 
case among married couples, then joint filing does not allocate 
the benefit of income splitting and the burden of aggregation 
equitably between the two spouses.2i5 Because husbands tend to 
earn more than wives,2i6 ·the pattern in which joint filing reduces 
the tax attributable to the higher earner and increases the tax 
attributable to the lower earner usually inures to the benefit of 
husbands and to the detriment of wives.257 Therefore, the higher 
wage earner, usually the husband, is better off by filing jointly 
compared to filing separately/l!i8 while the lower earner, usually 
the wife, is worse off as a result of filing jointly. Although a net 
economic gain results to the couple as a unit from joint filing,259 
that benefit is enjoyed primarily by husbands, and the economic 
harm is suffered disproportionately by wives. Income splitting 
and aggregation combine to give the higher-earning spouse an 
income-splitting benefit which is only partially offset by the harm 
from aggregation. In the usual case in which the husband earns 
more than the wife, a;o the husband adds half of his wife's smaller 
income to half of his own larger income, and thereby moves into 
a tax bracket that is lower than the one that would have applied to 
him had his income been taxed separately.l!n In this manner, the 
2i5se..Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent spouse Rules, 15 FAM. Anvoc., Fall 1992, at 30, 
32 (stating that divorcing wives should be cautious in filing jointly because any tax savings 
tends to benefit the higher-earning husbands more than their wives). q. McCaffery, Fresh 
Loolc, supra note 13, at 993-94 (stating that women suffer from the related phenomenon of 
the marriage penalty more than men because the aggregation effect has a tendency to 
discourage wives from working). 
2i6 Se.. supra notes 238-54 and accompanying texL 
3 7 It should be noted that if the wife were the higher earner, the tax attributable to her 
income would drop and that attributable to the lower-earning husband would increase by 
filing jointly. Thus, the pattern exists with regard to income disparities between the spouses 
and is technically independent of gender. However, because husbands generally earn more 
than their wives, that pattern tends to benefit men and to harm women. As of 1989, wives 
earned more than their husbands in only 18% of marriages. See Crispell, supra note 128, at 
9 (citing EARNINGS or MARiliED-COUPLE FAMILIES, supra note 128). In 1994, 18.9% of wives 
earned more than their husbands. See supra note 164 for a derivation of this figure. 
BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMEilCE, CUilllENT PoPUlATION REPORTS, Tables F-11 
and F-15 (1996). 
258 Se.. Edison-Smith, supra note 56, at 120. 
259 Se.. supra notes 106-11 and accompanying texL 
a;o Se.. supra notes 238-54 and accompanying texL It is not proposed in this article that 
wives should earn less or more than their husbands. Rather, this Article takes as a social 
fact that wives generally earn less than their husbands for a variety of reasons and explores 
how the current tax system impacts these higher- and lower-earning spouses. 
a;I Se.. supra notes 255-58 and accompanying texL 
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combination of income splitting and aggregation is beneficial 
for the husband. By contrast, income splitting and aggregation 
combine to give the lower-earning spouse, usually the wife, an 
income-splitting benefit which is more than offset by the harm 
she experiences from aggregation. When she files jointly, the 
wife adds half of her husband's larger income to half of her own, 
and she moves into a higher tax bracket vis-a-vis the bracket that 
would have applied had she filed separately. Joint filing causes 
the wife's income to generate more tax than under separate 
filing, and also causes the husband's income to generate less tax. 
Furthermore, whenever spouses' incomes differ, the benefit to the 
husband resulting from joint filing exceeds the burden to the 
wife so that, as a unit, the couple is induced to file jointly rather 
than separately. 
Table 2, above, illustrates this pattern, demonstrating that the 
tax burden attributable to the higher earner is lessened by filing 
jointly rather than separately and that of the lower earner is 
increased by filing jointly. The couple in which the husband 
earned $80,000 and the wife earned $40,000 generates a joint 
return liability of $29,729. Under separate filing, the h~sband 
would incur a tax of $21,564 and the wife would generate $8,802 in 
tax. The amount by which each spouse benefits or suffers by 
filing jointly rather than separately depends on the theory used to 
apportion the joint return liability between them. A variety of 
methods may be used to apportion that joint tax liability. In fact, 
no rule has been imposed requiring married couples to apportion 
their joint tax liability in a specific manner.lm Different 
approaches are appropriate for different analytical purposes or 
comparisons. 
One approach would be simply to divide the total tax liability 
in half, attributing half, or $14,864, to each spouse under the 
lm Couples who file jointly may divide their tax liability between them in any manner 
they choose. No rule exists mandating one approach over another because jointly filing 
spouses are jointly and severally liable for any unpaid tax. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994). 
From the perspective of the IRS, the apponionment method that spouses use to divide their 
joint tax liability between them is irrelevant because the IRS can proceed against either or 
both spouses for the entire amount of any unpaid tax liability. See, e.g., In re Richmond, 
456 F.2d 458, 462 (3d Cir. 1972). Because couples can divide their joint return tax in any 
manner they choose, the true incidence of the tax between them is difficult to determine. 
See generally jOSEPH A. PECHMAN, TAX REFORM: THE RICH AND THE POOR 19-24 (2d ed. 1989) 
(discussing the incidence of taxes generally). Empirical research should be conducted to 
determine how spouses, in fact, apponion their joint return liabilities. 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 312 1997
312 journal of Law & Politics [Vol. XIII:241 
theory that the spouses share all expenses equally. ai.'l This 
approach, hereinafter referred to as 50-50 apportionment, is not 
rational in theory because the amount of tax each spouse 
generates should depend on the amount of income each earns. 
Nevertheless, many couples who do not pool resources probably 
divide their tax liabilities in half.2i4 Under another approach, 
hereinafter referred to as relative-net-income apportionment, the 
tax burden would be attributed to the spouses in proportion to 
their relative net incomes. 265 Thus, the tax attributable to the 
husband would bear the same proportion to the total tax bill that 
ai.'IJn Van Vleck v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 433, 433 (1934), affd, 80 F.2d 217, 217 (2d 
Cir. 1935), spouses voluntarily divided their 1930 tax bill evenly between them even though 
only the wife had net income for the year since the husband had experienced a net loss in 
1930. Van Vleck illustrates that spouses sometimes split their joint tax liability in half even 
when one earns more than the other. Similarly, in Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So. 2d 281, 
282, 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), a husband believed he should be able to divide a 1965 
tax deficiency in half, to be borne half by him and half by his ex-wife even though he had 
earnings for that year and she had none. 
When, under the rule of joint and several liability, the Commissioner collects a joint 
return deficiency from one spouse, then that spouse may seek contribution from the other 
spouse in state court. In one spouse's action for contribution against the other, some state 
courts have held that the spouse paying a joint return federal income tax deficiency is 
entitled to be reimbursed for half by the other spouse regardless of the spouses' relative 
incomes. See Rude v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 165 (1967) (discussing whether a wife could 
deduct as a nonbusiness bad debt the amount that her husband owed her pursuant to an 
earlier right of contribution judgment from a California state court); Rocha v. Rocha, 297 
P.2d 505 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (under both law and an agreement between the 
parties); Bormaster v. Bormaster, 274 P.2d 757 (Kan. 1954); Strange v. Rubin, 456 S.W.2d 
416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Hanson v. Hanson, 350 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1960); and discussion 
infra note 375. Some spouses have been reported to divide other living expenses evenly 
even when one earns more than the other. See Beck, supra note 58, at 380 (discussing 
findings of a survey by SHERE HrrE, THE HrrE REPORT-WOMEN AND LOVE: A CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION IN PROGRESS 445-47 (1987)); Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 82 n.54 (describing 
findings in her own survey in which a couple described splitting some expenses evenly even 
though the husband earned more than the wife). Consequently, it is not inconceivable that 
spouses might divide their joint tax liability evenly although one had more income than the 
other. 
2i4 See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Tluqry and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861 (1994) sets 
forth the proposition that errors of cognition often influence people to make "irrational" 
decisions in all areas of life including tax. "If cognitive errors characterize people's 
thinking about tax, then such errors will in tum pervade all of those actions for which the 
people's ideas about tax are a predicate. These include such important acts as . . . making 
tax-sensitive decisions regarding work, savings, withholding, and the like." /d. at 1867-68. 
The present Article posits that cognitive errors may also impact how husbands and wives 
apportion their joint tax liabilities. 
265 Before Congress adopted the rule of joint and several liability, when federal courts 
had occasion to apportion hability to detenrune which spouse should pay a tax deficiency, 
they consistently used this second method, ruling that joint tax liability should be divided 
between the spouses on the basis of their respective net incomes. See Commissioner v. 
Rabenold, lOB F.2d 639, 640 (2d Cir. 1940); Cole v. Commissioner, Bl F.2d 485, 487, 489 
(9th Cir. 1935); Seder v. Commissioner, 38 B.TA 874, 877 (1938). See also Miller v. Miller, 
310 N.Y.S.2d 18, 21 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (state contribution action in which state court 
divided a federal tax liability between the spouses on the basis of their respective net 
incomes). 
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his income bears to total income. In this case, the joint tax 
attributable to the husband would be two-thirds of the total since 
his income comprises two-thirds of the couple's total income. 
Using this method, $19,819 of the joint return tax would be 
attributable to the husband and $9,910 would be attributable to 
the wife. A third approach, hereinafter referred to as secondary-
earner apportionment, would be to attribute tax first to the 
husband under the theory that, earning more, he is the primary 
breadwinner. The tax attributable to him would be the tax 
liability computed as if he were the only working spouse. A 
couple in which the husband earns $80,000 and in which the wife 
earns no income would generate a joint tax liability of $17,603. 
Under this third technique, $17,603 of the $29,729 tax liability 
would be attributable to the husband. The remainder, $12,126, 
would not have arisen had the wife chosen not to work, and, 
therefore, would be attributed to her. These results are 
summarized in the following table. 
TABLE4 
Husband Earning $80,000; Wife Earning $40,000 
Apportionment method Joint Return Liability Separate Return Liability 
H's share W's share H's liability w· s liability 
50-50 split $14,864 $14,864 $21,564 $8,802 
Relative-net-income $19,819 $9,910 method 
Secondary-earner $17,603 $12,126 
method 
Regardless of which of these methods is chosen to apportion 
joint tax liability between the spouses, joint filing, as opposed to 
separate filing, reduces the husband's tax burden and increases 
that of the wife. A separate return for the husband would have 
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resulted m a tax liability for him of $21,564, while joint filing 
resulted in tax attributable to him of either $14,864, $19,819, or 
$17,603, depending on the method utilized to apportion the joint 
tax. Regardless of which apportionment method is the most 
appropriate, the husband benefits financially from the decision 
to file jointly. Conversely, the wife is harmed from that decision 
regardless of the method used to apportion the joint tax liability 
between the spouses. Her tax liability would have been only $8,802 
had she filed separately in contrast to liability attributable to her 
of either $14,864, $9,910, or $12,126 by filing jointly. This decrease 
in the husband's tax liability and the increase in the wife's tax 
liability results from the combined operation of income-splitting 
and aggregation.ai6 By filing jointly, rather than separately, the 
husband benefits. Under the relative-net-income approach, he 
benefits by $1,745. While a portion of his gain comes at the 
expense of the U.S. Treasury, the other $1,108 comes at the 
expense of his lower-earning wife. Accordingly, the wife 
essentially transfers $1,108 to her higher-earning husband by 
agreeing to file jointly. 
The reason the wife's tax liability increases under the 50-50 
apportionment approach is that half of the total liability is being 
apportioned to her even though she has generated much less 
than half of the tax by earning less than half of the income. 
Under the second method, in which the joint tax liability is 
apportioned between the spouses on the basis of relative incomes, 
joint filing increases the wife's tax because income splitting and 
aggregation operate together to push her into a higher bracket 
than would have applied had she filed separately.267 Under the 
third technique for apportioning the joint tax between the 
spouses, the husband's earnings are treated as the first dollars 
earned and are taxed under the theory that his wife's job is 
discretionary. As a result, the tax attributable to him is the joint 
tax resulting if he were the only spouse generating income. 
Under this method, the husband is better off filing jointly than 
separately because his income exclusively, not that of the wife, is 
c 
ai61f the wife has no taxable income of her own, either earned or unearned, this 
pattern of the wife paying more by filing jointly may not hold true because the couple may 
apportion all the jomt tax liability to the husband In that case, the wife would incur no tax 
regardless of the filing status chosen. 
267 See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text 
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allocated to the lowest tax brackets. By the time the wife's income 
is placed in tax brackets, the lowest brackets have been completely 
filled. Her first dollar of income is taxed at her husband's 
highest marginal rate rather than being taxed at the lowest 
marginal rate had she filed separately. Her effective tax rate 
substantially exceeds what it would have been had she been able 
to use a portion of the lowest tax brackets. 
Note that under this pattern in which the wife pays more and 
the husband pays less by filing jointly, the increase in the wife's 
tax is very severe for her on a percentage basis because of her 
lower income, while the reduction in tax to the husband is a 
relatively modest benefit to him on a percentage basis because of 
his greater income. Under relative-net-income apportionment, 
the joint tax liability attributable to the wife is $9,910 and that 
attributable to the husband is $19,819. The percentage increase 
in the wife's tax as a result of filing jointly rather than separately 
is 13%,ai!!while the percentage decrease in the husband's tax from 
joint filing is only 8%.lrf.l The harm to the wife is more exacting 
from her perspective than the benefit to the husband is favorable 
from his point of view. Using the other apportionment methods, 
if the joint tax attributable to the wife is $12,126 and that 
attributable to the husband is $17,603 under secondary-earner 
apportionment, then the percentage increase in the wife's tax as a 
result of joint filing is 38%2'70while the percentage decrease in the 
husband's tax is only 18%.271 Alternatively, if the joint tax 
attributable to the wife is $14,864 and that attributable to the 
husband is $14,864 under 50-50 apportionment, then the 
percentage increase in the wife's tax as a result of joint filing is a 
staggering 69%272while the percentage decrease in the husband's 
tax is only 31%. m In each case, the increase in the wife's tax 
a;s The percentage increase in the wife's tax from filing jointly is computed by 
subtracting her separate tax liability from her portion of the joint tax liability and then by 
dividing by her separate tax liability. ($9,910- $8,802) + $8,802 = 13%. 
lr>9 The percentage decrease in the husband's tax from filing jointly is computed by 
subtracting his portion of the joint tax liability from his separate liability and then by 
dividing by his separate liability. ($21,564 - $19,819) + $21,564 = 8%. 
270 ($12,126- $8,802) + $8,802. 
271 ($21 ,564 - $17,603) + $21,564. 
272 ($14,864- $8,802) + $8,802. 
m ($21,564- $14,864) + $21,564. 
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liability from filing jointly is substantially harmful to her while 
the benefit to the husband is only relatively modest to him. 
Furthermore, the greater the disparity in incomes, the more 
benefit is transferred from the lower-earning wife to the higher-
earning husband by filing jointly rather than separately. This 
pattern is true not only in relative terms, as described above, but 
also in absolute terms. That is, the amount the wife transfers to 
her husband in dollars by filing jointly rather than separately 
increases the less she earns in relation to him. For example, 
assuming the husband and wife had respective earnings of 
$100,000 and $20,000, rather than the $80,000 and $40,000 shown 
above in Table 4, total earnings would remain the same but 
relative earnings would diverge even more. Under this scenario, 
the joint return liability would have remained $29,729. Under the 
50-50 apportionment method, each spouse's share of joint return 
liability would have amounted to $14,864. Under the relative-net-
income apportionment method, the husband's share of the joint 
return liability would have been $24,774, and the wife's share 
would have been $4,955. Under the secondary-earner 
apportionment method, the husband's share of the joint liability 
would have been $23,529, and the wife's share would have been 
$6,200. By contrast, had these spouses filed separately, the 
husband's separate tax liability would have been $28,764, while 
that of the wife would have been only $3,202. These results are 
summarized in Table 5, below.274 
2'14 The figures in Table 5 are derived from §§ I(a) and (d) of the Internal Revenue 
Code and are not adjusted for inflation. I.R.C. §§ I (a) and (d) (1994). 
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TABLE5 
Husband Earning $100,000; Wife Earning $20,000 
Apportionment Method Joint Return Liability Separate Return Liability 
H's share W's share H's liability w· s liability 
50-50 split $14,864 $14,864 $28,764 $3,202 
Relative-net-income $24,774 $4,955 method 
Secondary-earner $23,529 $6,200 
method 
Under relative-net-income apportionment, this wife has lost 
$1,753 by filing jointly rather than separately, while her husband 
has gained $3,991. While a portion of his gain comes at the 
expense of the U.S. Treasury, the other $1,753 comes at the 
expense of his lower-earning wife. In this case, the wife has 
essentially transferred $1,753 to her higher-earning husband. 
Note that the spouses' incomes are much more disparate in this 
case, $100,000/$20,000, than in the $80,000/$40,000 example above 
from Table 4. In the $80,000/$40,000 example, relative-net-income 
apportionment resulted in a transfer of only $1,108 from the 
lower-earning wife to her husband. In fact, under both the 
relative-net-income and the 50-50 apportionment methods, the 
transfer from wife to husband is greater for the $100,000/$20,000 
couple than it is for the $80,000/$40,000 couple.275 The fact that 
rates are structured to encourage joint filing when one spouse 
earns more than the other, and the fact that joint rates effectively 
cause a transfer from the lower- to the higher-earning spouse 
275under the 50-50 apportionment method, for the husband and wife earning $100,000 
and $20,000, respectively, joint filing would result in a transfer of $11,663 from the wife to 
the husband That is, she pays that much more by filing jointly than separately. Had the 
spouses earned instead $80,000 and $40,000, the transfer from the wife to her husband 
would have been only $6,063. 
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results in transfers of wealth from the "poorer" to the "richer" 
spouse precisely because the poor one earns less than the other. 
This incentive structure is contrary to notions of ability to pay. It 
is even more ironic and regressive that the amount of the transfer 
should increase in severity for the lower-earning spouse in 
absolute dollar terms the less she earns in relation to her 
husband. 
The transfer from the lower-earning to the higher-earning 
spouse does not increase as incomes diverge under the secondary-
earner apportionment method, however. Under that method, for 
spouses earning $80,000 and $40,000, respectively, the lower-
earning wife would transfer $3,324 to her husband because she 
would pay that much more by filing jointly than separately. 
However, if their incomes were further apart, $100,000 and $20,000, 
for example, the wife would transfer only $2,999 to her husband.~ 
Although the amount transferred from the lower-earning wife to 
the higher-earning husband declines the less she earns in 
relation to him under secondary-earner apportionment, this is 
probably not important because most spouses who divide their 
joint return tax liabilities probably do not do so using that 
method. No court, either state or federal, has ever required 
spouses to divide their joint tax liabilities in that manner.277 
Furthermore, not one respondent in an informal survey thought 
of dividing the joint return tax using that method.278 For 
purposes of dividing joint return tax liabilities, the vast majority of 
~The reason the amount transferred from the wife to her husband decreases as their 
incomes dive~e under secondary-earner apportionment is that under that apportionment 
method, the wife's income exclusively, and none of her husband's income, Js assigned to 
the top applicable rate bracket(s). In the case of couples with combined incomes of 
$120,000 the wife's income would be assigned to the bracket applicable to that level of 
income, the 31% bracket. If she earned $20,000, her portion of the joint return tax would 
be $20,000 x .31 or $6,200. If she earned $40,000 so that spousal incomes were closer 
together, her $40,000 of income would use all of the 31% bracket applicable to this couple, 
and a portion of their 28% bracket as well. $30,850 of her $40,000 would be taxed at 31% 
and would generate $9,564 in tax. The other $9,150 of her income would be taxed at 28% 
and would produce $2,562 in tax. Her portion of the joint return tax would amount to a 
total of $12,126. The wife's portion of the joint return tax is actually greater under 
secondary-earner apportionment the closer together the spouses' incomes. Consequently, 
the closer those incomes, the more she transfers to her husband under secondary 
apportionment. It is still true that the wife transfers money to her higher-earning husband 
under this apportionment method because of the decision to file jointly. Under secondary 
apportionment, however, the amount transferred from wife to husband does not increase as 
her income and ability to transfer that money decreases. 
277 See infra notes 375-78 and accompanying text. 
278 See infra note 374. 
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respondents would have chosen either the 50-50 method or the 
relative-net-income method. The secondary earner apportion-
ment method is appropriate in determining whether a second 
spouse will enter or remain in the labor force. However, in 
determining how much tax each spouse bears, that is, in 
considering how spouses divide their joint return tax liabilities, 
that method is inappropriate because spouses are unlikely to 
divide their tax liabilities in that manner. They are more likely to 
use either the 50-50 or relative-net-income methods, both of 
which cause a transfer from the lower-income wife to her higher-
income husband upon filing jointly and both of which result in 
larger transfers, the smaller her income is compared to that of 
her husband and the less her ability is to make such transfers. 
The amounts transferred from wife to husband because of the 
decision to file jointly are compiled below in Table 6. 
TABLE6 
Amount Wd'e Transfers to Husband by Agreeing to 
FJ.le Jointly 
Apportionment method Amount transferred from Wife to Husband because of 
decision to me jointly rather than separately 
H = $80,000 W = $40,000 H = $100,000 W = $20,000 
50.50 method $6,063 $11,663 
Relative-net-income $1,108 $1,753 
method 
Secondary-earner $3,325 $2,999 
method 
Under the most probable methods for dividing joint return 
liabilities, the greater the disparity in spouses' incomes, the 
greater the financial injury to the lower-earning wife and the 
larger the economic benefit to the higher-earning husband. 
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Under 50-50 and relative-net-income apportionment, the amount 
transferred from wife to husband increases the more disparate the 
spouses' incomes because of income splitting and aggregation. 
More income disparity causes more harm to the wife from 
aggregation and grants her less benefit from income splitting. 
Income splitting and aggregation combine to give the higher 
earner a huge benefit, one that increases along with the 
divergence of incomes. They combine to harm the lower earner, 
the amount of that harm also being a function of the income 
disparity. 
Because wives tend to earn less than their husbands, these 
patterns tend to redound to the benefit of husbands and to harm 
wives. Upon marrying, most couples file jointly because of the 
economic pressure built into the rates to do so. As to the lower-
earning spouse, the transition from filing as an unmarried 
individual to filing a joint return usually increases tax liability. In 
the case of the $80,000/$40,000 couple, the wife paid tax of $8,327 
as a single taxpayer.m Under relative-net-income apportionment, 
the apportionment method most favorable to the wife, her tax 
increases to $9,910 by filing jointly. lSl Her tax rose significantly 
upon marrying. In this manner, the operation of government tax 
policies in a society in which husbands earn more than their 
wives results in a reduction of women's after-tax income when 
they marry by increasing the amount of tax that they pay. When a 
man marries and starts filing jointly, his tax liability usually drops 
because he is likely to be the higher-earning spouse. In the 
example in which the husband earned $80,000 and the wife 
earned $40,000, the man's tax was $20,322 when he was single. 281 
By marrying and filing jointly, his tax dropped under relative-net-
income apportionment, the method least beneficial to him, to 
$19,819.282 The federal tax rates operate in the social context to 
reduce men's taxes when they marry and, therefore, to increase 
their after-tax earnings. By filing jointly, wives in essence transfer 
money to their husbands for every year in which they remain 
married to them, even though they earn less than those 
219 See supra Table 2. 
$1 See supra Table 4. 
281 See supra Table 2. 
282 See supra Table 4. 
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husbands. These patterns are identical to those described in the 
introductory Ames hypothetical.~ 
How can the notion that the wife is worse off economically by 
filing jointly be reconciled with the fact that the couple will file 
jointly to minimize total taxes? The analysis above demonstrates 
how tax attributable to the wife increases if she files jointly rather 
than separately. However, as a unit, the couple is better off filing 
jointly where total liability is $29,729, rather than separately where 
total liability increases to $30,366. Critics might argue that wives 
in common-law states are not worse off by filing jointly than 
separately. They would assert that the lower-earning wife is really 
better off filing jointly because the family as a whole pays less in 
tax, and more resources are consequently available for the benefit 
of all the family members, including the wife. 284 While it is true 
that the couple pays less money to the government, this 
observation does not alter the fact that the savings from joint 
filing is due entirely to the reduction in tax attributable to the 
husband's income, a reduction that exceeds the increase in tax 
attributable to the wife's income. While the couple is better off by 
filing jointly as a unit, the only way the wife can be viewed as 
having benefited individually from the decision to file jointly is if 
she has equal access to the substantial tax savings that her 
husband enjoys.al5 The assumption that any extra resources from 
filing jointly would, in fact, be available to the wife is far from 
certain. Spouses are required neither to share their resources nor 
even to live together to be eligible to file jointly. 2lli 
Whether or not the wife has access to the tax that her husband 
saves by filing jointly depends on whether or not she has access to 
his post-tax earnings because his tax savings is one component of 
those post-tax earnings. Many factors coalesce to suggest that the 
wife does not have real access to her husband's post-tax earnings. 
First, the property laws of common-law states fail to guarantee a 
~See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
284 See Mcintyre, supra note 118, at 483 n.31. 
$5 See Alstott, supra note 30, at 2029-30, 2050-51 (acknowledging that intra-family 
dynamics impact which family members benefit from a reduction in taxes); Beck, supra 
note 58, at 376 (noting that wives may receive no benefit from the tax savings due to income 
splitting unless tax reductions their husbands obtain are assumed to benefit the wives). 
2lli See Beck, supra note 58, at 378. S" also I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1994) (listing situations in 
which husbands and wives are barred from filing jointly but failing to mention living apart 
or keeping assets and earnings segregated). 
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wife access to her husband's earnings during the marriage.W 
Second, although the wife would have access to her husband's tax 
savings if they were to pool their resources voluntarily, empirical 
data suggest that many couples do not pool resources and that if 
pooling ever were prevalent, it is becoming less so.l!!!l As a result, 
the wife may not have access to her husband's tax savings through 
voluntary sharing. Third, sociological data indicate that spouses 
who do "share" resources do not do so in a meaningful way, and 
that the higher-earning spouse generally controls how such 
resources will be used. 281 Consequently, even if couples claim to 
share resources, the lower-earning wife will generally not achieve 
meaningful access to her husband's tax savings and will, indeed, 
be worse off by filing jointly than separately. Even when 
husbands do voluntarily share resources in a meaningful way so 
that wives benefit individually from filing jointly, power is still 
concentrated in the husband's hands, and messages reinforcing 
traditional male and female identities are conveyed to society. 200 
Federal tax law reflects the fact that common-law states do not 
guarantee wives access to their husband's post-tax earnings. 
Under federal law, if a wife had a present ownership interest 1 n 
her husband's earnings, then, like married residents of 
community property states, federal tax law would permit them to 
split their incomes even when filing separately.291 However, 
federal tax law precludes income splitting for separately filing 
couples who live in common-law jurisdictions292 precisely because 
common-law states do not give the nonearning spouse a present 
W See infra notes 291-329 and accompanying text. 
2!8 See infra notes 330-44 and accompanying text. 
281 See infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text. 
2!Xl See infra notes 368-69 and accompanying text. 
291 See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Galliher v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 760 
(1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 
718 (19'19); Fehland v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1312 (1975); Coffman v. 
Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1416 (1974); Quinn v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 
453 (1972); Ramos v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 781 (1969); PUBUCATION 555, supra 
note 52, at 3-4. See also United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 194-97 (1971); Beck, supra 
note 255, at 30, 32 (noting that community property residents must split their incomes even 
ifthey file separately); Murray, supra note 52, at 21, 53, 61; Quick 8c DuCanto, supra note 
57, at 78. 
292 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Publication 555 limits separate return income 
splitting to couples living in community property states. PUBLICATION 555, supra note 52, at 
1-2. 
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ownership interest in the other's earnings.2l3 In the forty-two 
common law jurisdictions2l4 in which wives are worse off filing 
jointly than separately,$ federal law does not permit income 
splitting to separately filing spouses because state law does not 
give one spouse a present ownership interest in the other's 
earnings. 2!ll This very lack of a present property interest in their 
husbands' earnings precludes these wives from the right to share 
in their husbands' joint return tax savings during the marriage. 
State property laws in the forty-two common-law jurisdictions 
confirm the federal tax treatment of separately filing spouses.297 
In forty-one common law jurisdictions a wife has no legal right to 
any part of her husband's post-tax earnings during the 
marriage,~ and, therefore, no legal right to access the savings he 
2l3 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
2l4 The forty-two common law jurisdictions consist of the forty-one non-community 
property states and the District of Columbia, see Greene, supra note 52, at 71, 77; Cheadle, 
supra note 52, at 1280 n.63; Emily Osborn, Comment, The Treatment of Unearned Separate 
Property at Divorce in Common Law Property/urisdictions, 1990WIS. L. REV. 903, 903 n.l; Susan 
Klebanoff, Comment, To Love and Oky 'ti Graduation Day-The Professional Degree in Light 
ofthe Uniform Marital Properly Act, 34AM. U. L. REV. 839, 841 n.l3 (1985). 
295 An examination of whether wives living in community property states have access to 
their husbands' tax savings under state marital property law is unnecessary for purposes of 
this analysis. Wives in those states are normally no worse off by filing jointly than they 
would be by filing separately. The income splitting required of separately filing spouses 
who live in community property states means that wives would pay as much by filing 
separately as they would by filing jointly. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); 
PUBUCATION 555, supra note 52, at 3-4. In fact, under separate filing they pay as much tax as 
if they had filed jointly and had divided the resulting liability using the 50-50 apportionment 
method because Seaborn requires them to pay tax on half their own income and half that of 
their husbands. Therefore, apart from the issue of joint and several liability, these wives 
would be no worse off financially had they filed jointly. See supra note 101. By contrast, as 
discussed in the accompanying text, wives who file jointly in common law states are worse 
off financially than if they had filed separately because under separate filing they could have 
enjoyed the benefit of the low tax bracket that would have applied to their own, individual 
lower incomes. They would not have been subjected to higher rates as a result of their 
husbands' higher incomes. To benefit from filing jointly, these wives would require access 
to the tax savings their husbands enjoy. 
2re See supra note 52. 
297 State law establishes the spouse's property rights in after-tax earnings. The filing of a 
joint return does not alter those property rights. See In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 
1972); Glaubke v. United States, 41 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 759 (E.D. Va. 1978); Pettengill v. 
United States, 253 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1966); In re Illingworth, 51 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1215 
(D. Ore. 1956); Dunn v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (1966); In re Estate of 
Carson, 199 A2d 407 (NJ. Camden County Ct. 1964); In re Estate of Trecker, 215 N.W.2d 
450 (Wis. 1974); Beck, supra note 58, at 334, 394 & n.383. In these cases, when a joint 
return generated a refund and only the husband had income and deductions for the year, 
the husband, the husband's estate, or the husband's bankruptcy trustee, but never the wife, 
was entitled to the federal income tax refund, a portion of the husband's after-tax earnings. 
~See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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enjoys by filing jointly.2'B The wife's lack of legal right to her 
husband's savings during marriage is a significant matter. !lXl The 
nonearning spouse may obtain rights in the other's saved 
earnings only when the marriage terminates, either by death or 
upon divorce.!Kil During marriage, common law states confer on 
the nonearning wife only an inchoate dower right or, more 
recently, the right to elect a statutory share in the husband's 
property upon his death. m ~ noted above, common-law states do 
not give the wife a present ownership interest in any part of her 
husband's earnings. Nor does common law permit her indirect 
access to her husband's earnings by making him liable for most 
debts she incurs.lll'l Consequently, a wife living in a common-law 
jurisdiction may in fact be harmed by filing jointly due to her lack 
of legal access to her husband's tax savings or to any other part of 
his post-tax earnings. 
Not only does state law deny women a present ownership 
interest in their husbands' tax savings, but it also fails to prevent 
the husband from misspending or wasting those savings or from 
219 Only in Pennsylvania have lower courts occasionally determined that filing a joint 
federal income tax return changed spouses' property interests in the tax refund, a portion 
of after-tax earnings. Those courts held that under Pennsylvania property law, filing a joint 
return evidenced an intention by the spouses to hold the resulting refund as tenants by the 
entireties. Consequently, wives who had not earned any income were entitled to joint tax 
refunds rather than to leave them with the executors of their husbands' estates. See In re 
Estate of MacNeill, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 480 (1959); In re Estate of Green, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 595 
(1958). Only under Pennsylvania law has filing a joint return been interpreted as giving the 
nonearning spouse a property interest in a portion of the other's after-tax earnings, and 
then it was only in the tax refund portion of those after-tax earnings. The wives' property 
interests did not extend to the husband's other after-tax earnings. Furthermore, not all 
Pennsylvania courts agree that filing a joint return necessarily evidences an intention to 
convey the tax refund to both spouses as a tenancy by the entireties. See In re Estate of 
Jackson, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 402 (1964) (the parties actions, including segregating resources 
and dividing the joint return tax between them, demonstrated that they did not intend by 
filing jointly to create a tenancy by the entireties in the refund). In no other common law 
jurisdiction does a spouse gain any legal property right to any part of the other's after-tax 
earnings by virtue of filing a joint return. 
!llO q: Bittker, supra note 29, at 1394 (acknowledging in another context that spouses' 
respective property rights are an important matter). 
!Kil See Cheadle, supra note 52, at 1269 n.2, 1312; Greene, supra note 52, at 87, 110-11; 
Osborn, supra note 294, at 907; Keith D. Ross, Note, Sharing Debts: Creditors and Debtors 
Under the rfniJcmn Marital Property Act, 69 MINN. L. REV. 111, 117 (1984). 
!KI2 See Greene, supra note 52, at 77 & n.29, 87. See also id. at 107-09 (discussing 
common-law elective share statutes); Osborn, supra note 294, at 907; Ross, supra note 301, 
at 115n.25. 
lll'l See Greene, supra note 52, at 97 ("Except for necessities purchased on credit, the 
Married Women's Property Acts generally relieve the husband and his separate property for 
his wife's debts" (citing 3 CHESTEil G. VERNIER., AMEIUCAN FAMILY LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF THE FAMILY LAWOFTHE FOIOY-ElGHT AMEIUCAN STATES, AlASKA, THE DISfiUCf OF COLUMBIA, 
AND HAWAII (TO jAN. 1, 1935) 47,49 (1935)); Ross, supra note 301, at 112, 117-18. 
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using them for his own benefit. Because only the husband has a 
present property right in his earnings, he may use them however 
he wants. He may use his earnings to acquire property in his own 
name.!!04 The wife has no legal remedy in an intact marriage if he 
uses the funds for his own benefit or even if he gives them away. n 
In this manner the husband's tax savings from filing jointly can 
be placed beyond the wife's reach as a practical matter. In 
common-law jurisdictions, the earner has the sole right to 
determine how his earnings will be used. He has the sole power 
to manage and control his earnings, !Di and no restrictions for the 
wife's benefit limit that power.!ll7 Thus, under common law a wife 
does not get the benefit of her husband's joint tax savings. In 
fact, she subsidizes his joint return savings by paying more tax 
herself.~ 
Only by divorcing is it possible for the wife to gain access to 
her husband's tax savings and other property. All common law 
!1>4 S« Ross, supra note 301, at 114-15. 
!ll5 See Zelenak, supra note 29, at 379 n.l95. q. Ross, supra note 301, at 115..17 
(discussing how a spouse in a common law state can use only his own assets, including his 
own earnings which are usually titled in his own name, to establish creditworthiness. The 
nonearning spouse generally cannot rely on earnings titled in the other's name to establish 
her own cred1t since she has no present right during the marriage to those earnings). If the 
couple divorces, however, earlier waste by one spouse may be taken into account under the 
eqmtable distribution laws of some states to reduce his or her share of the eroi;M!rty 
division. See Lewis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse that Dissipates Property Available for quatable 
Property Distribution: A Suggested Analysis, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 95, 97-98 (1991); Zelenak, supra 
note 29, at 385. 
It is far from clear, however, what constitutes dissipation, beyond the 
easy case of l{ifts to a lover. Conceivably dissipation doctrine could some day 
develop to tlle point where both spouses would truly share control over 
property subject to equitable distribution, so that they should be taxed as co-
owners, but that day has not arrived. 
Zelenak, supra note 29, at 385-86 (footnote omitted). 
!116 See Greene, supra note 52, at 90 ('The common-law system as modified by the 
Married Women's Property Acts provides that each spouse shall manage the property they 
(sic) own at the time of marriage and all property which the spouse is responsible for 
acquiring during marriage."). Thus, the husband has sole power to manage and control 
his earnings. See Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 74, 76. 77; Ross, supra note 30 I, at 127. 
!ll7 By contrast, in the community property state of California, for example, each spouse 
is bound by a fiduciary duty to the marital community not to waste or misuse community 
property. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(e) (West 1996) and CAL FAM. CODE § 721 (West 1996); 
Elizabeth De Armond, It Talces Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions tf 
Conamunity Property Law, 30 GoNz. L. REV. 235, 271 n.l93 (1995). Other community 
property states also impose duties, either by statute or under case law, on the managing 
spouse not to misuse or waste the community property although the duties in those other 
states do not rise to the level of fiduciary duties. See id. at 271-72 & n.l94. 
~See infra notes 371-78 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdictions have adopted equitable distribution regimes that 
permit property division upon divorce without regard to title. !100 
Under these provisions, judges have the discretion to divide the 
marital property, including any accumulated earnings, in an 
equitable fashion.s1o Consequently, upon divorce a wife may 
indeed acquire part of her husband's tax savings from prior years 
if the couple has property to divide. 
Nevertheless, equitable distribution upon divorce IS an 
inadequate mechanism for ensuring that wives will share m the 
financial benefits of joint filing. First of all, equitable 
distribution laws are triggered only if a couple divorces.1111 During 
m See Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 812 n.170; Osborn, supra note 294, at 903; 
Ross, supra note 301, at 115 n.23. See generally Cheadle, supra note 52, at 1282-305; 
Osborn, supra note 294, at 909-30 for descriptions of the various types of equitable 
distribution statutes. Of the forty-two common-law jurisdictions, including the District of 
Columbia, only Mississippi has failed to enact specific legislation authorizing equitable 
distribution of marital property upon divorce. See Osborn, supra note 294, at 909 n.27. 
However, Mississippi has adopted equitable distribution judicially. See id. at 909 n.27. See, 
e.g., Magee v. Magee, 661 So. 2d 1117 (Miss. 1995); White v. White, 557 So. 2d 480, 483 
(Miss. 1989) (listing factors to be considered in making the equitable distribution); Jones v. 
Jones, 532 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1988); Watts v. Watts, 466 So. 2d 889 (Miss. 1985). 
As to the other forty-one common law jurisdictions, the following statutes require 
equitable distribution of property upon divorce: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (Supp. 
1996); Alaska, AlASKA STAT.§ 25.24.160 (Michie 1996); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315 
(Michie 1993); Colorado, CoLO. REV. STAT.§ 14-10-113 (1987 & Supp. 1996); Connecticut, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West 1995); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 
(1993); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1989); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 61.14 (West 1997); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-13 (1991); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 580-47 (Michie 1997); Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 750/ 5-503(d) (West Supp. 
1997); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Michie Supp. 1996); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 598.21 (WestSupp. 1997); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-f610(b) (Supp. 1996); Kentucky, 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 403.190 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1996); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
19, § 722-A (West 1981 & Supp. 1996); Maryland, MD. CoDE ANN. FAM. LAw § 8-205 (1991 & 
Supp. 1996); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); 
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 552.23(1) (West 1988); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 518.58 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (West 1997); 
Montana, MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1995); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-365 
(Michie 1995); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:16-a (1992); New Jersey, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1996); New York, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236[B)[~J 
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1995); North 
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1991); Ohio, OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 3105.171 
(Anderson 1996); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 121 (West Supp. 1996); Oregon, 
OR. REV. STAT.§ 107.105(1)(0 (Supp. 1996); Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 
(West 1991); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-16.1 (1996); South Carolina, S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); South Dakota, S.D. CODifiED LAws § 25-4-44 
(Michie 1992); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN.§ 36-4-121 (1996); Utah, UTAH CODEANN. § 30-
3-5 (Supp. 1996); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1989); Virginia, VA. CoDE ANN. 
§ 20-107.3 (Michie 1995); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32 (1996); Wyoming, W\'0. 
STAT. ANN. § 20-2-114 (Michie 1997). 
!IIO See Ross, supra note 301, at 115 n.25; M;uy A Throne, Note, Pension Awards in 
Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 194, 197 ( 1988). 
!Ill See Greene, supra note 52, at 87, 102 (noting that wives would be better off with a 
present, vested one half interest in the marital property than with an inchoate right which a 
divorce court may bestow on her); Murray, supra note 52, at 25; Cheadle, supra note 52, at 
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the marriage the wife continues to lack a legal guarantee to her 
husband's tax savings.!l12 Equitable distribution is also 
insufficient to guarantee wives a personal benefit from the joint 
return tax savings both because judges have tremendous 
discretion in fashioning a division of property!11!1 and because 
equitable distribution does not guarantee equal distribution.!114 
Far-reaching judicial discretion in determining property 
distribution means that wives often receive less than they 
should. !115 "Some recent research has indicated that judges have 
misused the extensive discretion available under modern divorce 
statutes."!l16 "[O]ur largely male judiciary has forfeited its 
traditional claim to extensive discretion by its sorry performance. 
The data for New Haven and elsewhere is [sic] clear: a discretion-
laden system has resulted in uniformly unfair awards to, and 
decreased standards of living for, women and children. "!117 
Judges' wide latitude in determining a distribution of property 
fails to protect wives because it does not ensure for them a right to 
half of the marital assets. !118 This discretion has frequently 
resulted in judges awarding the majority of the marital property to 
1269n.2, 1312; Osborn, supra note 294, at 910; Ross, supra note 301, at 115 & n.23; Kahng, 
supra note 51, at 20. But cf. Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 75-76, 104 (noting that equitabfe 
distribution laws apply only upon divorce but suggesting that their existence may constrain 
one spouse from spending more than his fair share of assets during the marriage). 
!112 See Zelenak, supra note 29, at 379 n.195; Cheadle, supra note 52, at 1312; Kahng, 
supra note 51, at 21 n.o2. 
!11!1 See Gann, supra note 29, at 48 (the "uncertainty of Uudicial discretion] ... is 
unsatisfactory to the economically dependent spouse, who has no automatic right to a part 
of the property") (footnote omitted); Greene, supra note 52, at 98; Silbaugh, supra note 43, 
at 57, 59; Cheadle, supra note 52, passim; Osborn, supra note 294, passim 
!114 See e.g., Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); 
Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 129S-99 (Ohio 1981); Scott v. Scott, 218 P.2d 373, 376 
(Okla. 1950); Cheadle, supra note 52, at 1290, 1298 & n.163, 1303 n.188; Osborn, supra note 
294, at 935. 
!115 See WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 220; Saul Hoffman & John 
Holmes, Husbands, \Wves, and Divurce, in 4 FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES--I' ATIERNS OF 
EcoNOMIC PROGRESS 23, 2S.34, 61-62 (Greg J. Duncan & James N. Morgan eds., 1976); 
McGraw, supra note 220; Seal, supra note 220, at 10; Cynthia Starnes, Applications of a 
Contemporary Partnership Model fur /Jivorce, 8 BYU]. PUB. L. 107, 108 (1993); Starnes, supra 
note 220, at 92-95; Weitzman, The Economics of Divurce, supra note 220; Wishik, supra note 
220; Osborn, supra note 294, at 915. 
!116 Osborn, supra note 294, at 937 n.139. 
!117 McLindon, supra note 220, at 404. 
!118 "What person will enter a business or professional partnership or joint venture if the 
only liquidation rule is that a coun will have a discretion to make any order it thinks fit in 
regard to all the money and property?" Ian F. G. Baxter, Family Law &form in Ontario, 25 U. 
ToRONTO LJ. 236, 261 (1975) (discussing how judicial discretion in determining property 
distribution upon divorce provides inadequate protection for wives). 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 328 1997
328 journal of Law & Politics [Vol. Xlll:241 
husbands~19 under the view that only the husband contributed 
economically to the family during marriage. This view, of course, 
fails to account for wives' very real economic but nonfinancial 
contributions to the family: child rearing and household 
management.!131 The domestic services that a wife renders often 
make it more difficult for her to contribute financially, 321 and 
furthermore, her services "contribute[] indirectly to the [family's 
economic] acquiSIUons by making it possible for the 
[husband] to be employed. "!lZ! Consequently, upon divorce wives 
should generally be entitled to half of the property generated by 
either spouse during the marriage.~ Judicial discretion 
permitting unequal property divisions often fails to provide the 
wife with an adequate result, precluding her from reaching her 
husband's earlier tax savings. Even when state law requires judges 
to consider a wife's nonfinancial contribution to the family in 
319 See Greene, supra note 52, at 104 n.189 (acknowledging that wives are normally 
awarded less than half of the marital property). But see id. at 102 (stating elsewhere that 
there seems "to be a recent movement in the common-law states toward a more equal 
division of the property") (footnote omitted). 
!13> See De Armond, supra note ~07, at 24041; Silbaugh, supra note 43 (asserting that 
housework and child care have been treated in the disciplines of both sociology and 
economics as producing economic value); Cheadle, supra note 52, at 1310.11; Osborn, 
supra note 294, at 907, 914, 931 n.118; Ross, supra note 301, at 115, 138 n.127; Throne, supra 
note 310, at 197. 
321 See Greene, supra note 52, at 85; De Armond, supra note 307, at 240; Oleadle, supra 
note 52, at 1310-11. 
322 Greene, supra note 52, at 85. Seeid. at 83 ("Even if she did not contribute directly to 
the acquisition of property, her services enabled or hastened her husband's ability to 
acquire property.") (footnote omitted); De Armond, supra note 307, at 240-41; Throne, 
supra note 310, at 196-97. See also Joan Acker, Class, Gender, and the Relations of Distribution, 
13SJGNS 473,474 (1988) (arguing that without women's unpaid labor, the capitalist system 
could not function as beneficially for men); Cheadle, supra note 52, at 1271 & n.11; Sylvia 
A. Law, Equality: The Power and Limits of the Law, 95 YALI! LJ. 1769, 1771 (1986) (reviewing 
ZILlAH R. ElSENSfEIN, .FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY (1984)) ("our liberal society depends 
upon the unpaid work performed by women in the home"). 
32!1 This is the rationale underlying the community property system. See Wood v. Wood, 
465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Greene, supra note 52, at 73, 82 ('This 
communal approach recognizes that the contributions of both spouses are meaningful and 
that each spouse should share in the financial gains of the marnage. ");Jones, supra note 3, 
at 271, quoting Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas discussing community property laws 
('lhe law says, and most husbands will agree, that a wife's mental and physical labor at 
home is a 50 percent contribution and she should be properly paid."); Cheadle, supra note 
52, at 1271; Klebanofl, supra note 294, at 843, 845 n.37; Osborn, supra note 294, at 907. 
According to Martha Fineman, in most marriages women should be entitled to more than 
half of the family assets because women contribute more than half of the total economic 
production, working both at home and in the labor force, MAR.TIIA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE 
IlLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 4 (1991), and because 
despite joint custody arrangements, women typically assume more care for the children 
after divorce. ld. at 4-5. 
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determining an equitable distribution,Sl!4 those judges consider it 
as only one of many factors in dividing the property, !125 and they 
consistently undervalue the wife's contributions.~ As has been 
noted, case law often interprets "equitable" as not meaning 
"equal."~ As a result, the equitable distribution laws do not 
guarantee a lower-earning wife access to her husband's joint 
return tax savings upon divorce. During the marriage, as noted 
above, those laws do not apply at all. In some cases, equitable 
distribution laws are waived by prenuptial agreements and 
consequently do not apply even upon divorce.!ll!! 
State property and divorce laws are inadequate to ensure the 
wife any part of her husband's tax savings.!l29 Nevertheless, if 
!\24 Most states now recognize spouses' nonmonetary contributions in determining 
equitable distribution upon divorce. See Timothy B. Walker & Linda D. Elrod, Family Law 
in the Fifty States: An Overoiew, 26 FAM. L.Q. 319, 36~1 tbl.6 (1993). See also Cheadle, 
supra note 52, at 1311 n.223; Greene, supra note 52, at 103; Osborn, supra note 294, at 914. 
!125 See Greene, supra note 52, at 103; Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 5S.59; Cheadle, supra 
note 52, at 1289-90 (Indiana law), 1303 (Massachusetts law), 1305 (Ohio law). 
~See Greene supra note 52, at 87 (stating that if the wife does not ~et the right to half 
of the marital property, her contribution to the marital unit will be under-recognized"), 
103 (stating that m considering the wife's nonmonetary contributions as a factor in 
equitable distribution "the possibility exists that the court in the exercise of its discretion 
will fail to give the factor proper weight"); Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 57-59; Cheadle, supra 
note 52, at 1293 (discussing trial courts' undervaluation of the wife's contributions in the 
home in decisions which were reversed on appeal), 1299 n.164 (discussing an Oklahoma 
court decision that valued a wife's homemaking activities lower than her husband's labors 
on the farm). 
~See supra note 314. 
$28 See Kahng, supra note 51, at 20. 
!129 Accord Kahng, supra note 51, at 51. Some critics might argue that a wife has access 
to her husband's tax savings because state law obligates the husband to support his wife. 
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 29, at 1420-22; Greene, supra note 52, at 77; Kornhauser, supra 
note 29, at 9S.99. Of course, such a support obligation would exist even if the husband had 
filed separately and, therefore, enjoyed no tax savings. Furthermore, the husband's support 
obligauon is unlikely to increase because of the tax savings he would enjoy from filing 
jointly. Support obfigations are so illusory in application, that a $1,000 tax savings, for 
example, would be unlikely to increase his support obli~tion at all. Moreover, modern 
courts tend not to interfere or to enforce the husband s obligation to support his wife 
except in extreme cases, like a husband refusing to pay his wife's hospital bill. See, e.g., 
Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. Ct App. 1989) (court increased husband's 
alimony payments on the basis of his obligation to support wife who suffered debilitative 
multiple sclerosis). The support obligation was a creature of common-law, especially 
before the advent of the Married Women's Property Acts. Before wives could own property 
of their own, they needed, and the law provided them with, support from their husbands. 
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 52, at 77; Throne, supra note 310, at 195. Once wives could 
own their own property under the Married Women's Property Acts, see Greene, supra note 
52, at 79 n.43; Ross, supra note 301, at 114 n.20, the support obligation under common law, 
although not ceasing altogether, see Cheadle, supra note 52, at 1275 n.31, gradually became 
less important, as is evidenced by the recent decline in the importance of alimony, see 
Osborn, supra note 294, at 908, 915, a payment traditionally based on the concept of 
spousal support See O.eadle, supra note 52, at 1274 & n.26, 1283, 1295 n.142, 1298 & 
nn.160-6I. Alimony has also lost importance under no-fault property division regimes. See 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 330 1997
330 journal of Law & Politics [Vol. XIII:241 
spouses voluntarily pool their resources, the wife will have access 
to her husband's tax savings. Despite an historical absence of 
empirical research, couples have traditionally been assumed to 
pool their resources.li.'Kl However, data from recent studies 
question the validity of that assumption. !1.'11 Many instances may 
arise in which spouses who file jointly probably would not share 
resources, including situations in which the spouses are 
estranged, plan to divorce, marry late in life after accumulating 
significant assets, or have segregated their resources to provide 
for children from previous marriages.~ Empirical data show 
that, in fact, couples do not uniformly pool their resources.33!1 Not 
Starnes, supra note 220, at 85, 97. Because the support obligation has become so illusory, it 
is extremefy unlikely that a wife could invoke it to acquire any part of her husband's joint 
return tax saving:s, let alone a significant part of it. Furthermore, "[t]he suppon ... 
obligation[] ... [is] not directly enforceable between the parties when married. The 
suppon obligation may be enforceable during a marriage only by third-party creditors who 
may sue one spouse for certain very narrow categories of debts [, necessities like food and 
shelter,] undenaken by the other." (footnote omitted). Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 34. See 
also McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (holding that because husband and 
wife were not seJ;>arated or living apart, the wife could not maintain an action against her 
husband for mamtenance). Consequently, a wife could not prevail in a suit against her 
husband to obtain part of her husband's tax savings by using a support obligation theory. 
330 SeeBittker, supra note 29, passim (presuming equal sharing); Jones, supra note 3, at 
274 (stating that little, if any, empirical evidence supports the assumption that spouses share 
their incomes equally); Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 80 (describing this belief but 
contesting it); Schneider, supra note 50, at 110.11 (subscribing to this belief but citing no 
empirical support). 
!Ill See BLUMSTEIN & ScHwARTZ, supra note 252; ROSANNA HERTZ, MoRE EQUAL THAN 
OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN DUAL-CAREER MARiuAGES (1986); HITE, supra note 263; jAN 
P AHL, MONEY AND MARiuAGE ( 1989); Kornhauser, supra note 29. See also Beck, supra note 58, 
at 322 (questioning the prevalence of sharing during marriage); Edison..Smith, supra note 
56, at 122-23. 
~See Prager, supra note 52, at 120 (describing some reasons why spouses may prefer 
to keep their assets separate). 
33!1 See BLUMSTEIN & ScHWAJUZ, supra note 252, at 101 fig.9 (surveying whether or not 
couples believe in pooling money and finding that the belief is not universal: 69% of wives 
and 75% of husbands befieved in pooling); HERTZ, supra note 331, at 90.91 (finding in her 
survey that only 48% of the couples surveyed claimed to pool their assets); HrrE, supra note 
263, at 431-49; PAHL, supra note 331, at 186 tbl.5.3 (only 56% of couples claimed to share); 
Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 86 (discussing the results of her own empirical surveys: 30% 
of couples in one survey and 44.4% in the other survey claimed that at least some wages 
were not kept in joint accounts); id. at 81 ("[P]ooling is less monolithic in reality than it is 
in theory"); Meredith Edwards, Individual Equity and Social Policy, in WOMEN, SociAL SCIENCE 
AND Pusuc Poucv 95, 98-100 (Jacqueline Goodnow & Carole Patemen eds., 1985) 
(household members do not share income equally and, in fact, the standard of living of 
some wives may be lower than those of their husbands); Gann, supra note 29, at 26 (data 
"does not generally substantiate the assumption that married persons equally share their 
income[s]," (citing HAROLD M. GROVES, FEDERAL T AXTREATMENTOF1HE FAMILY 106 (1963))); 
Lily Kahng, Fictions in Tax, in TAXING AMERICA 25-44 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise 
Fellows eds., 1996) (questioning the assumption that spouses share their incomes and 
characterizing it as a fiction); Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 80 (the premise "that married 
couples share resources ... is largely unsupported by empirical evidence") (footnote 
omitted); Daniel J. Lathrope, State-Defined Marital Status: Its Future as an Operative Tax 
Factor, 17U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 257, 259 (1983); Mcintyre & Oldman, supra note 51, at 1594 
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only do couples fail to share income universally, but such pooling 
seems to be occurring less and less frequently for a variety of 
reasons.SM The women's movement in the 1960's and 1970's has 
probably contributed to the reduction in sharing by raising 
women's consciousness of the need for economic independence. 
Furthermore, some commentators speculate that spouses 
segregate resources more now because the high divorce rate 
reminds even happily married spouses of the need to maintain 
separate financial resources.!~.'!& Finally, others have speculated 
that the ascendancy of individualism and personal, rather than 
n.76; Oldman & Temple, supra note 118, at 597 (acknowledging that even spouses who 
supposedly share do not necessarily have "complete access to [each] ... others income"); 
Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 49 (questioning the notion that husbands share their financial 
resources with their wives); Staudt, supra note 43, at 1592-94 (noting unequal sharinl!' of 
income within the family); Diana Wong, The Limits of Using the Household as the Umt tf 
Ana~sis, in HOUSEHOLDS AND 111E WORLD-ECONOMY 56-63 (Joan Smith et al. eds., 1984) 
(discussing studies of households in various countries and concluding that household 
members do not share resources equally and often do not even live similar class styles); 
Davis, suJ!ra note 18, at 216-18; Note, supra note 118, at 372-73; Kahng, supra note 51, at 1S-
19 (marned couples do not uniformly pool resources or make all the1r decisions about 
earning, consumption and saving jointly). Accord OKIN, supra note 249, at 31 (suggesting 
that "many social 'goods,' such as time for paid work or for leisure, physical security, and 
access to financial resources, typically are unevenly distributed within families"); Viviana A. 
Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money: •special Monies, • 95 AM. J. Soc. 342, 352 (1989); 
Kahng, supra note 51, at 19. But see Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and Some 
Fundamental Institutional Dilemmas of Tax-Transfer Integration, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 609, 611 
(1994) (arguing that the family unit is the best choice for measuring income, asserting that 
one person's income alone does not reflect the other available resources or the financial 
responsibilities that accompany living in a household); Mcintyre, supra note 118, at 470 
(agreeing); Richard A. Epstein, The Gender Gap in Compensation: Some Reflections on the 
Gender Gap in Employment, 82 GEO. L.J. 75, 7S-79 (1993) (arguing that the family operates as 
one economic unit, positing that women share in the gains that men have generated 
through the division of take-home pay); Mcintyre, supra note 118, at 469-70 (while noting 
that marital pooling is not universal, that couples probably pool some or all of their 
incomes); Douglas Y. Thorson, An Ana~sis of the Sources of Continued Controversy Over the 
Tax Treatment of Fami~ Income, 18 NAT L TAX J. 113, 116 & n.11 (1965) (asserting that 
spouses normally pool their incomes, citing some family sociologists who based this 
conclusion on observations from the 1950's and early 1960's). Of course, purported 
sharing of income four decades ago does not constitute evidence of current pooling. But 
see Zelenak, supra note 29, at 34S-53 (reinterpreting Kornhauser's data and suggesting that 
"patterns of household income and expenditure indicate that most spouses have no choice 
but to share roughly equally in the consumption of their combined income"), id. at 353. 
Professor Zelenak concludes that spouses nominally pool their resources, but he does not 
examine empirical studies concerned with spouses relative consumption patterns. ld. 
(suggesting that allocation of deductions between spouses is difficult "precisely because 
there is a great deal of marital pooling"), id. at 381. See infra notes 345-til and 
accompanying text. 
!184 See B LUMSTEJN & ScHWAATZ, supra note 252; Beck, supra note 58, at 380; Kornhauser, 
supra note 29, at 81, 91; Ross, supra note 301, at 134. But cJ. Cheadle, supra note 52, at 1308 
(asserting, without referring to any empirical support, that "sharing principles have become 
more and more predominant in functioning marriages" and arguing that this justifies the 
movement in common-law states towards equitable distribution statutes). Of course, 
greater acceptance in those states of the idea of sharing within marriages does not 
guarantee that spouses actually share on their own. In fact, the need for equitable 
distribution statutes suggests a possible inadequacy of sharing between spouses. 
!85 See B LUMSTEJN & ScHW.uTZ, supra note 252, at 1 09; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 91. 
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group, fulfillment as cultural values has also contributed to the 
shift away from spousal pooling of earnings. !l!!6 
If husbands freely shared resources with their wives, then 
presumably they would not resist sharing legal title in property 
with their wives.~ However, husbands have frequently failed to 
transfer title of income-producing assets to their spouses, even 
when a significant tax advantage would have resulted: the 
splitting of unearned income when spouses file separately. 
Historically, wealthy married taxpayers have been unwilling to 
transfer the legal title of their property to a spouse, even though 
doing so would have often reduced income taxes by shifting the 
mcome the property generated to the spouse's lower tax 
bracket. 338 Furthermore, prior to Congress' 1948 adoption of 
!l.'!6 See Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 77-79 (family members who want some level of 
"emotional [or] ... financial independence," id. at 78, often keep all or some of their assets 
separately, even in traditional families); BLUMSTEIN &: SCHWAJUZ, supra note 252, at 47. 
Others who note the contemporary emphasis on self-fulfillment and mdividuality include 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisicm71Ul}ting About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 23-
24 (1990) and Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Famify 
Law, 83 MICH. L REV. 1803, 1856-57 (1985). For a description ol the movement towards the 
importance of the individual and away from the family, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
WESTERN EUROPE 292-93 (1989) (citing ALAIN 8tNABENT, La liberte individuelle et le manage, 
1973 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROITCML 440, 495). But see Susan Westerberg Prager, Sharing 
Principles and the FutuTtJ of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (1977) (arguing that 
emphasis on individualism is overstated, noting the interdependency of family members). 
'!«!Some might argue that spouses do share title, using joint tenancies on a widespread 
basis to hold property and to avoid probate when the first spouse dies, and that holding 
property in that manner constitutes complete sharing. In response to this observation, it 
should be recognized that joint tenancies, while established during life, effectively transfer 
the unfettered enjoyment of the property to the nonearning spouse only upon the earner's 
death. Until the earner dies, the nonearning spouse cannot encumber the asset in its 
entirety. See De Armond, supra note 307, at 238, 247 ("to bind the whole property all co-
tenants must agree"); Ross, supra note 301, at 117. Under a joint tenancy, the noneaming 
wife would finally get the benefit of the husband's tax savings only after he dies, and only if 
she survives him. The use of joint tenancies says nothing about whether there is any real 
sharing of that money during life. It also ignores the time value of money. If the tax savings 
were held in a relatively safe form so that inflation outpaced their growth, then the 
shrinking effect on the dollar would reduce the benefit of those tax savings to the surviving 
wife by the time she acquires them without restriction. 
Another response to the argument that spouses often hold assets in joint tenancy is that 
because of dominance in the relationship, le~ rights do not always reflect the social reality 
of who enjoys the property. See infra notes 345-61 and accompanying text. For example, if 
the husband deposits his tax savings from filing jointly into a bank account held jointly with 
his wife, he may have no qualms about withdrawing that amount for his own use. On the 
other hand, the wife, although completely within her legal rights to withdraw money for her 
own use, may tend not do so as freely if the husband is the primary earner or dominant in 
some other way. 
338 See Division of Tax Research, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, The Ta:x: Tr~tment of Famil, 
Income, in Hearings on Revenue Revisions BefOTtJ the House Comm. em Ways and Means, BOth 
Cong. 846, 860 (1947) (noting that this was "evident from the fact that spouses reponing 
substantial incomes on separate noncommunity-property returns frequently report[ed] 
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automatic income splitting for joint filers, and despite the 
income-splitting benefits husbands could have obtained, many 
husbands lobbied successfully against state proposals to adopt 
community property regimes,~ proposals that would have 
provided the significant federal tax advantage of income splitting. 
Such regimes would have given wives a one-half ownership 
interest in all the earnings acquired during marriage. 
Apparently, keeping title away from their wives was more 
important to many men than were the tax savings they could have 
achieved by transferring title in half the property to their wives, 
either through direct transfers of income-generating property or 
through the adoption of a community property regime. This 
desire on the part of many husbands to keep assets titled in their 
own names belies the notion that husbands intended to share 
resources equally. Perhaps certain husbands are amenable to 
sharing only when it is on their own terms, not when state 
legislatures determine the conditions of the sharing, such as 
providing the wives with an ownership interest in half of their 
husbands' earnings. Reports of a recent tendency among couples 
also suggest that couples divide expenses and keep track of their 
respective economic contributions, declining to pool their 
resources. Some couples reportedly request their return preparers 
to divide any joint tax underpayment so that each spouse pays only 
his or her own share.340 This practice suggests that among these 
couples, very little pooling occurs. 341 
unequal separate incomes"). See also Beck, supra note 58, at 379-80; Bittker, supra note 29, 
at 1394; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 96; Kahng, supro note 51, at 20 n.60. 
!139 See Jones, supra note 3, at 269-71; Kornhauser, sura note 29, at 102. C{. De 
Armond, supro note 307, at 270 (noting that people may be reluctant to share control over 
property they feel they have earned individually, and not as members of a group" in 
explaining community property provisions that vest exclusive management and control of 
some community property in only one spouse); Joseph W. McKnight, Texas Community 
Properlj Law-Its Course of Development and &fonn, BCAL W. L REV.ll7, 130 (1971) (noting 
with respect to a 1913 proposal in Texas to give both spouses management and control over 
community property that "most men objected that it would give wives too much control 
over property generated by the husband's efforts"). 
340 Ellen E. Schultz, How to split the Tax Bill with Your spouse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1993, 
at Cl. 
341 One commentator has consistently claimed that widespread sharing does occur 
within marriage. See Mcintyre, su;ra note 118, at 469; Mcintyre 8e Oldman, supra note 51, 
at 1578; Michael Mcintyre, Taxation of the Family: Economic Mutuality and the Need for Joint 
Filing, CAN. TAX'N, Winter 1979, at 13, 13-15. However, Mcintyre does not point to 
empirical data to suppon his position. See Louise Dulude, Taxation of the spouses: A 
Comparison of Canadian, American, British, French and Swedish Law, 68 OSGOOD£ HALL LJ. 67, 
88 (l985);Jones, supra note 3, at 274; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 80; Zelenak, supra note 
29, at 353 n.68. Furthermore, Mcintyre's supposition that husbands and wives share 
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Even when couples report that they share income, some may 
not be truthful. M2 "Because the dominant cultural myth 
regarding income is that people share their income, people state 
that they share or believe in sharing even when they do not. "M'I As 
a result, studies may overstate the true incidence of pooling.M4 
Couples in empirical surveys who believe that they pool 
resources, and who report doing so, do not necessarily share. 
Couples may report that they pool because they have one set of 
bank accounts or because both spouses share money 
management chores such as balancing the checkbook. However, 
spouses' relative freedom to use the resources for their own 
benefit may differ substantially, indicating that control, and 
therefore money, is not really shared. !14& A spouse claiming to 
resources because they each know of all the expenditures made by the other is belied by the 
existence of successful innocent spouse cases under I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1994). Those cases 
demonstrate that spouses frequently do not know about expenditures the other makes. 
Such innocent spouses frequently know nothing about the other spouse's finances and do 
not share in any spending decisions. See Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 808 n.144. 
M2 See PAHL, supra note 331, at 8~ (noting that couples who claimed to share 
everything when interviewed together, sometimes changed their stories when interviewed 
separately); Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 83 n.55, 105 and sources cited therein. 
M!l Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 106. See id. at 81 ("[s)pouting vague generalities 
about sharing is easy, especially when such sentiments are approved morally by tradition 1 
(footnote omitted); Beck, supra note 58, at 381 (noting that because respondents probably 
regard pooling as a commitment to marriage and would, therefore, view Jt as desirable, they 
may sometimes state that they pool when, in fact, they do not). See also HocHSCHILD & 
MACHUNG, supra note 183, at 20. 
!144 See Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 105; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 34!}.50 
(acknowledging that pooling might occur less than attitudes suggest). 
Professor Zelenak has argued that attitudes about resource pooling are more important 
than the extent of actual sharing because to be acceptable to the public, the income tax 
treatment of marria~e should be grounded in and consistent with widely held views about 
the nature of marnage, rather than actual practice. Zelenak, supra note 29, at 34%0. 
However, Professor Zelenak makes this assertion in the context of deciding whether the 
proper tax unit should be the individual or the couple. He does so with respect to whether 
couples neutrality" or "marriage neutrality" should prevail. Attitudes about pooling should 
not be elevated in importance above the prevalence of actual pooling with regard to 
whether the wife shares in the husband's joint return tax savings. Such distributional issues 
are resolved only by determining which person enjoys the economic benefit, and that 
determination may not be made without examining the prevalence of actual sharing, 
re~dless of prevailing attitudes. If attitudes favor poolin~, but behavior contradicts those 
atutudes, then wives generally will be harmed by filing jomtly. They will not share in the 
husbands' tax savings. 
M5 Se!IPAHL, supra note 331, at 57; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 81-82, 83 n.55; Wong, 
supra note 333, at 56-63 (discussing studies of households in various countries and 
concluding that household members do not share resources equally and often do not even 
live similar class styles); Zelizer, supra note 333 (families operate as hierarchical groups in 
which one person controls the allocation and use of money). CJ Ross, supra note 301, at 
134-35 (noting that even when spouses have the legal obligation to pay the other's liabilities, 
they do not necessarily believe they must do so or that they must share resources in other 
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pool resources may not even know of the existence of some 
assets.S46 Consequently, the reported incidence of true sharing 
may be overstated.M7 
Even when couples do pool nominaUy, the power, status, and 
freedom to decide how money is used nonetheless tend to be 
allocated to the higher earner, usually the husband. 348 This 
pattern is reflected in the findings of numerous sociological 
studies that nominal pooling of income does not mean that 
control over that income is shared. !149 "If one person dominates 
ways); Kahng, supra note 51, at 13 (noting that wives' economic dependence on their 
husbands contributes to their lack of control over financial decisions). 
!146 See Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 82. 
!147 See id. at 81-82, 105; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 349-50 (acknowledging that true 
pooling might exist less than attitudes suggest). 
348 See Beck, supra note 58, at 380-81 (women repon having to ask permission from 
their husbands to make purchases unless they earn significant amounts themselves); De 
Armond, supra note 307, at 251-54; Jones, supra note 3, at 274 (noting that the earner 
generally controls how earnings will be used); Zelenak, supra note 29, at 355; Kahng, supra 
note 51, at 26 (same as Jones). 
!149 See BER.GMANN, supra note 248, at 211-12 (men as primary wage earners have retained 
control over consumption patterns); BLUMSTEIN & SCHwAR.TZ, supra note 252, at 53-56; PAHL, 
supra note 331, at 146-51 (women married to wealthy men often lack resources for leisure 
activities although their husbands do not), 143 (women married to wealthy men may lack 
sufficient funds for necessities); Christine Delphy & Diana Leonard, Class Analy.sis, Gender 
Analysis and the Family, in GENDER AND STRATIFICATION 57-73 (Rosemary Crompton & Michael 
Mann eds., 1986) (unequal food distribution within the family undermines the assumption 
of equal sharing of resources and power); Jan Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the 
Structuring of InequaliiJ ffithin Marriage, 31 Soc. REV. 237, 251-58 (1983) [hereinafter Pahl, 
Structuring of Inequality]; Jan Pahl, The Allocation of Money ffithin the Household, in THE 
STATE, THE LAw, AND THE FAMILY. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 36 (Michael D.A Freeman ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter Pahl, ffithin the Household]; Diana Strassmann, Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric 
of Disciplinary Authority in Economics, in BEIDND EcoNOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND 
EcoNOMICS 54, 58-59 (Marianne A Ferber & Julie A Nelson eds., 1993) (noting that 
economists often assume incorrectly that the husband shares power and resources so as to 
further the best interest of each individual within the household). Accord CHRISTINE 
0PPONG, MIDDLE ClASS AFRICAN MAiuuAGE: A FAMILY SruDY OF GHANAIAN SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS 
86-88, 138 (1981); Carole B. Burgoyne, Money in Marriage: How Patterns of Allocation &th 
Reflect and Conceal Power, 38 SOc. REV. 634 (1990); Heidi I. Hanmann, The Family as the 
Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The &ample of Housework, 6 SIGNS 366, 366-76 
(1981) (arguing that men more often than women control how income will be used and for 
whose benefit); Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 80, 90-91 ((studies show "that individual 
incomes are not simply pooled and then spent to meet household needs in some unified 
fashion. They are spent at least in part accordin~ to the earner's own preference") 
(quoting Beatrice Lorge Rogers, The Internal Dyna17Ucs of Households: A Critical Factor in 
Development Policy, in lNTRA-HOUSEHOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION: ISSUES AND METHODS FOR 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PLANNING 1 (Beatrice l..o~e Rogers & Nina P. Schlossman eds., 
1990))); Kristin A. Moore & Isabel V. Sawhill, Implications of Women's Employment for Home 
and Family Life, in SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WoMEN WORKING: THEORIES AND l'Acrs IN 
PERSPECTIVE 201 (Ann H. Stromberg & Shirley Harkess eds., 1978); Staudt, supra note 43, at 
1594 n.91 (citing numerous studies which show that access to and control of resources is 
often tied to the gender hierarchy, often with the man controlling how money is used); 
Michael Young, Distribution of Income ffithin the Family, 3 BRIT. J. SOc. 305, 305 (1952) 
(historically men diseroportionately benefit from family resources: "the bread-winners are 
often the meat-eaters"); id. at 314 (describing the practice whereby husbands provide only 
limited access to their resources through an allowance system rather than by providing 
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the decision-making process, true sharing cannot exist. "&iO "The 
lack of sharing may be subtle, discernible for example only 
through a pattern of deference by the wife to the husband's 
decisions. "!51 For social and psychological reasons, many wives 
report feeling guilty if they spend money they have not earned 
themselves, even if they use it to purchase necessities. 352 
Consequently, they often forgo using that money, and even if they 
have literal access, they do not really enjoy the money as a 
practical matter. If control is not shared, then true pooling is 
absent.!l!i'l 
Surveys of women support the notion that when control is not 
shared, meaningful access to resources remains with the earner. 
Non-working women in those surveys claimed that if they started 
earning money, they would keep it separately, even though their 
husbands had always "shared" resources. !!54 "Surely, when sixty-six 
percent of married women say 'it's ethical to hide a portion of 
their spending money in a secret stash,' the freedom that non-
earner women feel to spend 'shared' income must be called into 
question. "355 Apparently these women did not regard themselves 
indiscriminate access); Kahng, supra note 51, at 21, 26 n. 73 (citing evidence that the earner 
retains control over the family's resources and that even in community property states where 
spouses are given equal management and control over community property earnin~s, the 
earner spouse often exerts de facto control over his earnings as the wife has little ability to 
prevent her husband from dissipating the couple's assets); WILLIAMA. REPPV,jR. & CmmiA 
A SAMUEL, COMMUNI1Y PROPERTY IN TilE UNITED Si"ATES 14-3 (3d ed. 1991} (same). See 
generally ROBERT 0. BLOOD & DONALD M. WOLFE, HUSBANDS AND WIVES: THE DYNAMICS OF 
MAiuuEo LIVING (1960); Stephen J. Bahr, Effects on Power and Division of Labor in the Family, in 
WORKING MOTIIERS 167 (Lois W. Hoffman & F. Ivan Nye eds., 1974); Randall Collins, A 
Conflict Theory of Social Stratification, 19 Soc. PROBS. 3, 13, 16 (1971) (describing sexual 
stratification in the workplace and in the home). But Sll$ Michael J. Mcintyre, Tax fustice far 
Family Members After New Yorlt State Tax Reform, 51 ALB. L REV. 789, 792 n.1'7 (1987) 
(claiming that the data in Jan Pahl, Patterns of Money Management 'ffithin Marriage, 9 J. Soc. 
PoL. 313 (1980) are unrepresentative). Professor Mcintyre cites data supportive of sharing 
that was gathered in the 1950's and early 1960's. The possibility of sharing between spouses 
in those years does not prove that spouses continue to share four decades later. 
&iO Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 88. See also Beck, supra note 58, at 380 (noting that 
the determination of which spouse has control over spending decisions is relevant to 
knowing whether those spouses share resources). 
!51 Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 106 (footnote omitted). See also HOCHSCHILD & 
MACHUNG, supra note 183, at 20. 
352 See HITE, supra note 263, at 433; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 88, 90 n.82. 
!15.'1 See Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 97, 105; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 350 
(acknowledging that dominance by one spouse is relevant to whether purported sharing is 
real). 
!164 See Burgoyne, supra note 349, at 649. See also Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 106 
(stating that women would do this in recognition that stated sharing is not real sharing). 
355 Kornhauser, supra note 29 at 106 (citing Honesty Not Best Marital Policy1, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 18, 1992, at E-3 (discussing a McCALL's magazine survey)). 
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as having true access to the resources their husbands "shared" 
with them. While some men may claim to share resources equally 
with their wives, some may be more willing to adopt an attitude of 
"sharing" when they control how much will be shared and for 
what purposes, and less willing to shift ownership to the wife so 
that she may make these decisions.S66 People may acclaim the 
idea of sharing only when they are the ones controlling the 
sharing, that is, when meaningful sharing is absent. In the 
absence of true pooling, the wife will tend not to use any part of 
the husband's tax savings, even when she has access to it as a 
legal matter or through her husband's generosity. 
Only when wives have significant earnings of their own, or 
when their husbands' earnings are low, do they tend to have more 
control over how money is spent, and thus, more meaningful 
access to their husbands' tax savings.S57 Wives tend not to have 
control over how resources are used when they have relatively low 
earnings or when their husbands have relatively large earnings. 358 
A couple in which the husband's earnings substantially exceed 
those of his wife is, therefore, less likely to practice true sharing 
than another couple with closer incomes. Furthermore, when 
one spouse earns substantially more than the other, the joint 
return benefit to the lower-earning spouse from income splitting 
is smallest and her harm from aggregation 1s largest. 
S66 See supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text. 
!57 See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWAKTZ, supra note 252 at 53; HERTZ, supra note 331, at 9~97 
(noting that separate accounts became more r.revalent once the wife starts eamins- more 
money); Collins, supra note 349, at 16; Jan Pah, Household Spending. Personal Spendmg and 
the Cuntrol of Money in Marriage, 24 Soc. 119, 12~24 (1990). 
358 See BLUMSTEIN & ScHwAKTZ, supra note 252, at 32~26; De Annond, supra note 307, at 
252-54; Louise B. Dulude, Joint Ta:cation of Spouses-A Feminist View, CAN. T AX'N, Winter 
1979, at 8 (noting that the greater the income, the less sharing); Zelenak, supra note 29, at 
343 (the earner controls how the earnings will be used). See also BLUMSTEIN & ScHWARTZ, 
supra note 252, at 53 fig.1 (same); P AHL, supra note 331, at 49-56, 69 (pointing out that wives 
have less access to the family money and that this is even more true the more the husband 
earns); Beck, supra note 58, at 381 n.296; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 83, 89 ("the amount 
of money one _partner earned relative to the other determined relative power and control 
over resources") (footnote omitted); Pahl, Structuring of Inequality, supra note 349, at 251-
58 (pointing out that wives have less access to the family money and that this is more true 
the more the husband earns); Pahl, Within the Household, supra note 349, at 4145 (the more 
the husband earns, the less the wife's control over money); Staudt, supra note 43, at 1595 
("[m]ost studies, however, indicate that the level of economic control corresponds to the 
level of each family member's market wage. Individuals who bring in a greater portion of 
income generally have more control over resources.") (footnote omitted). CJ BLUMSTEIN & 
SCHWAKTZ, supra note 252, at 56 (intra-family power disparities are related to relative income 
levels); Kahng. supra note 51, at 13 (stating, in the context of whether a woman will 
withhold the gift tax split-gift election, that a woman without assets of her own is more likely 
to lack power in the relationship). 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 338 1997
338 jtmmal of Law & Politics [Vol. XIII:241 
Consequently, JOint, rather than separate, filing provides the 
largest benefit to the husband and the largest detriment to the 
wife when the spouses have disparate incomes.Y6 This joint filing 
pattern is most harmful to wives in the very cases in which the 
wives would be least likely to have meaningful access to their 
husbands' joint return tax savings.soo For couples in which the 
spouses have disparate incomes, not only must wives pay 
significantly more by filing jointly than they would by filing 
separately, but their husbands are less likely to practice true 
sharing, so the harm to the wives is not mitigated because they do 
not acquire meaningful access to their husbands' tax savings.!l61 
Husbands often control not only how their own earnings are 
used but also how those of their wives are used. !Iff.! Critics may, 
therefore, argue that even if the tax system were modified to allow 
wives to share in the tax savings from joint filing, their husbands 
will be the true beneficiaries of those savings in any event because 
!1!"6 See supra Tables 4-6, notes 274-78, notes 348-58 and accompanying text. 
!160 See supra notes 345-59 and accompanying text. 
361 In low-income families the wife is more likely to manage the resources, thereby 
obtaining access to the husband's tax savings. However, in those low-income families, 
women's access to those savings does not necessarily permit them to use the savings for 
their own benefit. Such families generally lack the resources to cover basic necessities like 
rent or food. See Pahl, Structuring of Inequality, supra note 349, at 251-52. Any use of the 
husband's tax savings would most li"kely benefit the whole family, not the wife only. The 
wife would not likely be able to use the savings for her own leisure or to establish savings of 
her own. Cf. WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFLABOR, WORKINGWOMENCOUNTI: AREPORTTO 
THE NATION 24 (1994) (discussing the pressures encountered by some two-income families); 
Pahl, ~thin the Household, supra note 349, at 3648; Staudt, supra note 43, at 1596 (asserting 
that "[b]ecause money is scarce in low-income households, ... [managing money in these 
families] cannot be seen as a source of power1. Of course, in such low-income families, 
the ability to derive a lower total tax burden by filing jointly may not inure to the sole 
benefit of the husband either. 
!!62 See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL REV. L. 
&: WOMEN's SruD. 133, 154 (1992) (Women tend to pay for child care out of their own 
wages. Treating this cost as a woman's own personal expense, rather than as an expense of 
both spouses, causes the wife to pay for child care and to subsidize the husband's luxuries 
and savings.); Martha W. Griffiths, Can We StiU Affcml. Occupational Segregation? Some 
Remarks, in WOMEN AND TilE WORKPLACE 7, 9 (Martha Blaxall &: Barbara Reagan eds., 1976) 
(noting that the wife's salary is used to subsidize her husband's luxuries); Kornhauser, 
supra note 29, at 83; Staudt, supra note 43, at 1595-96 (describing how married women in 
the waged labor force tend to use their entire salaries for family necessities, while men often 
reserve their income for leisure activities--activities chosen by those men); id. at 1595 
("Studies indicate that often married women working in the home are given only enough 
resources to pay for the family's necessities such as food, clothing, and utility bills" but not 
enough to finance their own personal spending, and presumably not enough to accumulate 
savings in their own names (citing Pahl, Structuring of Inequality, supra note 349, at 244-
52)); Ann Whitehead, 'I'm Hungry Mum': The Politics of Domestic Budgeting, in OF MARRIAGE 
AND TilE MARKET: WOMEN'S SUBORDINATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 88, 106-07 (Kate 
Young et al. eds., 1981); Young, supra note 349, at 313-19 (discussing, in a historical 
context, the practice of husbands giving their wives "allowances"). . 
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the husbands control how all resources will be used. sm 
Alternatively, even if the wife files separately to avoid paying more 
tax, the tax she saves individually could be subject to her 
husband's control. This observation might be used to support 
retaining the status quo. Although the observation is probably 
correct in many cases, women would likely be better off filing 
separately in any event because they may be able to segregate 
some money, their own tax savings, in an effort to secure some 
modicum of economic independence.!64 Furthermore, the 
current system is more likely to be ineffective in permitting wives 
to share in the tax savings from filing jointly than a modified 
system would be. The possibility that a modified system might 
not function perfectly for all wives is not a justification for 
maintaining an even worse regime. 
Ifwomen do not have meaningful access to their husbands' tax 
savings from joint filing, then joint filing, in fact, leaves those 
wives poorer than would separate filing. Even when wives do have 
access to their husbands' tax savings through voluntary sharing, 
the tax savings are still the husbands' tax savings. Sharing men's 
resources through men's generosity is second best to women 
owning resources on their own as a matter of right.~ Husbands 
!!6.'1 See Staudt, supra note 43, at 1614 (noting that while mandatory separate returns 
would lower women's taxes, men might get the economic benefit of that tax savings because 
of their greater control over resources). q. Alstott, supra note 30, at 202!}.30 (noting that 
wives' greater labor force participation may translate mto economic benefit to husbands 
rather than to wives because of family dynamics that "divest [the wife] of effective control 
over the additional incomes"). 
364 See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text. 
!65 See OKIN, supra note 249, at 3~31 (discussing whether justice has been required 
within the family and suggesting that one spouse's generosity is inadequate to ensure such 
justice); Bittker, supra note 29, at 1394 (acknowledging that women's le~al rights in 
earnings are "a significant matter, not a trivial one" for purposes of determinmg who the 
taxpayer should be for tax computation purposes); Greene, supra note 52, at 103 (noting 
that inchoate expectancies are inferior to a full-fledged present ownership interest); 
Hadfield, supra note 252, at 107 (arguing that one reason why the gender gap in wages 
should be efiminated is "to secure women's ability to ensure their own well-being rather 
than being dependent on transfers from a spouse or the government"); Davis, supra note 
18, at 218 (noting that assumed sharing should not be the standard assumption which is 
incorporated into the law: "spousal interdependence ... should not be accepted ... as a 
justification for refusing to accord women equal advantages in the economic or legal 
spheres. "). 
Even in the context of divorce where common-law property states sometimes give a wife 
greater access to her "husband's" property, discretion JS often left to a judge to divide the 
property fairly between the spouses. However, the "uncertainty of this method is 
unsatisfactory to the economically dependent spouse, who has no automatic right to a part 
of the property." Gann, supra note 29, at 48 (emphasis added). See supra notes 31~28 and 
accompanying text. 
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who voluntarily share their resources with their wives still enjoy 
the power and control that accompanies the concentration of 
assets in their hands. Numerous sociological studies suggest that 
money profoundly impacts the power relationships between 
husbands and wives.!ffi The fact that women generally have access 
to wealth primarily through their husbands' generosity 
concentrates control and power in the hands of those husbands. 
"[S]uperior earnings are rewarded with dominant control. "!£7 
This pattern, which exists because of cultural practices and 
because of the gendered wage gap, is further exacerbated by the 
fact that joint filing relative to separate filing directs even more 
money to husbands and even less to wives. 
Even if spouses do share resources in a meaningful way, so that 
the wife may avoid being harmed by filing jointly and may 
effectively share in her husband's tax savings, the fact that wives 
must rely on their husbands' generosity to enjoy the tax savings 
has a harmful pedagogical effect.868 The tax law sends harmful 
messages about men's and women's roles and identities by 
allowing women to benefit only through their husbands' 
benevolence. The tax law establishes a pattern whereby wives 
!ffi See BLUMSTEIN & ScHwARTZ, supra note 252, at 17-18, 55, 83 (examining 12,000 
questionnaire responses and 300 in-depth interviews on the subject of couples and their 
money, work and sex); MARciA MIU.MAN, WARM HEARTS AND COLD CASH: THE INTIMATE 
I))NAMJcs OF FAMIUES AND MoNEY 5 (1991) ("Money is a primary source of power in 
relationships."). 
~De Armond, supra note 307, at 253. See also BLUMSTEIN & ScHWARTZ, supra note 252, 
at 109 ("In traditional marriages, interdependence is usually achieved at the cost of the 
wife's autonomy and her participation on an equal basis in decision-making."); PAHL, supra 
note 331, at 109 (studying English couples); Burgoyne, supra note 349, at 655 (arguing that 
the spouses' perceived ownership interests in earnings is important in influencing their 
respective levels of power and access to "shared" money); I'ahl, supra note 357, at 124 
(study of English couples). 
!riB q. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundatitm.s for a Right to Education Under the U.S. 
Constitution: A ~nning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 
635-37 (1992) (discussing in the context of a. constitutional right to education, the 
beneficial pedagogical effect that law has in instructing the public about desired norms); id. 
at 635 ("[L]aw ... disseminates [values and priorities] ... back to the populace to become 
part of conscious conventional wisdom") (footnote omitted); De Armond, supra note 307, 
at 257 (suggesting that the messages in law have some power to transform society and 
arguing that '1aw is a belief system that helps define the role of the individual in society and 
relations with others, [and that] ... it can promote fulfilling, healthy roles for people and 
encourage them to relate in particular ways, and not in others."); id. at 258 (suggesung that 
law should change negative aspects of social reality, not exacerbate them); McCaffery, 
Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 656 (implying in the context of the symbolic 
danger of taxing men more dian women that the symbolic function of law is important and 
that law sends messages to society); Zelenak, supra note 29, at 365 & n.121 (implying that 
law, specifically the joint return, may be objectionable on the basis of inappropriate 
messages that it sendS to the public). But see Alstott, supra note 30, at 2031 (discounting 
the impact on society of symbolism in law). 
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must consistently request money from their husbands, money to 
which they should have had access by right. The law portrays the 
husband as a provider, a generous contributor, a chief financial 
officer, and an authority figure, and it portrays the wife as a 
beggar, a burden, a consumer, a drain on the "husband's" 
resources, and a dependent. This pattern in the tax law 
perpetuates marriage as an institution in which men 
economically dominate women.!OO The tax law arguably should 
not be allowed to perpetuate or contribute to such stereotypes. 
The voluntary sharing of resources within the marital unit is 
not a sufficient solution · to the pattern whereby husbands are 
better off and wives are worse off by filing jointly rather than 
separately. The tax law should neither rely on spousal sharing 
nor be structured to require that spouses share resources to 
enable wives to enjoy some of the financial benefit from filing 
jointly. In the absence of sharing, the joint return rate structure 
operates to force wives to transfer funds to their higher-earning 
husbands. The tax code, therefore, relies on marital sharing of 
assets in an attempt to achieve a just result, in an effort to allow 
both spouses to benefit from filing jointly. The Code relies on 
this sharing of resources despite the possibility that marital 
relationships are more stable when each partner retains some 
level of economic independence.~ 
An equitable method for apportioning joint return tax 
liabilities between husband and wife, one that differs from those 
described above, is to split the joint tax liability in proportion to 
the spouses' respective liabilities had they filed separately. Using 
the example in which the husband and wife earn $80,000 and 
$40,000 respectively, this approach would allocate $21,112 of the 
$29,729 joint tax to the husband and $8,617 to his wife. g'7I Note 
!69 q. Kahn!!", supra note 51, at 2 (discussing how the estate and gift tax systems also 
perpetuate marnage as an institution privileging husbands over wives). 
S70 &e, e.g., Kornhauser, rupm note 29, at lOB. 
m These amounts are computed as follows: 
$21,564 (husband's MFS liability) x $29,729 (MFJ tax)+ $30,366 (Total MFS liability) = 
$21,112 (husband's portion of joint tax). 
$8,802 (wife's MFS liability) x $29,729 (MI'J tax) + $30,366 (Total MFS liability) = 
$8,617 (wife's portion of the joint tax). 
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that under this apportionment method, both spouses are better 
off than they would have been had they filed separately.m 
Consequently, this method is the most desirable.m Nevertheless, 
it is inappropriate to apportion joint return tax liability in this 
manner in analyzing which spouse benefits by filing jointly 
rather than separately because when a couple pays its joint return 
tax liability, it is unlikely that each spouse contributes to the 
payment based on his or her respective separate return liabilities. 
First, no tax rules apply in this context to instruct the couple to 
mIn fact, the government has adopted this apportionment method for use in a variety 
of contexu but notably not to instruct joint filers how to divide their joint tax liabilities 
fairly. Respective separate return liabilities are used to apportion joint tax liability between 
the spouses in three contexu. First, this method is found in the rules for determining the 
amount the IRS will refund from a joint return to one spouse when the other is not entided 
to any refund because, for example, he has an ouutanding separate return tax liability from 
a previous year. See Rev. Rul. 80.7,1980.1 C.B. 296. See also Rev. Rul. 80-6, 1980-1 C.B. 296; 
Rev. Rul. 8(}.8, 1980.1 C.B. 298. 
[T]he overpayment is creditable or payable only to the spouse who 
actually made paymenu in excess of his or her own separate liability, but 
only to the extent aggregate paymenu of both spouses exceed their aggregate 
liability. In other words, the separate overpaymenu are credited only to the 
proper payor, but the refund is limited so as not to create a deficiency. 
Beck, supra note 58, at 394 n.384. This approach is consistent with I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) 
(1994), the rule of joint and several liabihty. Second, the method is also present in the 
rules for determining how much of a joint return income tax liability is deductible for 
estate tax purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(0 (1958). Third, the method is used to 
determine whether estimated tax paymenu for the current year have been underpaid when a 
joint return was filed in the yreceding year and separate returns are filed in the current 
taxable year. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.6654-2(e) (as amended in 1985). The same method is also 
used for allocating joint estimated tax paymenu between a husband and wife in the event 
they file separate income tax returns and cannot agree on an allocation. See Treas. Reg. § 
1.6015(b)-l (b) (as amended in 1976). 
m If Congress ever repeals the rule of joint and several liability, it should adopt in iu 
place an apportionment method which divides the joint tax liability on the basis of the 
spouses' respective tax liabilities had they filed separately, and it should instruct taxpayers 
that this method is the fairest manner for dividing their joint return tax liability. Accord 
Beck, supra note 58, at 389 n.341, 393-95. Apportioning joint return liabilities on the basis 
of respective separate return liabilities is more appropriate than doing so on the basis of 
respective net incomes because the former method permiu the lower-earning spouse to 
share in the financial income-splitting benefit of joint filing. The two methods yield 
different resulu because apportioning joint return liability on the basis of respective 
separate return liabilities allows the lower-earning spouse access to lower ma~inal rates. A 
low-income taxpayer who files separately would be subject to low margmal tax rates 
compared to a high-income taxpayer who files separately. Dividing the joint return liability 
according to respective separate return liabilities will give effect to the spouses' two different 
effective tax rates (ETRs). By contrast, apportioning the joint return tax on the basis of 
respective net incomes causes the combined incomes to be subject to tax at one, combined 
ETR, the ETR applicable in the joint return rates. This average ETR is higher than the 
wife's separate ETR and lower than the husband's separate ETR. Hence, the latter 
apportionment method taxes the wife's income more and the husband's income less than 
would separate filing. Apportioning joint return liability on the basis of res~ctive separate 
return liabilities prevenu the averagmg of the two ETRs, maintaining a difference m the 
ETRs applicable to the two different spouses. 
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apportion its JOint return tax in this manner. Second, the vast 
majority of the population is unlikely to consider apportioning 
joint tax liability in this manner.374 Thus, spouses who segregate 
their resources and divide each expenditure, including the joint 
return tax bill, most likely contribute equally or in proportion to 
their respective net incomes, rather than in proportion to what 
their respective tax liabilities would have been if computed using 
separate return rates. 
Furthermore, when given the opportunity to apportion joint 
return liability, the courts have consistently failed to do so on the 
basis of respective separate return liabilities. In state contribution 
actions where federal joint return tax liabilities were apportioned 
between spouses, not one reported state court decision stated that 
the joint return tax should be divided according to the spouses' 
374 In an informal smvey of 32 attorneys conducted by this author, 63% of respondents 
reported that the fairest way to divide joint return tax would be according to the spouses' 
respective net incomes. Twelve percent thought that it would be fairest to apportion the 
joint tax either according to the spouses' respective net incomes or on a 50-50 basis. Only 
25% thought of splitting the liability in proportion to the respective separate return tax 
liabilities. If most attorneys, individuals who tend to be educated in general tax principles, 
do not think to split the joint return tax in proportion to separate tax liabilities, then the 
average couple is very unlikely to think of splitting the joint tax in that manner. Of course, 
limitations on the usefulness of such a survey include the fact that respondents were simply 
asked their opinion. Had respondents actually been working on their own tax returns and 
deciding whether to file jointly or separately, they might have discovered that 
apportionment on the basis of separate return liabilities rendered a different result than 
apportionment on the basis of respective net incomes. Even Professor Beck, an expert on 
joint return law, has occasionally slipped in this regard. Professor Beck knows about the 
possibility of apportioning joint return liability according to spouses' respective separate 
return liabilities. Su: Beck, supra note 58, at 394 (discussing how this apportionment 
method is used in other contexts). In the context of discussing how wives pay the price 
statistically for the benefit of income splitting, he states that the benefit accrues entirety to 
husbands. "It should be noted that the wife's taxes would be identical whether she files 
jointly or separately; all the saving is on the husband's side of the return." ld. at 376. This 
statement would not be correct if the couple apportions joint return liability on the basis of 
their respective separate return liabilities. Most spouses probably do bear the joint return 
liability using a 50-50 split or in proportion to their respective net incomes. Professor 
Beck's statement reflects this proliable reality, inferring that the tax savings from income 
splitting are enjoyed 100% by husbands. Of course, joint return liability ought to be 
divided by spouses so that each spouse attains a fair share of the joint return tax savings. 
Professor Beck agrees. Id. at 389 n.341, 393-95. See also Alstott, supra note 30, at 2028-29 (in 
the context of the ability for each spouse to pay tax, equating spouses' abilities to pay tax 
with apportionment of the joint return liability on the basis of their respective incomes 
rather than on the basis of their respective separate return liabilities). 
It should be noted that some individuals, probably only tax accountants, do apportion 
joint return liability between spouses in a manner that approximates the correct method, 
according to respective separate return liabilities. They have been reported to divide that 
liability on the basis of the spouses' respective liabilities had they been single. Under this 
method, both spouses benefit economically from filing jointly rather than separately. See 
Schultz, supra note 340, at Cl (noting that some couples are more frequently asking their 
return preparers to determine how to divide underpayments between the spouses, 
indicating 6oth that most individuals do not know how to do this fairly on their own and 
that they do not share resources). Empirical research should be conducted to determine 
how most spouses divide their joint return tax liabilities in practice. 
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respective separate return tax liabilities.375 Rather, state courts 
375When, under the rule of joint and several liability, the Commissioner collects a joint 
return tax deficiency from one spouse even though his or her income or deductions did not 
contribute to the deficiency, then that spouse may bring a right-of-contribution action in 
state court against the other spouse. See Estate of Mcaure v. United States, 288 F.2d 190, 
192 (Ct. a. 1961). State law determines the plaintiff spouse's rights. See Alioto v. 
Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2133, 2136 (1994) ("Contribution is a matter to be 
resolved under State laws."). In Murchison v. Murchison, 33 Cal. Rptr. 285, 288 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1963), the court ruled that a spouse who had paid the entire federal joint return 
tax deficiency was entitled to contribution for the other spouse's share. That decision did 
not address the issue of how each spouse's fair share should be determined. 
In the context of joint return tax liability, state courts have determined fair-share 
apportionment using a variety of methods, but no decision has reported apportioning the 
joint return tax on the basis of respective separate return liabilities. But see Beck, supra 
note 58, at 396 (stating that state courts apportion joint return liability on the basis of 
respective separate return liabilities, but providing no evidence and erroneously citing cases 
that did not so hold). Rather, state courts have apportioned joint return tax liability in the 
following manners: (1) according to the spouses respective net incomes, see Chappell v. 
Chappell, 253 So. 2d 281, 285, 287 (F1a. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (party divided tax obligation in 
half and had it not been for policy against withholding alimony, court seemingly would 
have allowed contribution on the basis of respective earned incomes); Miller v. Miller, 310 
N.Y.S.2d 18, 21 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); (2) half to the husband and half to the wife, see Rude v. 
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 165, 171-75 (1967) (discussing whether wife could deduct as a non-
business bad debt the amount her husband owed her pursuant to an earlier right of 
contribution judgment from a California state court); Rocha v. Rocha, 297 P.2d 505, 507 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (under both law and an agreement between the parties); 
Bormaster v. Bormaster, 274 P.2d 757 (Kan. 1954); Hanson v. Hanson, 350 P.2d 859, 86~1 
(Wash. 1960); and (3) according to a property settlement agreement or stipulation between 
the ex-spouses, see Gillman v. O'Connell, 574 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (App. Div. 1991) 
(agreement provided that any tax deficiency arising from the marriage would be 
apportioned to the spouse whose income or deductions generated the deficiencies); 
Gooden v. Wright, No. 14823, 1991 WL 57230, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1991) 
(agreement provided that any tax deficiency would be paid entirely bY the ex-husband); 
Strange v. Rubin, 456 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (pursuant to a stipulation between 
the parties that half of the deficiency was attributable to each spouse). 
It should be noted that Rocha, Hansun, and Rude, three of the four decisions in which 
liability was attributed to the spouses on a 50-50 basis, involved couples who had been living 
in community property jurisdictions. Dividing the joint return liability in half would have 
corresponded with apportionment on the basis of respective separate return liabilities if the 
deficiencies in those cases resulted from unreported community income. Such income is 
properly taxed half to each spouse. Nevertheless, none of the three opinions explained the 
reasons for the deficiencies in question. 
The states in those three cases for the tax years in question treated earnings from 
separate property as separate, not community, earnings. Rocha and Rude both involved 
California residents and the tax years 1949 and 1950 in the case of Rocha, and 1951 in the 
case of Rude. California law at that time, as now, designated income from separate 
property as separate income. CAL. FAM. CODE App. §§ 5107-5108 (West 1997); George v. 
Rarisom, 15 Cal. 322 (1860) (holdin~ that law providing that such income was, itself, 
community property violated the California constitution). Hanson involved residents of 
Washington state and the 1956 tax year. In that year, as now, Washington state law provided 
that income from separate property would, itself, also be separate _property. 1879 Wash. 
Laws § 1, at 77; WASH .. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.010-.020 (West 1997). Thus, had income 
arisen from one spouse's separate property in any of those three cases, that income should 
have been taxed solely to the owner-spouse pursuant to community property law and the 
principles enunciated in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-18 (194!>), that the owner of 
income-producing property is the pror.er taxpayer. A deficiency due to a failure to report 
such separate earnings would be attributable entirely to the spouse owning the separate 
property. In that instance, a 5().50 allocation would not correspond to apportionment on 
the basis of respective separate return liabilities. 
Had a deficiency resulted from one spouse's improper deduction or an understated 
gain on the sale of separate property, then that deficiency would not be borne half by each 
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apportioned joint return liability between the spouses by dividing 
it in half, by dividing it on the basis of respective net incomes, or 
in accordance with a property settlement agreement between the 
ex-spouses. Moreover, prior to Congress' enactment of joint and 
several liability, federal courts sometimes had occasion to 
determine how to apportion joint tax liability between spouses. 
None of the federal courts addressing that issue apportioned the 
joint tax on the basis of what the spouse's individual tax liabilities 
would have been had they filed separately. Rather, those courts 
ruled that joint tax liability should be apportioned on the basis of 
the spouses' respective net incomes. 376 If courts have apportioned 
separately filing spouse. In that instance, a 5()..50 allocation would not correspond to 
apportionment on the basis of respective separate return liabilities. Given the absence of 
information documenting the reason for the deficiencies in Rocha, Hanson, and Rude, it is 
impossible to know whether or not the 50.50 allocation corresponds to apportionment on 
the basis of respective separate tax liabilities. None of these courts provided any indication 
in their opinions that they had put much thought into the apportionment issue. 
Furthermore, none of the decisions ever referred to apportionment on the basis of 
respective separate return liabilities. Had courts intended to apportion on that basis it 
seems reasonable to expect that they would have said so. It, therefore, seems unlikely that 
the three courts had intended to apportion the deficiencies on that basis. 
In general, state courts have not apportioned joint return liabilities in a manner that 
permits both spouses to share in the financial benefits of joint filing. Instead, they seem to 
apportion those liabilities in manners that benefit the higher-earning spouse and that harm 
the lower-earning spouse. 
376 See Commissioner v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 640 (2d Cir. 1940); Cole v. 
Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485, 487, 489 (9th Or. 1935); Seder v. Commissioner, 38 B.TA 874, 
877 (1938). 
It should be noted that during the tax years involved in those cases: (1) separate 
returns were called individual returns; and (2) income splitting had not yet been 
incorporated into the joint return tax rates. Joint tax liability was computed simply by 
applying the individual rates to the spouses' aggregate net incomes. See Bittker, supra note 
29, at 1400. Consequently, the aggregation effect would cause joint filing to result in a 
higher total tax liability, and income splitting would not apply to offset that harm. Joint 
return liability tended to exceed the sum of the spouses' individual liabilities. 
Assuming joint return liability was apportioned at that time on the basis of the spouses' 
respective net incomes, the higher-earning spouse, usually the husband, would have paid 
only a somewhat greater tax by filing jointly than the amount he would have owed had he 
filed individually. By contrast, the wife would have paid a much greater tax, on a 
percentage basis, by filing jointly than by filing individually. Apportioning joint return 
liability on the basis of respective net incomes tended to be more harmful to women than 
to men. Assuming the jomt return liability was apportioned on the basis of the spouses' 
respective individual tax liabilities, the higher-earning spouse would pay a greater tax by 
filing jointly than if he had filed individually, and the lower-earning spouse would pay an 
equally greater tax, in percentage terms, by filing jointly than the amount she would have 
owed had she filed individually. Consequently, apportioning joint return liability on the 
basis of respective individual liabilities tended to impose the aggregation burden from joint 
filing on both spouses fairly. The example below illustrates these principles. 
Assume a progressive individual tax rate as follows: 
Net Income ($) Mllfiinal Tax Rate 
0-10,000 10% 
10,001 - 20,000 20% 
20,001 - 30,000 30% 
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JOint return liabilities in a manner that prejudices the lower-
earning spouse, usually the wife, then it should be expected that 
taxpayers will make the same errors.m Without instruction, few 
couples would be likely to divide their joint return liabilities in 
this manner.m 
With regard to couples who segregate resources, until 
Assume the husband earns a net income of $20,000 and that the wife has net earnings of 
$10,000. If the spouses file individual returns, the husband's tax liability will be $3,000, or 
10% of his first $10,000 plus 20% of his last $10,000. The wife's individual liability would be 
$1,000, or 10% of her income of $10,000. Their combined individual tax liabilities would 
amount to $4,000. 
Assuming the couple files jointly, income aggregation would operate to produce a joint 
tax liability of $6,000. The couple's total income of $30,000 would be subject to all three 
marginal rates: 10% on the first $10,000; 20% on the second $10,000; and 30% on the last 
$10,000. The couple is better off filing individually than jointly. 
The $6,000 joint liability could be apportioned in many ways. The courts in Cole, 
Rabenold, and Seder all chose to do so on the basis of respective net incomes. Because one-
third of total net income was attributable to the wife, one-third of the $6,000 joint tax, or 
$2,000, would be apportioned to her. Two-thirds of net income was the husband's. 
Therefore, two-thirds of the $6,000 joint tax, or $4,000 would be apportioned to him. By 
filing jointly rather than individually the wife's taxes have, under this apportionment 
method, increased by 100% from $1,000 to $2,000. By contrast, this methOd causes the 
husband's taxes to increase by only 33% from $3,000 to $4,000. Using the courts' chosen 
apportionment method, the burden from aggregation is borne disproportionately by the 
lower-earning spouse, generally the wife. 
Had the courts thought of apportioning the joint tax on the basis of respective 
individual liabilities, the spouses would have borne the aggregation burden equitably. 
Because three-fourths of die combined individual liability. $3,000 of the total $4,000, was 
attributable to the husband, three-fourths of the $6,000 JOint liability or $4,500 would be 
apportioned to him. One-fourth of the total individual tax liability, $1,000 of the total 
$4,000, was attributable to the wife, and, therefore, one-fourth of the $6,000 joint liability, or 
$1,500, would be apportioned to her. Under this second apportionment regime, the 
husband and the wife would each pay 50% more than what they would have owed had they 
filed individually. This apportionment method would have allocated the burden of 
aggregation more appropriately. 
By choosing to apportion joint return liability on the basis of respective net incomes 
rather than according to the spouses' respective liabilities had they chosen not to file 
jointly, the Ninth and Second Circuits and the court known for its expertise in tax matters, 
the Board of Tax Appeals, all failed to spread the burdens of joint filing fairly between the 
spouses. This error was analogous to apportioning joint tax liability today on some basis 
other than respective separate tax liabilities and has the same effect of favoring the higher-
earning spouse and harming the other. Even federal courts have apportioned joint return 
liability improperly. 
mIt should be noted that husbands prepare the joint tax return more often than wives 
do. See Jerome Borison, Alice Through a Very Dark and Confusing Looking Glass: Getting 
Equity from the Tax Court in Innocent spouse Cases, 30 FAM. LQ. 123, 126 (1996). This 
practice may make it even less likely that joint return liability would be divided between the 
spouses in a manner that would benefit wives. 
$78 See supra notes 374-77 and accompanying text q: Alstott, supra note 30, at 2020 
(acknowledgmg in another context that taxpayers often fail to understand tax incentives, 
thus, lending support to the possibility that couples may not understand how to apportion 
their joint return liability appropriately); McCaffery, supra note 264 (discussing the concept 
that cognitive error often causes taxpayers to make faufty decisions regarding their taxes and 
with respect to tax policy in general). 
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Congress repeals the rule of joint and several liability and until 
spouses are instructed that the fairest manner of dividing their 
joint tax liability is on the basis of their respective separate return 
liabilities, apportioning joint return tax on that basis will 
continue to be inappropriate when analyzing who benefits and 
who is harmed from joint rather than separate filing. m Because 
spouses who segregate resources are unlikely to divide the joint 
return tax liability in a manner that provides a tax savings to each 
spouse, 3111 joint rather than separate filing is likely to inure to the 
benefit of the higher earner and to harm the lower earner. In 
this area, lack of explicit instructions from the Internal Revenue 
Service!l81 and taxpayers' imperfect understanding regarding 
apportionment appear to combine, permitting couples to 
apportion their joint return liabilities improperly and in a 
manner which tends to benefit husbands and to harm wives. 
Thus, by filing jointly rather than separately, the tax the wife bears 
most likely increases. 
As long as two spouses have disparate incomes, which is the 
usual case, the couple will generally file jointly, generating a tax 
benefit for the higher earner, usually the husband, and a tax 
detriment for the lower earner, usually the wife. It is ironic that 
for couples in which one spouse earns significantly more than 
the other an incentive would exist to file in a manner that would 
increase the burden on the lower-earning spouse while easing the 
burden on the higher-earning spouse. 382 This seems contrary to 
m For couples who share resources, any payment of tax is essentially a payment in 
proportion to the spouses' respective net incomes rather than a payment by each in 
proportion to their respective separate tax liabilities. Accordingly, for purposes of 
determining whether one or both spouses benefit from filing jointly rather than separately, 
it is inappropriate to apportion Joint return liability on the basis of respective separate 
return liabilities. Of course if a couple pools resources, then that apportionment 
benefiting the high earner and harming the lower earner is mitigated, in effect, by the low 
earner's access to the high earner's large tax savings. Problems regarding the concentration 
of power in husbands' hands remain, however. See supra notes 345-53 and accompanying 
texL 
!a> See supra notes 374-78 and accompanying texL 
!lSI In spite of a reference to which spouse may take credit on a separate return for 
previously paid joint estimated tax payments, II'ITERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP 'T or THE 
TllEASUR.Y, 19961040 FORMS AND INSTR.UCTJONS 24, and the information that one joint filer is 
entitled to part of the refund even if the other spouse owes money to the government, id. at 
30, the 1040 FoRMs AND INSTR.UCTJONS contain no guidance for taxpayers as to how to divide 
their joint return liabilities fairly when they owe additional tax upon filing. I d. at 30-31. 
!182 q. Davis, supra note 18, at 233 (stating that the tax system helps perpetuate women's 
inferiority in society by "subsidiz[ing] patriarchy"); supra note 219 (discussing how gender 
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notions of fairness, and is certainly regressive, especially if the 
spouses do not pool or share their resources. In situations in 
which spouses do not share resources, joint filing is likely to 
cause a transfer of wealth from the poorer wife to the richer 
husband.~ Furthermore, the greater the income disparity, the 
larger will be the transfer from the "poorer" to the "richer" spouse 
and the less likely it will be that true sharing will occur between 
the spousesll84 so as to mtugate the effect of that transfer. 
Through the mechanisms of income splitting and aggregation, 
the "poorer" wife essentially pays part of her "richer" husband's 
tax burden by letting him shift part of his tax liability into her 
lowest bracket and then by having her own income taxed in a 
higher tax bracket. Income splitting and aggregation force her 
not only to give away part or all of her lowest bracket but to give it 
away to someone who earns more than she does. 385 
biases tend to perpetuate themselves automatically in other tax contexts and in non-taX 
contexts as well). 
388 Cj.EVELYNNAKANO GLENN, ISSEI, NISEI, WAR. BRIDE: THREE GENERATIONS OF jAPANESE 
AMERICAN WOMEN IN DOMESTIC SERVICE 192 (1986) (women "perform a disproportionate 
share of work in the household, while men receive disproportionate advantages in the form 
of services and access to income"); Staudt, supra note 43, at 1584 n.54 (arguing that 
women's responsibility for housework has the effect of transferring wealth from women to 
men. "[T]he assumption [accompanying the ethic of care] ... that women should provide 
free caretaking services for the familY, enabling independence for the family while 
remaining dependent, herself ... is problematic."). 
ll84 See supra notes 357-61 and accompanying text. 
385 Comparing the impact on spouses of filing jointly with the impact of filing separately 
is equivalent to examining the marriage bonus that existed before Congress lowered "single • 
tax rates in 1969. The current MFS rates are structured in relation to joint return rates the 
same way single rates were related to them before 1969. Prior to 1969, the joint return rates 
produced tax equal to two times the single tax on half the income in question. Similarly, 
today the joint rates generate tax equal to twice the MFS taX on half the income in question. 
See supra notes 56 and 85. 
Prior to 1969, the rate structure never produced a marriage penalty because the harm 
from aggregation never exceeded the benefit from income splitting. In fact, a marriage 
benefit would always result unless spouses earned exactly equal incomes in which case 
marriage would produce neither a benefit nor a penalty. In th1s latter instance, the benefit 
of income splitting would exactly offset the burden of aggr~ation. This is equivalent to the 
situation today in which spouses are indifferent between fihng jointly and separately when 
they earn equal incomes. The larger the pre-1969 disparity in spousal incomes, the greater 
the benefit from marl)'ing. Similarly, the larger the disparity in spousal incomes today, the 
greater the incentive to file jointly rather than separately. 
The examination this Article makes of separate and joint filing for today's married 
couples is analogous to an analysis of the pre-1969 marriage benefit. Before 1969, getting 
married nearly always resulted in lower combined taxes. Currently, filing jointly nearly 
always results in lower combined taxes than does filing separately. The current patterns 
between filing separately and jointly are in all important respects identical to the old 
patterns between filing as single and filing jointly. 
The present analysis, however, transcends the pre-1969 studies of the marriage bonus. 
This Article examines not only how filing jointly rather than separately reduces total tax. It 
also probes how that decision impacts each spouse individually. The husband pays less 
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D. The Hann the Rate Structure Inflicts on Women Is Not ]ustifzed by the 
Fact that Many Women Enjoy the "Luxury" of Not Having to Wom in 
the Paid Labar Force 
The various gender problems associated with joint filing, 
including: (1) the aggregation effect which subjects wives' 
earnings to tax rates that are higher than those applying to 
husbands; (2) taxing wives more and husbands less than under 
separate filing; and (3) patterns penalizing similar-income 
couples but benefiting one-earner couples, could all be viewed as 
being offset by the fact that many married women enjoy the luxury 
of not having to work in the paid work force, a luxury which fewer 
men, by contrast, are afforded. Currently 39.3% of married 
women are not in the work force, while only 22.6% of married 
men are not in the work force.!l86 More wives than husbands enjoy 
the luxury of being supported financially by someone else's work. 
Perhaps this benefit ought to be viewed as offsetting the unfair 
gendered effects of joint filing. Of course, that benefit is not 
confined to married women, given that more than one-fifth of 
married men are not in the labor force. Furthermore, most of the 
women who are not counted as being in the labor force are in fact 
working at housecleaning and child rearing, work which is 
unpaid. Therefore, the "luxury" a wife enjoys of being supported 
by another person may be viewed, in substance, as value she earned 
by contributing to the work of the family. !Rl From this perspective 
because of the decision to file jointly, while the wife actually pays more than she would by 
filing separately. This pattern was also true prior to 1969: an overall bonus resulted from 
marrying but, as between the spouses, marriage reduced the husband's tax but increased 
that of the wife. Examinations of the pre-1969 marriage bonus tended not to inquire into 
questions of how that bonus was distributed between the spouses. This Article asks just 
that question under today's rate structure and concludes that wives actually fund the benefit 
husbands obtain by filing jointly. 
While previous articles demonstrated the pre-1969 marriage bonus, this Article takes a 
different focus, describing the distributional effects of that bonus as between the spouses. 
Today, when the financial interests of spouses are not always or obviously aligned, 
examining how the benefit from filing jointly rather than separately is distributed between 
the spouses is particularly appropriate. A benefit accruing to one spouse can no longer be 
assumed to aid the other or to compensate her for the detriment she bears in generating it. 
!186These figures were derived by taking the complement of the percentages of married 
men and women who were in the labor force in 1994, the most recent year for which data is 
available. See SrAnsnCAL ABSrRAcr, supra note 202, at 405 tbl.636. 
!Rl See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 323, at 4 (noting partnership theory and suggesting 
ways in which it could be modified and improved); Gann, supra note 29, at 48; Klebanoff, 
rupmnote 294, at 843 n.25; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 73, 77 n.41; Joan M. Krauskopf, 
Recompense fur. Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in 
Human Capita~ 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980) (advocating partnership theory); Reva B. 
Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning l-Wves' Household Labor, 
1850.1880, 103YALE LJ. 1073 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modemiz.ation of Marital Status Law: 
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the average wife should not be viewed as enjoying any benefit that 
she did not earn. Consequently, it is questionable that the 
disadvantages of joint filing are justified by the "luxury" she enjoys 
of being supported by another, the luxury of not having to work 
or to earn a living. 
Even for non-working wives who neither do housework nor 
raise children, this "luxury" of not having to work obviously 
precludes economic independence during marriage. Power and 
autonomy as between marriage partners tend, therefore, to be 
concentrated in the hands of working husbands and not in the 
hands of stay-at-home wives. The wife's cost for the benefit of not 
having to work is the loss of power and autonomy and maybe even 
status within the marriage.!88 Women bear additional costs by not 
working in that they forgo developing skills that could be 
employed gainfully outside of the home.31ll They also fail 
generally to accumulate their own "private savings reflected in ... 
[their] own separate property. "!ro Policymakers should not, 
therefore, assert that the "luxury" of not having to work justifies or 
outweighs the harmful gendered effects of joint return taxation. 
Other costs, significant ones, are already imposed for the so-called 
"benefit" of not having to work. !191 
Furthermore, the harmful effects of joint filing exist for 
married women even if the wife does support herself, working 
full-time but earning less than her husband. In that instance, the 
Adjudicating Wiv~· Rights to Earnings, 1860.1930, 82 GEO. LJ. 2127 (1994); Starnes, sufra 
note 220, at 108-09, 119 passim (defending the partnership approach to dividing mantal 
assets upon divorce). Su also Wolk, supra note 11, at 1248-50 (discussing the position the 
Tax Court has taken that the support a man provides to a woman, such as food and shelter, 
is compensation that she earned by performing domestic service). CJ Staudt, supra note 
43, at [630-31 (discussing how taxing housework could help society understand that women 
should be treated as having eamed social security benefits by doing nonmarket labor). But 
see Judith T. Younger, Is Marriage an Economic Partnership1, CAsE & CoM., Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 
3-10 (criticizing the view that the law treats marriage as an economic partnership). 
!88 Su supra note 367. See also BLUMSTEIN & ScHwARTZ, supra note 252, at 55, 83 
(examining 12,000 questionnaire responses and conducting 300 in-depth interviews on the 
subject of couples and their money, work, and sex); MILLMAN, supra note 366, at 5 ("Money 
is a primary source of power in relationships."); Burgoyne, supra note 349, at 655 
(perceived ownership of earnings by earner is important); De Armond, supra note 307, at 
253 ("[S]uperior earnings are rewarded with dominant control."). 
!!89 Su Gann, supra note 29, at 47. 
!ro /d. CJ Staudt, supra note 43, at 1632 (in discussing the risk of commodif}ing women 
by taxing housework, Professor Staudt acknowledges that "even if Congress does enable 
some women to avoid the market, it is not at all clear that women benefit from staying out 
of the waged labor force."). 
~1 See Davis, supra note 18, at 214. 
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costs of joint filing exist even though the wife does not enjoy the 
"luxury" of being supported by someone else. In such a case, the 
gendered impact of joint filing cannot be defended on the 
ground that the wife does not have the burden of supporting 
herself. 
The view that the discretionary nature of some married 
women's work force participation is a benefit for them is not, in 
fact, a benefit without significant costs. In fact, the belief that 
married women's work-force participation is discretionary harms 
women by marginalizing them,S92 contributing to notions of 
some that women do not have much of value to contribute. It 
further perpetuates protectionist views of women, that they are 
better off not being self-supporting, that they should be protected 
by and economically dependent on their husbands.!l93 Some 
women may enjoy the "luxury" of not having to work, but this so-
called benefit is not really a benefit at all for women on a societal 
level. Therefore, the possibility that wives do not have the same 
burden to work as men should not be invoked to defend or justify 
the unfair gendered effects of joint filing. 
E Women Cannot Realistically File Separately to Avoid the Problems the Joint 
Rate Structure Imposes 
Although women can avoid the problems of joint filing by 
filing separately,~ doing so is not a realistic option in most 
!92 Any "invisible • practice, including women's discretionary work force participation, 
marginalizes the actor. CJ Becker, supra note 362, at 166 (by failing to speak about the 
household labor of women, we ignore and devalue it); Finley, A Break in the Silence, supra 
note 9, at 52 (noting that "(m]ost torts books and tort cases are silent about why unpaid but 
crucially productive and important services such as household management and 
childrearing are consistently undervalued or overlooked in a system which gauges damages 
to the market economy."); Staudt, supra note 43, at 1627 (because household labor is 
unpaid, the women performing it are undervalued, marginalized, and treated as invisible in 
the legal system). Similarly, if women are not seen as necessary to the economic well-being 
of the family, they may also be marginalized in legal, social, and economic institutions. 
Professor McCaffery describes exactly this pattern in both Fresh Look and Slouching Towards 
Equality. Employers may rationally, because of perceptions and past experience, avoid 
hiring women for positions requiring responsibility and long-term commitment. They may 
assume, given women's lower average job persistence compared to that of men, that women 
are not sufficiendy dedicated to work because of family responsibilities or because of the 
chance they will leave if they have children. Of course, as Professor McCaffery points out, 
lower levels of persistence in women have resulted from and have reinforced both wage 
discrimination and the segregation of women in low-paying jobs with limited 
responsibilities. See McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1031; McCaffery, Slouching 
Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 609-11,616. 
!m See Gann, supra note 29, at 47; Davis, supra note 18, at 214. 
~ I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994), requiring income aggregation, applies only when a JOint 
return is filed. No analogous provision exists regarding separate returns. See Johnson v. 
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situations because of the financial incentive most couples 
experience to file jointly.lm The only way a wife can avoid being 
taxed at higher rates and thereby avoid being discouraged from 
working altogether, as well as prevent a transfer of her wealth to 
her higher-income husband, is to insist on filing separately. 
However, if she does so, the couple's overall tax bill will be 
higher, perhaps significantly higher, primarily because of the 
unavailability of income splitting for separate filers living in 
common law states, but also because the section 21 credit for 
child care will probably be unavailable to her as a separate filer. !l!li 
Consequently, a woman who earns less than her husband faces a 
conflict: she may either (1) file jointly to minimize the family's 
tax liability and bear a larger individual tax burden, thereby 
facing financial pressure not to work, or (2) file separately to 
minimize the tax liability attributable to her own income while 
increasing the family's tax burden overall. '!f.1l This conflict is an 
example of the tensions that arise between "the community of life 
that marriage involves and the separate, autonomous existence of 
the individuals who are associated in this community of life."!RI 
With regard to this conflict, a number of points are worthy of 
note. The interests of the primary breadwinner, usually the 
husband, tend to be aligned, giving him an easy choice. He, 
individually, is better off if he files jointly because the tax on his 
own income is lower than if he files separately, and the family is 
better off if he files jointly because the overall tax bill is also 
lower. Men tend not to have to choose between their own 
United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 968 (N.D. Ind. 1976). Similarly, in the forty-one common 
law states and in the District of Columbia, income splitting is available only to joint filers. 
Compare the brackets in I.R.C. §§ 1 (a) and (d) (1994). In the nine community property 
states, income splitting is available to married taxpayers whether they file jointly, under 
§ I (a), or separately. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
lm See supra notes I 06-1I and accompanying texL 
!9i I.R.C. §§ 21 (e)(2)-(e)(4) (1994). 
'!Hllt should be noted that a husband would face the same conflict between self-interest 
and the family interests if he earned less than his wife. However, in most situations, 
husbands are not secondary earners. They are, by and large, still the primary breadwinners 
and, therefore, tend not to face this conflict. CJ Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 64 
(suggesting in the context of whether or not the second earner will enter or remain in the 
labor force that the joint return subjects the secondary earner, usually the wife, to 
psychological stress). 
!118 Glendon, supra note 52, at 323 (discussing the conflict between individuals and the 
families to which they belon~ in the context of property law). C{. Kornhauser, supra note 
29, at 90 (noting that the mterdependence of spouses is usuafly achieved at the wife's 
expense). 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 353 1997
1997] Joint Return Rate Structure 353 
interests and the group interests when it comes to selecting a 
filing status. By contrast, women face a conflict that men rarely 
face. Women may do either what is better for themselves, file 
separately, or do what is worse for themselves but better for the 
family unit as a whole, file jointly. !m By filing separately, a wife 
may experience resentment from her husband in whose interest it 
is to file jointly. 4Xl If the wife is less powerful in the relationship 
or if the husband has a history of inflicting physical or emotional 
!m Some critics might argue that women do not experience a conflict in choosing a 
filing status. In response to this observation, it should be noted that many citizens, 
including wives, who do not experience such a conflict simply do not understand the costs 
of filing jointly. They do not realize that by filing jointly rather than separately, the tax 
attributable to the lower-earning spouse increases, and they do not know that filing jointly 
exposes them to joint and sever:U fiability for their spouse's tax. Finally, they may not know 
about the aggregation effect or realize that it is one reason why their post-tax disposable 
earnings are so low. See generally McCaffery, supra note 264 (asserting that cognitive error 
often induces incorrect decisions with regard to tax). 
Other critics might observe that even women who understand the costs of joint filing 
may not view themselves as experiencing a conflict because they may view their interests as 
aligned with those of their children. Consequently, women might not see themselves in 
conflict with their families in the context of choosing a filing status. In fact, if women bond 
with and feel responsible for their children, then they might not view their choice to file 
jointly and to benefit the marital unit as presenting any conflict at all. Such wives would 
prefer to file jointly to make more total resources available to their children. In response to 
this observation, one school of feminist legal scholars would argue that women's perceived 
alliance with children is really a method utilized by patriarchy to ensure the continued 
subjugation of women. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
797, 828-36, 841 (1989) (raising the argument concerning women's perceived alignment 
with children in non-tax contexts); TJ. Jackson Lears, The Conapt of Cultural Hegemony: 
Problems and Possibilities, 90 AM. HIST. REV. 567, 569-70 (1985) (discussing how Antonio 
Gramsci has described a concept of cultural hegemony, a picture of how the dominant 
culture rules with the consent of the subjugated groups by shaping a "hegemony" of values, 
norms, perceptions, and beliefs that "helps mark the boundaries of permissible discourse, 
discourages the clarification of social alternatives, and makes it difficult for the dispossessed 
to locate the source of their unease, let alone remedy it"). While this argument is subject to 
dispute, it does reinforce the notion that the wife's individual interests are often not aligned 
with those of the family. 
Furthermore, even if a wife views her interests as consistent with those of her children, it 
should be noted that her decision to file jointly does not necessarily make more resources 
available to those children. It makes more resources available to her husband who may or 
may not use them to benefit the couple's children. 
Finally, the fact that many women view themselves as aligned with their children does 
not alter the fact that filing jointly benefits the family unit by benefiting the husband and 
that it tends to be harmful to the wife as an individual. Any given wife may decide that the 
harm to herself from filing jointly is worth undergoing because of the offsetting benefit her 
family experiences. In making this determination, however, she has balanced the harm to 
herself against the benefits to ber family and has implicitly faced the very conflict between 
self-interest and family interest that was described above. Wives, like husbands, should be 
able to align themselves with their families in choosing a filing status without harming their 
own financial interests. Justice within the family should not be set up to be in conflict with 
intimate, harmonious family ties. See OKIN, supra note 249, at 32. 
4Xl See Beck, supra note 58, at 332. 
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harm, the wife may not realistically be able to file separately.401 
She may have to worry about recriminations from the husband 
who is angry at her for filing separately given the additional tax 
liability that results. 
Through the mechanisms of income splitting and 
aggregation, the tax system tends to create a situation in which 
women consistently face conflict, one in which their own 
individual interests are at odds with those of the family as a whole. 
Because the vast majority of married couples file jointly, it is clear 
that many women are choosing others' interests over their own. 4<1.! 
Society already presents many serious dilemmas to women that 
men tend to escape, such as the conflict of whether to work for 
their own independence or to stay at home for their children, 40!1 a 
decision that men may choose to consider but generally are not 
expected to face. These conflicts facing women could pose 
psychic costs to the extent that women are aware of them.404 The 
tax system should not impose additional psychic costs on women 
by presenting them with yet another conflict.4ffi 
401 Her behavior may have long been modified by a pattern of abuse on the part of the 
husband, so that she would not even consider filing separately in this instance even if she 
understood the benefit of doing so. 
In some instances, the wife may be able to argue that the joint return is invalid as 
procured by duress on the part of her husband. See Quick & DuCanto, supra note 57, at 69-
70. However, this argument is not always successful even in abuse cases, see, e.g., Osborn v. 
Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 130 (1993); Estate of Aylesworth v. Commissioner, 24 
T.C. 134 (1955), and has been employed by the wife only to avoid joint and several liability, 
not to avoid the joint return rate structure composed of income splitting and aggregation. 
402 q. Williams, supra note 399, at 823-24 (discussing generally how the dominant 
culture teaches women to ~ choos [ e] ' to marginalize themselves"). Choosing to file join dy 
would be one example of that phenomenon. 
40!1 See Staudt, supra note 43, at 1616 ("Women at every income level report they 
experience extreme stress and fatigue when they struggle to balance waged work with 
household responsibilities.") (footnote omitted); Lucie E. White, On the "Consensus" to End 
Welfare: W7lere are the Womens Voicu7, 26 CONN. L REV. 843, 846-47 (1994) (discussing the 
dilemma that women face of whether to work or to stay at home for their children); 
Zelenak, sufwa note 29, at 370 (noting the existence of this conflict in society at large); Law, 
supra note g22, at 1771 (discussing the conflict women face between achieving in the public 
world and nurturing in the domestic sphere). 
404 Cf. Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 64. 
405 To the extent women and the public generally are not aware of the conflict, then the 
features of the joint return tax that cause this conflict, income splitting and aggregation, are 
problematic for another reason. The gendered nature of the jomt filing system is generally 
unknown to the public. Any laws which are hidden from those subject to them are suspect 
as "secret • laws and, therefore, ought to have questionable authority. George Hegel has 
argued that law does not have authority unless it is known. GEORGE HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY or 
RIGHr 135 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) ("Hence making a law is not to be represented as 
merely the expression of a rule of behaviour valid for everyone, though that is one moment 
in legislation; the more important moment, the inner essence of the matter, is knowledge of 
the content of the law in its determinate universality."). See alsojOSEPHRAZ, THEAUTHORI1Y 
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The purpose of this Article has been to identify gendered 
aspects of the tax code that result from the joint return rate 
structure. It is my hope that this critique will inspire further 
discussion and debate about these problems and about their 
possible solutions. Numerous responses could mitigate the 
gendered aspects of the joint rate structure. Some would be 
incremental changes, while others would be more sweeping. 
One partial solution to the aggregation effect and its bias 
against two-earner families would be for Congress to enact a 
special allowance for dual-earner couples.400 If large enough, 
such an allowance could counteract the Code's gender bias by 
offsetting the higher tax rates that apply to secondary earners, by 
countering the nondeductibility of "personal" working expenses, 
and by offsetting the Code's failure to tax the imputed income of 
one-earner couples.407 Such a deduction would also have the 
effect of roughly countering the tendency of the marriage penalty 
to concentrate harm on spouses with similar incomes. Such an 
allowance could, however, be attacked as a penalty against single 
taxpayers 401 or as anti-family because it would remove some of the 
disincentive mothers face from entering the paid work force. 
Congress enacted a dual-earner deduction in 1981, but repealed it 
in 1986409 to pay for a reduction in tax rates. 410 Because the 
deduction was limited to 10% of the earnings of the lesser-
earning spouse, it was not large enough, however, to counter 
adequately all of the incentives operating to favor in-home, 
unpaid labor on the part of secondary earners. 
A broader proposal, aimed at encouraging women's paid labor 
or LAW: EssAW ON LAw AND MORALITY 51 n.9 (1979); THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER. AND 
DISCIPUNE IN CHINA: THI! SHANGHAI MIXED COURT 1911-27, at 78-82 (1992). 
406 See Contrad with Ammca Hearings, supra note 31, at 8S.90, reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES 
at 1346-47 (statement of Professor Alstott); Cann, supra note 29, at 36. 
1111 See McCaffery, Fresh LooA, supra note 13, at 996 (describing how the tW!H!arner 
deduction was meant to lessen the high tax burden on secondary earners). 
401 See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1437. 
409 I.R.C. § 221 (1981) (enacted under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 
No. 97-34, § 103, 1981 U.S.C.C.AN. (95 Stat.) 172, 187, and later repealed under the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, § 131, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 StaL) 2085, 2113). 
410 See Audio tape of Tax and Social Policy Forum, held by the American Bar 
Association, Section of Taxation (May 10, 1996) (comment by Robert Williams, 
Congressional Budget Office) (on file with author). 
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force participation, would be to subject husbands' earnings to tax 
rates that are higher than those that apply to wives' earnings. 411 
Proponents of this tax rate differential would argue that it is 
justified on normative grounds as a means of overcoming the 
entrenched, self-perpetuating gender bias found in the tax 
code. 412 A system in which men were taxed at higher rates than 
women could also be defended on efficiency grounds, as well. 413 
An efficient tax is one that imposes a high rate on activities or 
goods that have inelastic supply and one that avoids taxing 
activities and goods with elastic supply. 414 Because the labor 
supply of husbands is generally inelastic, taxing their income at a 
high rate would not discourage their work effort significantly and 
would, therefore, not be inefficient. Because wives' labor supply is 
much more elastic, 415 by contrast, a high tax rate would effectively 
411 Professor McCaffery tentatively advocates taxing husbands at higher rates than wives. 
Su McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1040; McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, 
supra note 13, at 656; McCaffery, supra note 162, at 312. Others who have expressed 
support for this approach include: Michael J. Boskin &: Eytan Sheshinski, Optimal Tax 
Treatment oftheFamily: Mmried Couples, 20J. PUB. EcoN. 281 (1983); Daniel R. Feenberg &: 
Harvey S. Rosen, Alternative Tax Treatment of the Family: Simulation Methodology and Results, 
in BEHAVIORAL SIMULATION MnHODS IN TAX Poucv ANAL~IS 7-41 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1983); 
Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. EcoN. 77, 90 (1976); Gann, supra 
note 29, at 44; Leuthold, supra note 134, at 103; Harvey S. Rosen, A Methodology for 
Evaluating Tax Reform Proposals, 6J. PUB. EcoN. 105, 114 n.22 (1976). Among those who 
have stated their opposition to taxing men at higher rates than women include: Maule, 
supra note 16, at 54748; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 371. 
412 See generally McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 662-65 
(speculating that taxing men at higher rates than women could help eradicate wage 
discrimination in the work force by improving women's labor persistence); McCaffery, Fresh 
Look, supra note 13, at 1005 (describing beneficial effects of taxing men at higher rates than 
women). 
413 A tax is considered efficient if it does not distort behavior vis-a-vis the no-tax 
scenario. See U.S. DEP'TOF TllEASURY, supra note 29, at 49; RICHAR.DA. MUSGRAVE&: PEGGY B. 
MUSGRAVE, PUBUC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRAcnCE 277-95 (5th ed. 1989); Frank P. Ramsey, A 
Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37EcoN. J. 47 (1927); Rosen, supra note 165, at 425-27. 
Consequently, if an income tax prompts workers to work fewer hours to avoid a portion of 
the added tax, then that tax would be considered inefficient to some degree. 
414 See Gann, supra note 29, at 39 n.131 (describing how an efficient tax system imposes 
tax on goods wiili inelastic demand and avoids taxing goods with elastic demand); 
McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 658 (noting that the greater the 
elasticity of demand, the higher taxes could be and remain efficient); HARVEY S. ROSEN, 
APPUCATIONS OF OmMAL TAX THEORY TO PROBLEMS IN TAXING F AMIUES AND INDMDUALS 34 
(U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis Paper No. 21, 1976). Labor supply is 
inelastic if its quantity remains high even when wages decline. By contrast, labor supply is 
elastic if it responds quickly to changes in wage rates, declining rapidly when wages fall. A 
tax imposed on inelastic workers will not discourage them from working and will be 
considered efficient because it will not distort behavior, while one imposed on elastic 
workers would discourage them from working and would accordingly be considered 
inefficient because its impo.sition distorts behavior. 
415 Su Gann, supra note 29, at 42 n.137 (describing the labor supply response of 
husbands as relatively inelastic and that of wives as highly elastic). 
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induce the substitution of unpaid home production for paid 
market work. A high tax on wives would distort their behavior 
and would, therefore, be considered inefficient. To avoid 
distorting wives' behavior significantly, a lower tax rate should be 
imposed on them than could be applied to their husbands' 
earnings. Because of the disparity in elasticities of husbands' and 
wives' labor supplies, an efficient tax would tax husbands at a 
higher rate than wives.416 Such a proposal would undoubtedly face 
an equal-protection challenge. Nevertheless, one likely 
proponent of such a system, Professor McCaffery, has suggested 
that this proposal could be designed to survive constitutional 
scrutiny by tying the higher tax rate to "primary earners" rather 
than to husbands and by applying the lower tax rate to "secondary 
earners" without specifying wives. 417 Taxing husbands at higher 
rates than their wives could encourage more women to enter the 
labor force and in that regard could counter the tendencies of 
income splitting and aggregation to discourage wives from 
working. 
Another broad solution to the gendered problems of joint 
return filing would require eliminating both income aggregation 
and automatic income splitting that occurs in the absence of a 
transfer of the income. Eliminating income aggregation would 
remove a work disincentive that secondary earners experience. If 
income aggregation were repealed, income splitting should also 
be repealed so that couples filing jointly would not be favored 
unduly over all other taxpayers. Furthermore, eliminating 
automatic income splitting would have the salutary effect of 
encouraging wives to work so that income would be produced 
equally by the two spouses, generating a natural income-splitting 
effect. By repealing both automatic income splitting and 
aggregation, the marriage penalty would no longer operate to 
reward disparate-income couples and to punish similar-income 
couples. 
One means of eliminating these two features of joint return 
416 See McCaffery, Fresh Loolc, supra note 13, at 1035-46 (taxing men more than women 
according to the respective elasticities of their labor supplies would improve the efficiency 
of the tax system). According to Professor Boskin the failure to tax household capital and 
labor results in a misallocation of capital and labor to households that costs society 
between $24 billion and $45 billion in 1972, or 7% to 13% of 1972 tax revenues. Soskin, 
supra note 227, at 11-12. See also Gann, supra note 29, at 40. 
417 McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 662-63. 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 358 1997
358 journal of Law & Politics [Vol. XIII:241 
filing would be to abolish the joint return altogether and to 
institute a system of mandatory individual filing. 418 This reform 
would have many beneficial effects. The absence of joint filing 
would eliminate joint and several liability between spouses.419 It 
would also dispense with the need for the highly litigated 
innocent spouse exceptions to JOint and several liability. 
Abolishing joint returns could also eliminate the marriage 
penalty and bonus by taxing each spouse the same as a single 
taxpayer.431 Eliminating joint returns would eliminate automatic 
income splitting, and accordingly, earned and unearned income 
that is not transferred to the non-owner could no longer be 
shifted for beneficial tax computation purposes. 421 Accordingly, a 
tax incentive would arise for earners to transfer ownership of 
property to the nonearning spouse. Such an incentive could 
benefit women. As noted above, abolishing joint returns would 
eliminate income splitting, income aggregation, and the 
attendant work disincentives they each impose on secondary 
earners422 by allowing both spouses to start at the bottom of the 
418 Abolition of joint rerum filing has been proposed by Gann, supra note 29, at 39; 
Zelenak, su;ra note 29, at 343 & n.l6, 365-69; Davis, supra note 1S, at 236-3S, and has been 
discussed m Economic Problems of Womm, supra note 29, at 608-09 (statement of Carlyn 
McCaffery, Assistant Professor, New York University Law School); Brazer, su~ra note 11S, at 
244-45; Harvey E. Brazer, Commmt to Mcintyre & Oldman, Treatmmt o the Family, in 
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 237 Qoseph A Pechman ed., 1977); Du ude, supra note 
35S, at S; Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 65, 110.11; Maule, supra note 16; Munnell, supra 
note liS, at 247-7S; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 31, at 7S7, 852; Rosen, supra note 165, at 
427-2S; Winn & Winn, supra note 1>2, at S69-70. The following commentators have 
expressed opposition to the idea of abolishing joint returns: Bittker, supra note 29, at 1437-
42; Contract with America Hearings, supra note 31, at S7-8S, reprinted in 60 TAX NOTES at 1345 
(statement of Professor Alstott); Mcintyre, supra note liS, at 480. 
419 See Edison-Smith, supra note 56, at 127 (arguing that Congress should repeal joint 
and several liability); Murray, supra note 52, at 64 (recommending that Congress repeal 
joint and several liability); Domestic Relations Comm., ABA Sec. on Tax'n, Commmts on 
Liability of Divorced Spouses for Tax Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint &turns, 50 TAX LAw. 
395 (1991) (report of resolution recommending the repeal of joint and several liability 
passed at the 1995 Summer meeting of the Tax section). None of these recommendations 
involved abolishing joint returns altogether. 
431 See Contract with Ammca Hearings, supra note 31, at S7-8S, reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES 
at 1345 (statement of Professor Alstott); Afstott, supra note 30, at 2010-li; Bittker, supra 
note 29, at 1437. Of course to attain this result, individual rates for married taxpayers and 
rates for single taxpayers would have to be equalized. 
421 See Zelenak, supra note 29, at 390.91 (favoring taxing unearned income to the owner 
of the income-producing property and noting that this would preclude income splitting in 
cases where the property was not transferred). 
422See Contract with Ammca Hearings, supra note 31, at S6-87, reprinted in 66 TAX NoTEs 
at 1344 (statement of Professor Alstott). But see Alstott, supra note 30, at 2017-21 
(questioning whether individual filing would really encourage women's market work by 
examining the weaknesses of economic studies). 
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progressive rate schedule. 42.'1 Abolishing joint returns would also 
eliminate the annual coerced transfers of money from wives' to 
their husbands that currently occur in the absence of real 
sharing. Furthermore, it would eliminate the dilemma wives face 
between acting in their own best interests by filing separately 
versus acting in the best interests of the marital units by filing 
jointly. Abolishing joint returns would also serve simplicity goals 
by eliminating that filing status and the joint rate schedule. 424 
Tax theorists posit that mandatory separate filing would improve 
the tax system's efficiency as well by taxing a wife's first dollar of 
income in the lowest tax bracket rather than at her husband's top 
marginal rate.425 These varied effects of a system of mandatory 
individual filing would probably benefit women by removing the 
disincentive against wives to work, by putting more assets at 
women's disposal, both income-producing property that would be 
transferred from their husbands in an effort to shift income and 
greater after-tax earnings from their own paid labor. As a result, 
women could enjoy more control over expenditures. 426 These 
results could lead, in turn, to improved social and political status 
for women. 4'0 
Eliminating joint returns and relying solely on individual 
returns may require some additional corrective legislation. In 
abolishing joint returns, or at least their income-splitting 
component, Congress would have to override Poe v. Seaborn.flB to 
prevent a return of geographic disparity. 42l Congress could do so 
by requiring community property earnings to be taxed to the 
42.'1 See Davis, supra note 18, at 23 7. 
424Su id. 
425 Su Gann, supm note 29, at 46; Rosen, supra note 411, at 114. 
426 Su Davis, supra note 18, at 237. But see Alstott, supra note 30, at 2017, 2022-26 
(questioning whether individual filing would provide much economic benefit to women). 
4'0 Su Davis, supra note 18, at 241. But see Alstott, supra note 30, at 2016-17, 2022-23 
(questioning whether individual filing would really foster much change in gender roles) . 
.fl8 282 u.s. 101 (1930). 
429 Su Gann, supra note 29, at 4; Davis, supra note 18, at 238. Professor Gann argues 
that Congress could override either Poe v. Seaborn or Lucas v. Earl to avoid geographic 
disparity. She concludes that the former method would be preferable. Compare Zelenak, 
supra note 29, at 378, 382 & n.206 (arguing that Earl should be retained but that Congress 
should override Seaborn). Any constitutional objections to overriding Seaborn and taxing a 
spouse on all his earnings even though state law vests ownership of half of them in his 
spouse would probably be overcome. See Norton, supra note 159; Winn & Winn, supra 
note 52, at 874-75. See also Gann, supra note 29, at 55-58 (discussing potential constitutional 
objections to a legislative override of Seaborn). 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 360 1997
360 journal of Law & Politics [Vol. XIII:241 
earner and to the individual with management and control over 
the community property generating the earnings, rather than 
half to each spouse. Congress has done just that in other tax 
provisions.-m Alternatively, geographic disparity could be allowed 
to persist for the purpose of encouraging states to adopt 
community property regimes, systems which would give women 
rights during marriage in their husband's earnings. 431 
Although a regime of mandatory separate filing would have 
many benefits for women, eliminating joint returns and relying 
solely on individual returns is not without cost. By eliminating 
joint returns and restoring marriage neutrality, the goal of 
couples neutrality would no longer be satisfied.432 Equal-income 
couples would no longer be taxed equally.~ That is, a couple in 
which the husband earns $100,000 and the wife earns $0, would 
pay more tax than another couple in which each spouse earns 
$50,000. This result occurs because an individual return system 
would prevent the splitting of earned income. Thus, the husband 
in the first couple would be pushed into a higher tax bracket than 
either of the spouses in the second couple. His first $50,000 of 
income would be taxed the same as the income of one spouse 
from the other couple, but his second $50,000 of income would, 
under progressive rates, be taxed at a higher rate than the income 
of the other spouse from the second couple. Attaining marriage 
neutrality comes at the cost of either taxing equal-income couples 
equally as described above, or of progressive taxation. Sacrificing 
progressivity would probably not be acceptable as a political 
4.'10 See Davis, supra note 18, at 238 n.229. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 911 (c)(3) (1994) (the 
amount of income earned by a nonresident that is excluded is determined without regard 
to community property laws applicable to the couple's income); 1304(c)(3) (1994) 
(community income is attributed to the earner in applying income averaging rules); 
6013(e)(2)(A) (1994) (innocent spouse is relieved of tax hability for income attributable to 
the other spouse, attribution being made without regard to community property laws). 
431 See Gann, supra note 29, at 59-60. 
432 See STAFF or jOINT Co MM. ON TAXATION, 96m CONG ., THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT or 
MARluED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 26 (Comm. Print 1980); Tax Treatment Hearings, supra 
note 118, at 7S.79 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy) ("No 
algebraic equation, no matter how SOJ?histicated, can solve this dilemma. Both ends of a 
seesaw cannot be up at the same time. ); Bittker, supra note 29, at 1395-96, 142~31; Gann, 
supra note 29, at 9. 
43!1 s~ Contract with America Hearings, supra note 31, at 87-88, reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES 
at 1345 (statement of Professor Alstott); Bittker, supra note 29; Davis, supra note 18, at 237. 
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matter4!14 and probably should not be pursued. 
Further examination, then, should occur with respect to which 
goals are more important, the goals of eliminating the marriage 
penalty and helping women by eliminating income splitting and 
aggregation, or the goal of taxing equal-income couples equally. 
Taxing equal-income couples equally is justified to some extent if 
spouses share resources. In the absence of complete and 
meaningful sharing, however, taxing the first couple the same as 
the second couple would not reflect the individuals' abilities to pay 
tax. In a world with diminished sharing of resources, the first 
couple should pay more tax than the second because a husband 
who earns and retains control over his income of $100,000 should 
be able to pay more tax than two individuals, each with incomes 
of $50,000. Countervailing arguments exist, 4.'15 of course, especially 
when couples share resources completely. 4!!6 
Even so, abandoning the equal taxation of equal-income 
couples may be justified even when couples do pool their incomes 
because the two couples are not similarly situated. The couple in 
which only one spouse is employed, earning $100,000, is better off 
than the couple in which both spouses work, each earning 
$50,000, because the second couple incurs significantly more 
"work-related" expenses, expenses that are not deductible, 451 and 
because the first couple enjoys the benefit of untaxed imputed 
income.438 The first couple contains two individuals performing 
4.'14 Even the recent so-called flat tax plans do not really abandon progressivity 
completely because they generally contain exemptions for the first $20,000 or so of family 
income. In a system with a $20,000 family exemption and a 20% flat tax rate, a family with 
income of $20,000 would have an effective tax rate ("ETR") of 0% and would pay no tax. A 
family with income of $25,000 would have an ETR of 4% and would generate $1,000 of tax. 
A family with income of $30,000 would have an ErR of 6. 7% and would generate tax of 
$2,000. A family with income of $100,000 would have an ETR of 16% and would pay tax of 
$16,000. As taxable income increases, so does the family's ErR. Hence even a flat tax 
remains somewhat progressive if it is designed with a fixed exemption, as are most recent 
flat tax proposals. 
4.'15 Opponents of sacrificing couples neutrality include Professors Michael Mcintyre, 
Oliver Ofdman, and Anne Alstott. SetJ Mcintyre & Oldman, supra note 51; Mcintyre, supra 
note 118; Contract with America Hearings, supra note 31, at 87-89, reprinted in66 TAX NoTES at 
1345-46 (statement of Professor Alstott); Alstott, supra note 30, at 2015, 2026-29, 2032. 
4.'15 See pros and cons in Gann, supra note 29, at 8, 24-31. 
451 See Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 903 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
438 See Gann, supra note 29, at 36; Staudt, supra note 43, at 1575-79. See also Specific 
Elements in the Computation of Taxable Income-Taxation of Family Income: Hearings 
Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong. 211, 213 (1959) (statement of Joseph A. 
Pechman, Comm. for Economic Development) (discussing argument that it would make 
some sense to tax two-earner couples less than a one-earner couple with the same income); 
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two jobs, one paid job and the other unpaid housework, and the 
second couple has two individuals performing three jobs, two 
paid jobs and unpaid housework . .m Clearly, the first couple is 
significantly better off than the second couple. Abandoning 
couples neutrality and taxing the first couple more than the 
second would recognize that the two "equal-income" couples are 
not really similarly situated. 
Finally a completely different approach to solving these 
problems would be for Congress to eliminate joint returns and 
simultaneously to override Lucas v. Earl, 440 allowing assignment of 
income by contract, regardless of state marital property laws. 441 ff 
this avenue were pursued, geographic disparity need not return 
upon the institution of mandatory separate filing because couples 
in all jurisdictions would be permitted to contract to split the 
ownership of their incomes. 442 To obtain the benefits of income 
splitting under the contract approach, actual ownership in the 
income would have to be transferred.~ In this regard, this last 
approach is superior for women to the automatic income 
splitting currently available where actual ownership of earnings IS 
not transferred. 444 
William D. Andrews, Comment to Mcintyre & Oldman, Treatment of the Family, in 
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 234,235-36 Qoseph A Pechman ed., 19'77); Bittker, supra 
note 29, at 1431-33; Gann, supra note 29, at 30.31 (arguing that the true economic well-
being of two-earner and one-earner couples with the same total incomes is not equivalent). 
But see government's argument in Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 972 (N.D. 
Ind. 1976) that couples neutrality is more important than marriage neutrality because two 
married people living together have greater ability to pay tax than two single people with the 
same total income due to economies of scale enjoyed by the married couple that are not 
available to single taxpayers. The court responded that many single taxpayers enjoy similar 
economies of scale by living with parents or others. Furthermore, Professor Oldman has 
acknowledged that generalities about economies of scale are not useful with respect to 
couples living above the subsistence level. Mcintyre&: Oldman, supra note 51, at 1573, 1595 
n.80. See also Bittker, supra note 29, at 1424-25. 
<l'!9 See Audio tape of Tax and Social Policy Forum, supra note 410 (comment by 
unnamed audience participant). 
440 281 u.s. 111 (1930). 
441 See Gann, supra note 29, at 19. See also supra note 429. 
442 Cf Cain, supra note 118 (arguing in the context of unmarried couples that contract 
ought to play a more important role in federal income taxation). Of course, to enter into 
such a contract, the couple may need to obtain legal advice from an attorney. This fact 
mitigates against overriding EarL 
40 See Davis, supra note 18, at 246 (suggesting this but stating that it is the least 
desirable solution because of the danger that the inter-spousal contract would be a sham); 
Gann, supra note 29, at 61-63 (also suggesting this as a solution but preferring mandatory 
individual returns and a congressional override of Seaborn). Accord Zelenak, supra note 29, 
at 378, 382. 
444 See Bittker, supra note 29. 
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Eliminating automatic income splitting by eliminating JOint 
returns without permitting assignment of earned income by 
contract would revive the problem that only unearned income 
could be assigned between spouses.445 As long as the high-bracket 
earner was willing to transfer income-generating property to the 
other spouse, the assignment of unearned income would be 
effective and would generate a tax savings.4«i This tax 
minimization strategy would be permitted but would be available 
primarily to high-income couples, those with significant 
unearned income, and would not be as readily available to lower-
income couples whose incomes come primarily from wages, 
earnings which could not be shifted under Lucas v. EarL 447 The 
renewed shifting of unearned income would probably generate 
significant litigation over whether a transfer of income-
generating property is effective when the transferor has not 
relinquished total control over the shifted property. 448 Another 
consequence of eliminating joint returns would be to revive 
problems regarding the allocation of deductions between 
spouses.449 Deductible expenses that benefit both spouses would 
have to be allocated or divided between them in some manner.-1'i0 
The proposals described above should be examined more 
thoroughly. A more complete treatment of these possible policy 
prescriptions is the subject of a future article. It is my hope that 
the current Article will stimulate further debate not only on the 
biases hidden in the tax code, but also on the best means for 
eliminating them. 
445 See Mcintyre &. Oldman, supra note 51, at 1590. 
446 SeeBittker, supra note29, at 144041. 
447 281 u.s. 111 (1930). 
448 Laura Ann Davis proposes special rules for allocating unearned income between the 
two spouses. See Davis, supra note 18, at 242-48 (proposing that unearned income should 
not be split in the absence of an actual transfer of ownership. In common law states, 
unearned income would be taXed to the spouse who owns it. In community property 
states, unearned income would be taXed to the spouse who contributed to the mcome-
generating property.). 
449 See Beck, supra note 58, at 397 n.394; Bittker, supra note 29, at 1441 &. n.l44, 1442; 
Gann, supra note 29, at 65 n.208. 
-1'iO Allocation problems arise currently when spouses file separately. However, because 
the vast majority of married couples file jointly, most allocation problems never arise and, 
consequently, have not yet been resolved. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 58, at 396; Richard B. 
Malamud, Allocation ofthe]oint Return Marriage Penalty and Bonus, 15VA. TAXREV. 489, 497-
98 (1996). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
[Vol. XIII:241 
Four major themes emerge from this Article. First, the joint 
return rate structure, through income splitting and aggregation, 
penalizes couples in which spouses earn similar incomes and 
rewards couples in which spouses' incomes diverge. These 
patterns benefit, thereby rewarding, families in which only one 
spouse works. The joint return penalizes couples in which both 
spouses do paid labor, thereby discouraging secondary earners in 
the family from participating in the paid labor force. Because 
this pattern has a disparate impact on women, calls have arisen to 
repeal the joint return and to institute a system of mandatory 
separate returns for married taxpayers. The first theme arising in 
this Article, therefore, concerns the privileging of single-earner 
couples over dual-earner couples and the concomitant 
disincentive for wives to participate in the paid work force. 
The second theme emerging from this Article involves a 
pattern that has not been documented previously in the tax 
literature: joint filing, in contrast to separate filing, redistributes 
resources from the lower-earning to the higher-earning spouse, 
that is, typically from the wife to her husband. This pattern 
results because income splitting and aggregation act together to 
reduce the tax liability of the higher-earning spouse and to 
increase that of the lower-earning spouse. Abolishing joint 
return taxation would alleviate this problem as well. In the 
absence of reforms eliminating income splitting and 
aggregation, the Internal Revenue Service could mitigate this 
concern by publicizing the problem and by instructing married 
taxpayers that the fairest manner to apportion their joint return 
liability is in proportion to what their relative individual 
liabilities would have been had they filed separately. Given power 
differences between the spouses, sociological patterns regarding 
the earner's retention of control over income, and the 
continuing economic incentive for husbands to file jointly rather 
than separately, wives may, nevertheless, often file jointly using 
improper apportionment. In such instances, the joint return 
system could continue to effect a coerced wealth transfer from 
wives to their higher-earning husbands even if the IRS does 
publicize the problem and instruct taxpayers how to apportion 
liability properly. 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 365 1997
1997] Joint Return Rate Structure 365 
The third theme arising from this Article and which has not 
been discussed previously in the tax literature is that the tax rate 
structure tends to impose conflicts on women that it fails to 
impose on men. First, because a wife's first dollar of income is 
taxed at her husband's highest marginal rate, the joint return 
rates exacerbate the conflict wives face over whether or not to 
participate in the paid labor force. The rates present no such 
conflict to husbands in the usual case in which husbands are the 
primary earners. Second, because joint returns tend to increase a 
wife's taxes, while diminishing those of the marital unit overall, 
the wife tends to face another conflict from which her husband is 
generally immune: the conflict over whether to file jointly for the 
benefit of the family overall or to file separately for her own 
individual financial interest. Eliminating income splitting and 
aggregation would eradicate both of these conflicts. 
The fourth theme addressed in this Article concerns the self-
perpetuating nature of gender bias within the tax code. Not only 
do patterns exist which adversely impact wives, but they tend to 
reinforce the very practices which originally allowed the Code to 
operate in a biased fashion. First, disparity in incomes induces 
joint filing which discourages women from working. This 
disincentive for women to work in paid labor, in turn, perpetuates 
the very income disparity that led to joint filing in the first place. 
Second, a disparity in incomes induces joint filing. Joint filing, 
in turn, results in a transfer of wealth from the lower-income 
spouse to the higher-income spouse. Thus, through the 
operation of the joint return rate structure and the incentives it 
creates (to file jointly), a disparity in incomes leads to the 
regressive and gendered result of a transfer of wealth from the 
lower-earning spouse, probably the wife, to the higher-earning 
spouse, probably the husband. In this manner, the tax rate 
structure perpetuates the economic subordination of women. 
These sources of self-perpetuating bias which this Article 
identifies have not been discussed in the tax literature until now. 
This Article has demonstrated that the tax rates do not operate in 
a neutral fashion as applied. Furthermore, they tend to interact 
with societal realities to perpetuate and exacerbate bias. 
The joint return provisions are objectionable because they 
react to women's subordinate economic status and have the effect 
of furthering it. The gendered characteristics of the joint return 
HeinOnline -- 13 J.L. & Pol. 366 1997
366 Journal of Law & Politics [Vol. XIII:241 
all converge to send restricting messages to society about which 
roles are appropriate for women, messages that have the effect of 
perpetuating negative and harmful stereotypes. They tend to 
sanction the notions that a good woman is one who does not 
work for financial remuneration, that women do not deserve to 
hold money of their own, and that they do not need access to 
their own financial resources. Rather, the law portrays wives as 
drains on their "husbands'" resources. 
Every element described in the introductory Ames hypothetical 
is present and operating in the United States of America. The 
U.S. government rewards men who marry non-working women 
over men who marry working women. Women's after-tax income 
generally drops and men's after-tax income generally increases 
upon marrying. Incentives operate in the rate structure to induce 
women not to work in the labor force once they marry. The U.S. 
government also participates in harming women economically by 
sustaining the overwhelming incentive to file jointly, and 
consequently by forcing wives to transfer their relatively meager 
financial resources to their relatively wealthier husbands. This 
transfer is required, in effect, for every year in which the wife 
remains married to her husband. The combined impact of these 
various effects of the joint return rates is to disadvantage women 
substantially and to ensure their continued economic 
subordination. Clearly, the U.S. tax system is in dire need of 
reform if justice is to be served. 
Debates within feminist jurisprudence concerning how best to 
advance women's interests have profound implications for the 
direction tax policy should take with regard to the joint return 
rate structure. Currently, the tax system is tilted in favor of women 
staying out of the labor force. Much of the discussion in tax 
literature and, indeed, in this Article presumes that dismantling 
the tax policies that discourage women from entering the work 
force would serve women's interests. It is widely assumed in tax 
scholarship that women, as a group and as individuals, benefit 
from policies encouraging them to take paid positions. 451 Tax 
451 See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 10, at 49, 90-95; Gann, supra note 29, at 40 
(describing how aggregation adversely impacts wives, discouraging them from working and 
criticizing that fact); McCaffery, Slouching Towards Ejuafi~, supra note 13, at 602, 657 
(describing how the tax structure interferes with wives ability to farticipate in paid labor 
and that, therefore, that structure is inefficient and objectionable ; McCaffery, Fresh Look, 
supra note 13, at 1029, 1035 (criticizing tax laws for discouraging married women from 
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discourse has almost universally failed to scrutlmze that 
underlying assumption, however. Are women's interests really 
served if they are encouraged to undertake paid labor? Or would 
such policies push some women into the workplace against their 
wishes or against their best interests? 
As described above, different approaches to reforming the rate 
structure would go to different lengths to encourage married 
women into the work force. For example, a proposal to eliminate 
joint returns would eliminate income splitting and aggregation 
and would allow the wife's first dollar of income to be taxed in the 
lowest rate bracket. Under such a regime, a wife's decision to 
participate in the paid labor force would be no more influenced 
by the tax rates than would her husband's decision. Other 
proposals would go further, taxing husbands at higher rates than 
their wives. These other approaches could not only serve to 
counteract the many disincentives within the tax system that 
discourage women from working but could affirmatively 
encourage or subsidize women's paid labor.452 
undertaking paid labor); Davis, supra note 18, at 198-99 (describing the work disincentive 
that the tax rates place on married women as having a negative impact on women and as 
creating problems for women); Note, supra note 118, at 363 (describing the tax disincentive 
against the paid labor of wives as a "drawback"). Even Boris Bittker assumed that women's 
interests would be served through additional participation in the paid work force. See 
Bittker, supra note 29, at 1433 (noting that the tax system is "biased against women" because 
of the worK. disincentive caused by aggregation). 
452 A similar formulation of this point can be found in Alstott, supra note 30, at 2007. 
Either of these two approaches can be described as creating a neutral system. Tax rates 
would be neutral under the former proposal in which husbands and wives each enjoy the 
benefit of the lowest tax brackets for their own wages. Tax rates would not be responsible 
for discouraging wives from working to any greater degree than they discourage husbands 
from working. Other approaches could potentially operate to push women into the paid 
work force by making paid labor more worthwhile to women than to men. Taxing wives at 
lower rates than their husbands would accomplish this objective. Such a system could be 
viewed as creating more meaningful gender neutrality not only by countering the 
disincentives within the rate system against women's labor force participation, but also by 
countering the other features of the tax code which discourage secondary-earner paid 
labor, such as the nondeductibility of work-related personal expenses and the tax-free status 
of self-performed services. Consequently, taxing husbands at higher rates than their wives 
could be viewed as permitting neutrality within the tax system as a whole. 
One commentator has pointed out that making only the tax system neutral in a non-
neutral society will permit the persistence of non-neutrality overall. See McCaffery, Slouching 
Towards Equaliry, supra note 13, at 668-69, 675; McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 13, at 1052. 
For example, if employment discrimination and cultural pressures discourage women from 
working, those women will continue to face pressure against paid labor even if the tax 
system is corrected to remove any bias inherent in it Professor McCaffery has argued 
compellingly that tax policies could be used affirmatively to encourage many more women 
to work. In essence, he contemplates setting spouses' relative tax rates not only to offset 
bias within the tax system overall, but also to counter non-tax sources of bias such as 
employment discrimination, for example. Tax rates could be designed to accomplish this 
broader social goal by adopting much larger differentials in the rates applicable to men and 
women. Taxing wives at negative effective tax rates would also effectuate such a goal and 
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Certainly, to the extent the tax system itself restricts women's 
access to the paid labor market and to economic independence, it 
should probably be modified. e The tax system arguably should 
not be permitted to operate as a systematic bar to women's 
employment. To the extent the tax structure contributes to 
inequities, using the tax system to combat them is appropriate. 
Even critics who oppose affirmative inducements toward women's 
paid work would probably oppose constraints that deny women 
the meaningful opportunity to work. Because a woman's decision 
not to work in the marketplace is favored under the current tax 
system, encouraging women to undertake paid labor by removing 
tax-based disincentives to their paid work should not be viewed as 
"pushing" women into the work force or as eliminating their 
choice not to work. Rather, such reform should be viewed as 
affording women a meaningful choice by making the options of 
accepting and declining paid labor more neutral. Eliminating 
features of joint filing that discourage women's paid labor would 
allow real choice by putting the options of paid labor and 
nonparticipation in waged employment on a more level playing 
field. 
Before policymakers undertake broader, more radical reforms 
designed to combat the non-tax causes of women's limited labor 
force participation, that is, policies that are designed to 
encourage women's paid labor affirmatively, a thorough 
examination of whether women would benefit from increased 
labor force participation should be undertaken. Few tax scholars 
have explicitly addressed the question of whether encouraging 
more women to work would actually serve women's interests. 454 
Rather, the literature generally assumes that such encouragement 
would serve women well. Although most tax literature has 
virtually ignored this question, scholarship within feminist 
jurisprudence has grappled with the issue. 
could be described as neutral in the sense that taX and social bias would counteract each 
other to create overall social neutrality. See Alstott, supra note 30, at 2015-16, 2034-35 
(describing this broader notion of neutrality). 
Q Accord Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 47 (acknowledging that the taX code ought to be 
neutral with regard to women's decision to enter the paid work force while declining the 
position that paid labor is necessarily the best means of serving women's interests). 
454 Among the few taX scholars who have explicitly acknowledged this issue are Nancy 
Staudt and Anne Alstott. See generally Staudt, supra note 43, at 1572-74; Alstott, supra note 
30, at 2024-26. 
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A brief review of feminist literature on this question reveals 
that many feminist scholars believe that women's interests would 
be served by policies designed to increase their paid labor.4!D 
Increased participation in the paid work force serves women's 
interests, they argue, because it gives them greater access to and 
control over economic resources. Doing paid work allows women 
greater levels of economic independence.456 To the extent access 
to money fosters power and autonomy, encouraging women to 
work would improve women's status generally. The failure to 
engage in market work has harmed women by preventing them 
from accumulating their own private savings and by preventing 
them from developing human capital. Consequently, women who 
have not participated in paid labor suffer the greatest economic 
risks upon divorce or widowhood. 451 In a society in which 
economic resources are critical to survival and in which 
caregiving in the home is unpaid, women's interests would be 
served, these feminists argue, through policies that make paid 
labor more attractive. 
Another benefit derived from women's increased participation 
in the labor force is that paid work and women's movement into 
society's economic mainstream have helped to counter 
longstanding stereotypes in which women are viewed as 
marginal, as having little value to contribute, and as being 
subordinate to men. 4!i8 To the extent tax policies encourage more 
women to do paid labor, such stereotypes will be weakened 
further. Negative stereotypes will probably persist, these feminists 
assert, as long as women's labor participation continues to be 
455 See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 249; Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study 
of Ideology and Legal &fonn, 96 HA!w. L. REV. 1497, 1543-60 (198~); Pateman, sut,;a note 164, 
at 2~1. 2~7 (noting how "(p]aid employment has become the key to citizenship'). 
456 See BEilGMANN, supra note 248, at 5; Alstott, supra note ~0. at 2024-26 (noting that the 
increasing availability of market work has benefited many women, particularly those who 
are skilled doctors, lawyers, or nurses, and those who do not have caregiving 
responsibilities, offering them greater economic and social independence). 
4G1 See Alstott, supra note ~o. at 2026 (noting that women who do not participate in the 
paid labor force are "at risk for impoverishment upon divorce"); McCaffery, Fresh Look, 
supra note 1~. at 1051. 
458 See Alstott, supra note ~0. at 2017 (describing some feminists' arguments that 
"(w]omen's market employment may ... confer political and psychological benefits"); 
McCaffery, Fresh Loolc, supra note 13, at 1051..52 (noting that unwaged labor leaves women 
socially disempowered). 
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viewed as more discretionary than that of men. 459 
Finally, others note that encouraging women to enter the paid 
labor force would allow more women to enjoy the psychic benefits 
that accompany a productive professional life.400 Given that 
historically wives tended to be excluded from the paid work force, 
it would seem contrary to women's interests not to encourage 
their further entry into the labor market. 
More recently a number of feminist scholars have questioned 
whether encouraging paid labor serves women's interests. They 
question whether policies designed to promote additional work 
force participation would really operate to improve women's lives. 
They point out that the opening of paid positions to women has 
been most helpful to upper-class and upper-middle-class white 
women with educations, those women who, arguably, least need 
economic enhancement.461 As for women of color and lower-class 
women who have historically enjoyed fewer educational 
opportunities, access to the labor market has done much less to 
improve economic standing. In large part, high-paying jobs are 
not available to these women. The jobs most women obtain 
typically offer low pay, few fringe benefits, and little opportunity 
for advancement. 462 Women who work and have children often 
see very limited economic benefit from their positions because 
they need flexible jobs that accommodate child-care 
responsibilities and because those positions typically pay less 
459 But see Staudt, supra note 43, at 1617 (noting that "women's entty into the market 
may not work to break down the current gender hierarchy"). 
460 See Zelenak, supra note 29, at 371-72. See also GERSON, supra note 252, at 69-91 
(discussing reasons why women choose to work); Law, supra note 322, at 1779 (noting that 
"most women do not want a lifetime of unpaid work in the home and economic 
dependence on a man"). 
461 Even if other women are in greater need of financial security than are well-to-do 
white women, I would assert that even these relatively privileged women benefit from the 
economic independence that their own paid labor affords. See also Alstott, supra note 30, at 
2025-26. 
462 See Alstott, supra note 30, at 2024-25 ("studies of low-income workers suggest that 
persistence at low-wage work may not materially improve earnings or enhance women's 
ability to achieve economic self-sufficiency"); Qaudia Goldin & Solomon Polachek, 
Residual Differences by Sex: Perspectives on the Gender Gap in Earnings, PAPERS & PRoc. 99TH 
ANNUAL MEI!:TINGAM. EcoN. Ass'N, inAM. EcoN. REV.l43, 146 (1987); Vicki Schultz, Telling 
Stories About Wom.m and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in 
Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HAR.v. L. REV. 1749, 17'99-814 
(1990); Staudt, supra note 43, at 15'74, 1583, 1585, 1615 (noting that "[m]any wage earners 
... remain economically vulnerable and are often in poverty due to low wages and limited 
benefits" and that there is a "weak relationship between market participation and economic 
independence"). 
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than others that demand longer hours or travel.«iil For these 
women, participating in the paid work force has not translated 
into economic independence. Consequently, policies designed 
to encourage women to work would not always result in 
significant financial resources being made available to women. 
Many feminists have observed further that as wives enter the 
paid work force, they remain primarily responsible for the bulk of 
the family labor.464 As a result, wives who take paid positions 
typically undertake a double shift. 465 They work a paid job and 
then return home to start their "second shift, "466 the unpaid jobs 
of cooking, cleaning, and caring for children. Policies designed 
to push women into the paid work force, but which fail to address 
the existence of unpaid domestic labor in women's lives do not 
«iil See ROBERTA M. SPALTEil-ROTH & HI!IDI I. HAilTMANN, UNNECESSARY LossES: Cosrs TO 
AMERICANsorTHE LAcKorFAMILYANDMI!DICALLI!AVI! (EXI!cUTIVI!SUMMAR.Y) 10 chart 1 (1988) 
(new mothers' annual earnings and hours of employment are lower than those of women 
without babies); Research Report, WILSON Q., Spring 1997, at 14~ (reviewing DIANA 
FURCHTGOTI-ROTH & CHRISTINI! STOLBA, WOMEN'S FIGURES: THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS orWoMI!N 
IN AMI!IliCA) . 
464 See BERGMANN, supra note 248, at 261-69; SARAH FI!NSTI!RMAKI!R BERK, THE GENDER 
FACTORY: THE APPOimONMI!NT or WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS ( 1985); David H. Demo & 
Alan C. Acock, FamiZ., Diversity and the Division of Domestic Lalxn-: How Much Have Things 
Really Changed7, 42 FAM. REL. 323 (1993) (women continue to be responsible for three-
fourths of housework responsibilities); Nona Glazer, Everyone Needs Three Hands: Doing 
Unpaid and Paid Worlc, in WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABoR 249, 261-68 (Sarah Fenstermaker 
Berk ed., 1980); Hadfield, supra note 252, at 97; Julia A. Heath & David H. Ciscel, 
Patriarchy, Family Structure and the &ploitation of Women's Labor, 22 J. EcoN. ISSUI!S 781, 787 
(1988) (noting that in 1983 employed wives worked an average of 44% more hours than did 
housewives); Graeme Russell, Prohl4ms in RoU-Reversed Families, in RI!ASSI!SSING FATHERHOOD: 
NI!W OBSERVATIONS ON FATHERS AND THE MODERN FAMILY 161, 163-64 (Charlie Lewis & 
Margaret O'Brien eds., 1987) (noting that in families in which the wife works and the 
husband does not, many wives retain greater responsibility than their husbands for 
"decision-making, planning, monitoring and anticipating" children's needs); Silbaugh, 
supra note 43, at S.13 (citing sociological studies demonstrating that women do more 
unpaid work than men, even when both spouses are employed at paid labor); Staudt, supra 
note 43, at 1580 ("Sociological studies indicate that despite labor-saving appliances and 
women's move into the market, the number of hours women work in the home has 
remained constant."); Joann Vanek, Household Worlc, Wage Worlc, and Sexual Equality, in 
WoMEN AND HousEHOW LABoR 275, 277 (Sarah Fenstermaker Berk ed., 1980); Tamar 
Lewin, Women Are Becomin~ Equal Providers, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at A27 (describing a 
survey of single and marned employed women, in which 90% report that "it [is] their 
responsibility to take care of the people in their families"). 
465 See HAilllls, supra note 183, at 9S.99; HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 183, at 3, 
276; Alstott, supra note 30, at 2023; McCaffery, Fresh Loolc, supra note 13, at 984-85; Staudt, 
supra note 43, at 1580-81; Myra H. Strober, Twr;Eamer Families, in FEMINISM, CHILDREN AND 
THE NI!W FAMILII!S 161, 169 (Sanford M. Dornbusch & Myra H. Strober eds., 1988); White, 
supra note 403, at 84647. 
465 Arlie Hochschild fashioned the term "second shift" in THE SECOND SHIIT, supra note 
183, at 6. 
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necessarily seiVe women's interests. 'i')l Although these women 
may have additional access to some economic resources as a 
result of holding a paying job, that access comes at the great cost 
of additional anxiety, stress, and exhaustion, 4ffi problems which 
not only impair the quality of life but which also pose significant 
health risks. 
The current social reality, in which women do the majority of 
the family care even when they also have paying jobs and in which 
those jobs typically offer limited economic rewards, indicates that 
policies designed to increase women's labor-participation rates 
burden women substantially without providing sufficient 
offsetting economic rewards. Feminists emphasizing these 
arguments assert that given these social and cultural constraints, 
perhaps the best means to empower women would be to assign 
greater value to the domestic functions that women typically carry 
out rather than to push women into the labor force. 400 
'i')l &eStaudt, supra note 43, at 1573; Law, supra note 322, at 1782 (noting that formal 
equality, formal access to the work force would not yield substantive equality in a world in 
which women do most of the housework). 
468 See Staudt, supra note 43, at 1581 ("Studies indicate that women who perform these 
dual roles in the market and in the home sleep less, enjoy less leisure, and work far longer 
hours than the average man.") (footnote omitted); Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and 
Temperament in Modem Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 
ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 1097 (1995) (noting that a mother's labor force participation often 
induces unwanted stress and undesired Changes in family life). 
469 See Christine A Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1297 
(1987) (noting that "if women currently tend to assume primary responsibility for 
childrearing, we should ... figure out how to assure that equal resources, status, and access 
to social decision-making flow to those women (and few men) who engage in this socially 
female behavior"); Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 85 (declining to presume that increased 
labor participation would best serve women's interests, but arguing instead that housework 
and child care should be valued more highly and treated within legal systems as creating 
economic value); Staudt, supra note 43, at 1617. But see McCaffery, Fresh Look, supra note 
13, at 1051-52 (arguing that women who choose traditional roles may believe they are 
serving their own best interests but are wrong in light of the economic and emotional 
devastation they would suffer upon divorce or widowhood); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: 
Selfless Women in tM Refublic of Owice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1607-08, 1611-12 (1991) 
(asserting that women s decisions to remain at home and to undertake nurturing 
responsi&ilities are not free choices because society substantially restricts the range of 
options for women, imposing caretaking roles on women rather than on men); Williams, 
supra note 399, at 828-32 (noting that society is structured to provide women with 
unacceptable choices); Law, supra note 322, at 1774. 
Professor Staudt describes the various strains of feminist thought which incorporate the 
approach that valuing caretaking and nurturing more highly would benefit women. See 
Staudt, supra note 43, at 1581~5 & nn.47-57. The literature she describes mirrors the 
conflict over whether women are better off staying at home or entering the paid work force 
using biological, economic, and/or psychological explanations. The biological view 
generally asserts that women are biologically more suited than men to care and nurture. 
See generally Browne, supra note 468. Some feminists, therefore, argue that perhaps women 
would be most readily empowered if law and society enabled them to fulfill these roles 
without exacting social or economic costs. See Becker, supra note 362. Cf Robin L. West, 
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Accordingly, many feminists posit that policies affirmatively 
encouraging significant additional work force participation 
would not serve women's interests. On the contrary, such policies 
would encourage women to act like men and would devalue 
women's traditional roles further. m Policies designed to value 
caretaking and nurturing adequately would be more effective in 
serving women's interests. To this end, some feminists have 
argued that women's domestic contributions to family life should 
The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 
!I Wis. WoMEN's LJ. 81, 81-82 ( 1987) (describing radical feminism which posits differences 
between the sexes, differences society ignores, thereby banning women). Caretaking roles 
deserve more value than is currently assigned to them, these feminists argue. These 
feminists could conceivably argue against policies designed to encourage women's labor 
force participation, but would opt, instead, for society to reward caretakers financially. 
The economic or structural explanation of the conflict between staying at home and 
working in the market is that economic forces relegate women to household pursuits by 
making the market relatively unattractive. See Patricia Gerald Bourne &. Norma Juliet 
Wikler, Commitment and the CuUural Mandate: Women in Medicine, in WoMEN AND Wmuc 
PROBLEMS AND PI!RSPECfiVJ!S 111-121 (Rachel Kahn-Hut et al. eds., 1982); Martha Albertson 
Fineman, Preface to MOTHERS IN LAw: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF 
MOTHERHOOD at x-xii (Martha Albertson Fineman &. Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); Schultz, 
supra note 462, at 1 '799-815. For example, wage discrimination and relegation of women to 
positions with litde opponunity for adVancement limit women's success in the market and 
make the decision to assume the traditional roles of homemaker and caretaker easier. See 
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Impact of Hierarchical Structures on the Work &havior of Women 
and Men, in WOMEN AND WoRK: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECfiVJ!S 2!14-47 (Rachel Kahn-Hut et al. 
eds., 1982). An atmosphere of harassment, whether overt or subtle, would also tend to 
chill women's desires for employment and would make the role of homemaker that much 
more attractive. This strain of feminist thought generally assumes that women would be 
better off if they were able to participate in the work force freely but that their choices to do 
so are constrained by both econom1c and organizational factors that make paid labor less 
desirable. 
A third school of thought within feminist literature asserts that psychological differences 
between men and women may contribute to separate gender roles. Feminists in this group 
argue that psychological differences, whether biological or socially constructed, lead 
women towards connection, caring, and responsibility, and lead men towards individual 
autonomy, competition, and a rule-bound orientation. See CHODOROW, supra note 219; 
CAROL GIWGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PS\OfOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT 2 
(1982); Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1184-86 (1992); Nel Noddings, Ethics from the 
Standpoint of Women, in THI!ORI!TICAL PI!RSPECTIVJ!S ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 160, 166-71 
(DebOrah L. Rhode ed, 1990). In general, feminists subscribing to this school of thought 
argue that the traits of connection, interdependence, and care have historically been 
undervalued because they do not fit within the psychological framework endemic to men. 
These feminists would generally argue that these feminine values, which lead naturally to 
women taking roles involving interconnection such as childrearing rather than those in the 
working world that evolved around men's traits, ought to be rewarded and valued much 
more than they are currently. Consequently, the roles women may choose naturally as a 
result of psychological predispositions ought to be recognized and valued more highly by 
society. Presumably the ethic of care would heighten the perceived value of women who 
choose to stay at home with their families, but it would also infiltrate the public world as 
other women choose the work force and would allow for a feminization of all areas of life. 
m See Staudt, supra note 4!1, at 1617 (arguing that accepting the "male norm of 
achievement" devalues what women do); Law, supra note !122, at 1772. 
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be compensated financially. 471 
Other feminists counter that proposals to pay women for 
housework and caring for their children are politically 
impossible, if not economically unfeasible, and that society is 
unlikely to value women's domestic contributions 
appropriately. 472 They assert that women's economic and social 
status . will not improve until women gain greater access to 
economic resources through paid work. In fact, valuing women's 
nurturing capacities more highly could unintentionally result in 
the perpetuation of socially oppressive roles for both men and 
women.m In response to the problem of women's 
disproportionate home responsibilities and the double-shift 
phenomenon, these feminists assert that women should be 
pushed into the work force but not on the same terms as men. 474 
Rather the work force should be restructured to offer more 
alternatives including shorter working hours, viable part-time 
471 See MAirrHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 161-66 (1995); NANCYFOLBRE, WHO PAYS FOR THE KIDS?: 
GENDER AND THE STRUC11.JRES OF CONSTRAINT 123 (1994); OKIN, ropra note 249, at 181-82 
(arguing that the state should intervene to require spouses to divide their wages equally so 
that unpaid labor is compensated as much as paid labor); Alstott, ropra note 30, at 2007; 
Littleton, supra note 469, at 1301, 1329-30 (asserting that the government should {lay 
mothers the way it pays soldiers); Silbaugh, supra note 43, at 67.71 (arguing that femimsts 
should encourage society to value the productive nature of women's labor both in the 
home and in the market and that society should pay women for housework by providing 
access to social welfare benefits such as social security for their contributions to domestic 
life); Staudt, supra note 43, at 1573-74, 1617. But see Browne, supra note 468, at 980.81 
(noting that if women are biologically more nurturing than men, then "it is not obvious that 
social policy should be oriented toward ensuring that economic outcomes [for men and 
women] are nonetheless equivalent"). 
472 See Law, ropra note 322, at 1771 (noting that society undervalues nurturin~, in part, 
because it views caregiving as being inextricably intertwined with seJf.sacrifice); id. at 1776 
(noting that nurturing has been "devalued by being removed from the market and assigned 
to people removed from the market"). 
m See McClain, ropra note 469, at 1198 (warning that "advocating an ethic [of care] ... 
may have the unintended effect of creating or perpetuating socially oppressive expectations 
of both women and men and that [doing so] may validate the already unequal and deeply 
gendered division of labor for caretaking"). But see DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: 
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 134 (1989) (noting that many women do not view caring for 
their children as oppressive); Jennifer Roback, Beyond Equality, 82 GEo. LJ. 121, 129 (1993) 
(same); Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IowA L. REV. 95, 97 {1993) (same); 
Staudt, supra note 43, at 1573 (same). 
474 SeeFINEMAN, ropranote 323, at 8-9, 20.21 (distinguishing equality of treatment from 
equality of result when individuals are not similarly situated). Cf FINEMAN, supra note 323, 
at 29 (noting in the context of property division rules that govern in divorce proceedings 
that an over-adherence to the concept of equality has subverted the development of 
substantively fair rules); Pateman, supra note 164, at 257-58. 
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employment, and more flexible schedules.475 To avoid the 
mommy-track syndrome in which those positions are held only by 
women and are consequently underpaid,476 some feminists argue 
further that all employment should be restructured to 
acknowledge both parents' domestic commitments.477 Many 
feminists assert that a restructuring of workplace expectations 
would benefit both men and women by enabling both spouses to 
spend more time with their children. 478 
The question of whether a policy serves women's interests 
presupposes that all women have the same needs, that women are 
monolithic. A policy that encourages women's work force 
participation may advance the interests of some women, but do 
little for women without access to desirable positions, that is, 
women of lower socioeconomic classes. A policy pushing women 
into the work force may even harm some women, those with 
significant household responsibilities. 479 Even if an identifiable 
"best" policy exists for women overall, such a policy may not 
coincide with the best interests of individual women or of certain 
identifiable groups of women.48> Any adequate policy analysis 
475 See McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, supra note 13, at 665 (criticizing current 
employment options for lacking flexibility); Dowd, supra note 164, at 450. 
476 See, e.g., Susan Vogel, The Perils of Part Time: For Many Women Lawyers, the Panacea 
ofthe '80s Has Become the Albatross ofthe '90s, CAL. LAw., Apr.1996, at 37. See also supra note 
252. 
477 See Dowd, supra note 164, at 43S.56; Finley, Transcending Equality Theory, supra note 
7; Frug, supra note 249, at 61, 66; Carrie Menkei·Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the 
Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 
289, 304-12 (1989); Williams, supra note 469. They argue that the workplace evolved around 
the "ideal worker," a man who typically devoted all his energy to work and who needed little 
time for family responsibilities because he typically had a wife who took care of such 
responsibilities. Because employers could historically expect full·time commitment, jobs 
evolved to require full·time workers. They did not serve the needs of workers with 
significant outside responsibilities. See ScHwARTZ, supra note 252, at 30()..()2 (arguing that 
employers unfairly treat the male employee as the norm). 
478 q. OKIN, supra note 249, at 181-82 (arguing that the government should require 
spouses to share equally the responsibilities for both paid and unpaid labor); Dowd, supra 
note 164, at 132 & n.I77 (arguing that the law should require husbands to assume equal 
responsibility for a family's domestic obligations to lessen women's double shifts); Ann C. 
Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. LJ. 375, 441 & n.341 (1981) (same) . 
.rl9 See Alstott, supra note 30, at 2024, 2032 (arguing that a single tax policy cannot 
address the needs of all women). 
48> Professor Cain makes the point that there is no such thing as an "essential woman." 
Patricia A Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the JOsle of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. 
Soc. PoL'Y & L 43, 4~5 (1994). See also Twila L. Peny, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and 
D~dency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. LJ. 2481, 2482 (1994) (noting generally that "all 
too often, feminist analysis is based on the assumption that all women are white and middle 
or upper-middle class. As a result, it is argued, feminist theory is largely irrelevant to the 
lives of poor women and, in particular, poor women of color.") (footnote omitted); 
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should consider the impact of reform upon the variety of women 
who are intended to benefit under that reform. The effect of 
reform by race, by class, and by other groupings of individuals 
should be identified and evaluated. 
A more complete discussion of whether women's interests are 
served through policies designed to increase their labor force 
participation is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, 
before policies are adopted which affirmatively push women into 
the labor force, a thorough analysis of this issue should be 
undertaken. I conclude that ridding the Code of bias against 
women is appropriate. At a minimum, good tax policy would 
require abandoning the unfair bias symbolized through the 
Amesian tax system hypothetical. Therefore, the disincentives 
against women undertaking paid labor should be eradicated from 
the Internal Revenue Code. However, because a policy 
affirmatively subsidizing women's work force participation may 
counteract the interests of many women, it is also my tentative 
conclusion that such far-reaching reform would be inappropriate 
until further analysis demonstrates that an affirmative subsidy of 
women's paid labor would serve women's and society's interests. 
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginaliz.ing the lntersectiun of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscriminatiun Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139, 139 (arguing that feminist theory has generally ignored the unique 
combination of race and gender issues that African-American women face); Angela P. 
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L REV. 581, 585 (1990) 
(criticizing Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West for advocating "gender essentialism," the 
notion that an essential-woman experience can be described independently of race, class, 
and sexual orientation). 
